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THESIS ABSTRACT 
This thesis elaborates upon Charles Baudelaire and T. S. Eliot's poetic 
negotiation of the erosion of the essentialist cognitive and moral foundations that 
hypothetically monitor human praxis and cement a stable subjectivity on the basis 
of the human subjects' co-inhering in a common horizon of understanding. I 
contend that Baudelaire's work consciously belaboured the collapse of vaulting 
cognitive frameworks and testimonial accountability in a way that reveals both the 
historical and trans-historical dimensions of the non-integratability of experience 
within a modem economy of existence. His work eschews the trappings of both 
aestheticism (history being one of its explicit and pervasive concerns) and 
historicism, since it reveals parameters of the reification of organic experience 
that are intrinsic to language and specific to the mnemonic abridgement of the 
subject's experiential trajectory. Moreover, Baudelaire's poetry compels the 
critique of the aesthetic abstraction from the social being of man, and solicits 
scepticism vis-a-vis straight historicism's teleological infrastructures and 
collateral crypto-transcendentalist angles. The examined poetry exposes the inner 
complicity of the two perspectives in question latent beneath their surface mutual 
closure. 
I examine T. S. Eliot's work in order to address the anti-essentialist motifs 
of his poetry in counterpoint to his literary criticism, and reveal the dialectic of 
cultural determinism (mostly materialising in the latter) and radical impersonality 
that resumes modernity's aporetic necessity to deploy egological categories within 
an agenda that has invalidated any notion of essence fundaments sustaining 
human experience. His poetry's homeopathic re-enactment of the experiential 
fragmentation that it thematically laments constitutes the privileged terrain 
whereupon essentialist construals of human subjectivity and history can be 
revealed to be inherently ideological. 
I have throughout drawn on Walter Benjamin's understanding of allegory 
and memory, along with Paul de Man's enhancement of the antagonism of the 
material and transcendental axes endemic in language and cognitive anchoring. 
This thesis explores the problematisation of essentialist configurations of 
subjectivity and history in the poetry of the archetypal poet of modernity, and the 
mutations they submitted to when they were inscribed within an aesthetic and 
political agenda that was far more reluctant to relinquish egological paradigms of 
communication and subjectivity. The underlying concern has been to elucidate 
Baudelaire's 'inexhaustible wealth of responsiveness vis-a-vis the collapse of 
organic experience, and his resistance to both historicist and reductively aesthetic 
appropriations. This thesis has aimed to analyse his treatment of experiential 
disintegration as an effect of historical juncture along with his welcoming address 
of cognitive and experiential reification as the outcome of the differential and 
semiotic character of language and memory. 
INTRODUCTION 
PREMISES AND METHODOLOGY: ESSENTIALISM, HISTORY, 
SUBJECTIVITY 
... the bases for historical know ledge are not 
empirical facts but written texts, even if these 
texts masquerade in the guise of wars and 
revolutions. 
De Man, Blindness and Insight 
The aim of this dissertation is to question essentialist construals of 
cognition and analogical representation of experience vis-a-vis the poetry of 
Charles Baudelaire and T. S. Eliot. The thematic and rhetorical fibre of their 
work will be analysed with the aim to reveal its resistance to critically sanctioned 
adequations of origin and prescribed telos, linguistic performance and cognitively 
owned experience, and, most of all, the trappings of aestheticism and historicism. 
The poetry of Baudelaire and Eliot has been chosen on account of its 
inexhaustibly anti-essentialist potential and as a paradigm of resistance to the 
above adequations. The diagnostic protocols that sustain the argumentative 
framework interrogate the conception of literary modernity as an event that can be 
affixed a historical index. One of the undergirding caveats throughout is that 
modernist poetry enhances what has potentially lain dormant within "pre-modern" 
paradigms as language's intrinsic antagonism of axes. Historicism-oriented 
criticism has fallaciously understood the rhetorical dimension inherent in 
modernist poetry to be referable to, and exhausted within, empirically verifiable 
realities susceptible to periodisation. This empiricist verification has strategically 
weakened the signification and social potential of the targeted works by assigning 
them the status of a finished, if not inherently abortive, project. Any negotiation 
of modernist literarity, accordingly, cannot but play out the collision of the two 
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spheres, the rhetorical and historical, while simultaneously being. challenged to 
address the containment of literary modernity within a genetic and horizontal 
historical vista. I aim to polarise the tenacity of this asymmetrical interlocking. 
There has been a massive and multi-faceted investment in sanctioning the mutual 
penetration of the two realms on the basis of a putative co-sharing in essence. The 
intention is to show the reductive and self-justificatory character of this logic 
which, typically, fails to accede to the contingent dimension of its own veracity in 
terms other than subliminal. Its correlative aesthetics of immanent metaphoricity 
and symbolisation concerning both language and reality data are invalidated by 
Eliot and Baudelaire's work, as I will argue further on. 
The examined poetry exemplifies the resistance to the conjuring of 
temporality as difference counterpointed to egological consciousness and as 
difference with self. Instead, The Waste Land shapes experience and the 
temporal realm so that the self-identity of its age, of any age, is exposed as 
internally fissured, divided, subject to non-sublimatable finitude. Baudelaire's 
Tableaux parisiens stake their self-understanding on categories of urban 
modernity sanctioned by his contemporary collective imaginary and imposed by 
the specific historical conjuncture. Yet, the crisis-oriented reason that infuses 
them exceeds their chronological containment. Baudelaire's poetic enterprise 
leverages the unseating of essentialism and its correlative historicist affidavits. In 
Derrida's words, "this self-difference, this difference to self [a soil, and not simply 
with self, makes life hard if not impossible for historical science. But inversely, 
would there be any history, would anything ever happen, without this principle of 
disturbance? Would there be any event without this disturbance of the 
2 
principality?"· The examined poetry solicits the understanding of history and 
experience in terms that eschew the cognitive and semantic comfort of 
phenomenalism and analogical representation. Within its textual space, history 
and subjectivity shape up in a differential, diacritical mode. The French poet's 
work countenances experiences that resist assimilation within over-arching 
conceptual and moral frameworks. It is sceptical towards the capacity of language 
to rescue experience, or serve as a testimonial corroboration of it in the interest of 
ontologising historical and subjective self-transparency. In distinction to the 
universality of Aujhebung, Baudelaire and Eliot's work does not relate to reality as 
a predicate of immutable essences but, on the contrary, interrogates the ontology 
of genetic grounding vis-a-vis human subjectivity and historical necessity. 
Baudelaire and Eliot exhibit a sobering awareness of the holistic 
proclivities of history. They belong in a group of modernist authors who 
poetically registered their unease with cumulative and restorative configurations 
of experience and history. The former's "memoire du present,,2 names the 
fallaciousness of horizontal history, of any genetic stringing out of witnessed 
experience. As Paul de Man writes, the literary history whose taking place as an 
actual sequence in time is but a metaphor "making a sequence out of what occurs 
in fact as a synchronic juxtaposition [of the time-free immediacy of (writing) 
See Jacques Derrida, "To Do Justice to Freud," in Resistances of Psychoanalysis, trans. 
Peggy Kamuf, Pascale-Anne Brault, Michael Naas (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 108. 
2 The following edition will be used throughout: Charles Baudelaire, Oeuvres completes, 
ed. Claude Pichois, 2 vols. (Paris: Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1975). Hereafter abbreviated as OC 
and cited parenthetically whenever necessary. The following will be used alongside whenever the 
translations are not mine: Charles Baudelaire, The Complete Verse, trans. aIld ed. Francis Scarfe, 2 
vols. (London: Anvil Press, 1986). Hereafter abbreviated as CV. For "memoire du present" and 
"representation du present" see "Le peintre de la vie moderne," OC II: 684; translated as ''The 
Painter on Modern Life," in Selected Writings on Art and Artists, trans. P. E. Charvet (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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experience and the return to a temporal dialectic]" can serve as a paradigm for 
history in general. The mutual illumination of the two spheres emanates from the 
fact that "man himself, like literature, can be defined as an entity capable of 
putting his own mode of being into question. ,,3 
I have subtly drawn on Jacques LaCan'S~!f,~XJ;s~~~~:~~aul de 
Man's theory of rhetoric since they bear down upon all endeavours to assign man 
a nature and a concomitant concept that will exhaust his significations within 
essentialist demarcations. They both countenance the non-sublimatable finitude 
undergirding human affairs.4 It is also their scepticism towards the analogical 
foundations of most representational modes that integrates them smoothly to this 
project.S The examined texts endorse the potential of language to disrupt the 
rapport of phenomena with cognition transpiring through the arbitration of 
analogi sm. De Man's theory of rhetoric is particularly apt to help shed light upon 
poetic discourses that are inimical to the edging of the linguistic body to a 
3 De Man, "Literary History and Literary Modernity," in Blindness and Insight: Essays in 
the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1983), 163-5. 
4 See John Forrester, Seductions of Psychoanalysis: Freud, Lacan and Derrida 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 296, apropos of Lacan's work: "[It] directly 
addresses the question of the possibility of representation --whether of conflict, of desire, or of 
signification -- by expecting it precisely in that most contradictory of places, the unconscious." 
Forrester condenses Michel Foucault's positive valorisation of psychoanalysis in the final pages 
(especially 373-376) of Les mots et les choseslThe Order of Things, trans. unknown (London and 
New York: TavistockIRoutledge, 1989). Foucault's stance will gradually inflect to overt criticism 
culminating in the History of Sexuality Vol. I, An Introduction (London: Penguin, 1990). See 
rarticularly p.159 passim. 
, The version of psychoanalysis upon which I have cautiously drawn bears the traits of a 
non-anthropological understanding. As will become clearer I do not endorse analysis in toto as a 
discourse that zeroes in on the hypothetical fundaments conditioning human behaviour. The 
aspects of it that are relevant to my work are summarised in Foucault, The Order of Things, 374. 
Non-anthropological psychoanalysis "moves towards the moment ... at which the contents of 
consciousness articulate themselves, or rather stand gaping, upon man's finitude. This means that, 
unlike the human sciences, which, even while turning back towards the unconscious, always 
remain within the space of the representable, psychoanalysis advances and leaps over 
representation, overflows it on the side of finitude." Again, analysis' susceptibility to essentialist 
appropriations is always borne in mind. 
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cognition server via analogical representation.6 Les Fleurs du mal and The Waste 
Land complicate the alignment of cognition and phenomenalism by, among other 
strategies, bringing the non-assimilable materiality of the letter into sharp relief. 
Baudelaire inscribes this materiality on the oversexed yet unyielding body and the 
non-reciprocating, non-auratic gaze. Discursive materiality vis-a-vis the 
consolidation of reference and cognition constitutes a perpetual principle of 
disturbance which Eliot's essays attempted to cover up. I will explain how his 
axiomatic criticism was erected in distinction to his poetic language and the way 
his postural inscription within a commonality of concerns between him and the 
French modernists (Baudelaire especially) concealed his strategic smoothing over 
of dispersed subjectivity into dominant cultural norms and moral hegemony. I will 
read in the tense counterpoint of his criticism and poetry the dialectic of blindness 
and insight that is endemic in large segments of modernist poetry that address the 
impossibility of binding reference to cognition in essentialist terms, and the 
corresponding theory that tries to account for it. 
The textual subjects' insecurity concerning the testimonial processing of 
reality will be argued to be prototypical of another abortive accession, the one to 
macro-history. The Baudelairean subjects' difficulty in acceding to the veracity of 
their personal histories has been treated as a micro-scale model for the 
impossibility of appropriating experiential contents and making them cohere with 
vaulting explanatory, historical arch-structures. A version of memory that is 
6 Baudelaire has consistently attracted de Man's attention. See among others, 
"Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric," in The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984), 239-262; "The Rhetoric of Temporality," in Interpretation: 
Theory and Prqctice, ed. Charles Singleton (Baltimore: Ionhs Hopkins University Press, 1969), 
173-209; "Literary History and Literary Modernity," and "Lyric and Modernity," in Blindness and 
Insight, 142-65 .and 166-86 respectively; "Allegory and Irony in Baudelaire," in Romanticism and 
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based on diacritical difference instead of the intui.tive or empathetic re~possession 
of experiential nuclei will be counterpointed to the mechanism whereby accession 
to history is clogged up. Baudelaire cannot have been aware of the conflict of the 
material and transcendental dimensions of (poetic) language in the terms with 
which we can address it now. However, his poetry constitutes the privileged 
terrain where we recognise this conflict since it incorporated and explicitly 
addressed the antagonism of aestheticism and historicism, and revealed through 
recourse to lyrical allegory the material/sensuous recalcitrance of language to 
conceptual and hermeneutic appropriations. Also, Baudelaire's overt engagement 
with the concept of modernity points to a relatively conscious awareness on his 
side of the stakes involved.7 
I have also deployed notions deriving from Michel Foucault's work since I 
believe that the examined poetry questions the inundation of existence with 
essence that is supposed to monitor history's trajectories, a theme that he has 
worked through extensively.8 The transcendental constitution that Foucault 
critically addresses has been poetically elaborated by Baudelaire and Eliot in a 
fashion one cannot write off to a modernist centrifugation that would ultimately 
refine categories of subjectivity and organic history. The examined poetry, 
especially The Waste Land, is deeply aporetic. It underscores the aporia befalling 
all attempts at erecting transcendent meaning and securing its concomitant 
egological meta-awareness setting off from empirical confrontations of reality. 
Contemporary Criticism: the Gauss Seminar and Otner Papers, ed. E S. Burt, Kevin Newmark, 
Andrzej Warminski (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 101-19. 
7 See, indicatively, Baudelaire, "The Painter on Modem Life," 390-435; esp. 390-409. 
8 The safest denominator one can abstract from his work is his refusal to think in terms of 
essence fundaments, whether in the field of history, politics or sexuality. For his complication of 
6 
Derrida has formulated the historicist paradox .succinctly: "The transcendental 
condition of a series is also, paradoxically, a part of that series, creating aporias 
for the constitution of any set or whole, particularly, of any historical 
configuration (age, episteme, paradigm, themata, epoch, and so on). ,,9 The poetry 
corroborates the hypothesis that history can no longer be experienced as the 
overarching synthesising nexus of metaphorisable and mutually reverberating 
events, and invites us "to understand the original [the supposedly witnessable 
event] from the perspective of the translation [language, memory]."lO The 
substructure intertwining history and language admits of neither mimesis nor 
empathy. 
Chapters one to eight address the particular modes that sexuality, 
subjectivity, essence, and certain mnemonic fixations assume in the service of a 
depletion of subjectivity and essentiality in Baudelaire's poetry, and its 
commensurate placement of historicist perspectives in an unsettling abeyance. It 
will be argued that Baudelaire's centrality as the Modernist poet par excellence 
can be attributed not only to his responding to the political and aesthetic 
upheavals of the 19th century. More significantly, Baudelaire will be seen to 
embody an awareness of the tropological underpinnings of reason and the 
mnemonic upheaval of linear construals of historical experience. This awareness 
exposes the parasitism of all transcendentalisms upon language and finitude. It 
exceeds, and controverts, the conjunctural moorings of various historicisms since 
the imbrication of subject and history see, indicatively, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. 
Alan Sheridan Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 1989),202-3. 
9 Jacques Derrida, "To Do Justice to Freud," in Resistances of Psychoanalysis, 79. 
10 Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1986), 82. . 
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it cuts deep into what irreducibly undergirds the~. His insights will be related to 
a particular mode of remembering that organises his conceptual field, and an 
idiosyncratic way of seeing that subtends the scopic realm of his work. The 
distinction between Erfahrung (experience and remembrance whose value 
emanates from a commonality of concerns within a society bound up by tradition) 
and Erlebnis (memory dissociated from vaulting cognitive and moral frameworks) 
is crucial to my understanding of the poetry. Walter Benjamin's belabouring of 
the conceptual and historical parameters of remembrance and experience will be a 
constant throughout. It is through these mnemonic and specular grids that a 
fragile and non-egological subjectivity remains visible in the case of the 
emblematically modem Baudelairean subjects. My ultimate thesis in the interest 
of which I have deployed and qualified the above notions is that Baudelaire's 
oeuvre exhibits a dual resistance to both historicist and aestheticist appropriations 
and constitutes the privileged terrain whereupon the internal complicity of these 
apparently antithetical zones can be exposed. This complicity derives from the 
subtle imbrication of essentialist construals of human experience and history into 
both historicist agendas and aestheticist projects. The former fail to address the 
necessarily extra-historical perspective from which they supervise human praxis 
whereas the latter idealise language as the ultimate reservoir of cognitive potential 
in an attempt to stave off the commodification of the work of art under market 
conditions. I argue that Baudelaire's poetry combines awareness of its historical 
contingency with an unsettling insight into the trans-historical dimensions of 
testimonial unaccountability and withering of experience. 
8 
" 
Chapter One engages Walter Benjamin'~ understanding of allegory. I 
explain its relevance to approaching Baudelaire's work and the way I will be 
using it throughout. Chapter Two addresses Baudelaire's voiding of naturality 
within sexuality, and argues for comprehending the latter in the context of a 
cleavage between perception and cognition. The third chapter embeds the poetry's 
delineation of subjectivity within a selective genealogy of concerns and argues for 
its understanding within the broader horizon enabled by the German Romantics' 
notion of the Work in Progress and their grasp of subjectivity as the discursive 
space wherein poetic and/or philosophical discourse can materialise. Baudelaire's 
underlying suspiciousness of creative geniality shows through the dialogical, 
contractual, and inter-textual economy of his poetry. I I The genealogical links I 
have traced have been enabled by the revisionist labour of Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, among others. 12 They do not reflect any conscious 
adoption of strategies or themes on the part of Baudelaire, but simply the 
reverberation of his concerns within a compatible echoing chamber. The 
presuppositions sustaining the "new" reading that the above authors propose are 
equally, if not more, important to the articulation of my broader argumentative 
framework. Chapter Four "dialogically" engages, and then cautiously departs 
from, Walter Benjamin's views on memory in order to put the accent on the 
destructive way in which memory impacts on linear embedments of experience. I 
address the issue of Baudelairean correspondences and explain how they are 
., 
For the dialogical, intersubjective and contractual character of Baudelaire's poetry see 
Barbara Blood, Baudelaire and the Aesthetics of Bad Faith (California: Stanford University Press, 
1997), 8. On intertextuality in Baudelaire see Barbara Johnson, "'Les Fleurs du mal arme': Some 
Reflections on Intertextuality," in Lyric Poetry Beyond New Criticism, ed. Chavina Hosek and 
Patricia Parker (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985),264-80. 




internally fissured by temporality. This latter causes the retrieval of past plenitude 
to abort. One of the underlying premises of this dissertation is that Baudelairean 
memory marks a rupture with genetic conceptions of anamnesis as retrieval of 
experiential contents and restitution of essences. Baudelairean memory is then 
treated in counterpoint to Hegelian Gediichtnis as read by Paul de Man, that is, a 
memory that obeys the dictates of mechanical inscription away from any notion of 
a reproducible ideality of content. Chapter Five analyses Baudelaire's "Le 
Cygne," a poem that condenses most of the problematics that his poetry hosts. 
From the delirious unhinging of the mnemonic trajectory from any sense-
stabilising conceptual frameworks to the allegorical counter-image of history as 
the trauma-infused terrain where understanding and remembering are in a position 
of mutual closure, the resistance of memory and experience to the defensive 
horizontal assimilation of perceived and recollected scenes is put into relief. The 
text leverages the semantic unresolve that inheres in any endeavour to append 
experience to a genetically bound history. The sixth chapter enhances the 
ruination of experience the poetry responds to by, initially, focusing on the 
cleavage between perception and cognition that a poem such as "Les Sept 
Vieillards" negotiates. The Baudelairean subjects operate in the grip of a literal 
.memory whose targets cannot be imbued with any symbolic or associative 
potential whatsoever. As such, they expose the internal, and primarily temporal, 
rift separating experience from the distilment of its meaning. This rift renders the 
closure of essence and cognition impossible. I analyse "Les Sept Vieillar~s" with 
the aim to clarify the nature of this cleavage. I then offer my understanding of 
Baudelaire's urban sublime in the qualifying context of a material, non-cognitive, 
10 
non-auratic gaze which I nuance in counterpoint to the one that Paul de Man read 
within the Kantian sublime. Chapter Seven debates the historical and 
transhistorical dimensions of Baudelaire's poetry and rounds off assumptions that 
were topically tested in the previous sections. The poetry's openness to history 
was accompanied by an aesthetic alertness that transcended the configuration of 
the human dimension within historical experience in terms of macr~­
consciousness cumulatively augmenting its understanding and recognition of 
itself. Chapter Eight recapitulates Baudelaire's dual resistance to aestheticism and 
historicism. I argue for the constructive character of Baudelairean melancholia 
and counter the notion that allegorical melancholy undercuts the notional 
infrastructures of any solidaristic politics of recollection that aims to redress past 
injustice by challenging their viability. Baudelaire's melancholy allegories call for 
the re-negotiation of the conceptual categories with which we engage praxis, 
history, and subjectivity. The underlying tenet throughout is that Baudelaire's 
poetry makes a point of failing to produce the concept of cognitive wholeness that 
it promises and stages this failure as a binding condition. In its non-reversible 
dispersal of sexual identity, subjectivity and harmony of consciousness and 
reality, it voids all hermeneutic efforts accruing upon the homology between 
. consciousness and factual givens. Chapter Nine sets off by zero¢ing in on the 
way T. S. Eliot twisted inherited configurations of dispersed subjectivity into his 
notion_of impersonality, and his implantation of a pre-modern aesthetic of ocular 
plenitude and reality-transparent signification within a literary the9ry that 
purported to account for modern discursivity and a poetic practice that was hailed 
as a modern arch-paradigm. His configuration of subjectivity and notion of 
11 
..... , 
allegory and ocular-versus-auditory imagination are examined in distinction to 
Baudelaire and Benjamin's' construals of allegory and imagery. I discern within 
"The Hollow Men" the treatment of an inherently abortive attempt to affirm a 
history-transcending ocular and experiential plenitude. Then I dissect Eliot's 
demand that language be transparent to reality givens and counterpoint it to the 
centrifugal inclinations of his poetry that undercut the above dependency. In 
Chapter Ten I read "Prufrock" within a Lacanian framework of concerns, and 
counter more phenomenological accounts of the text. I see the text as exposing 
the dependency of subjectivity upon a self-undermining self-affection that hankers 
after an unattainable, reality-binding afflatus of sense. Finally, I approach The 
Waste Land intending to enhance what I regard as a homeopathic, mythopoetic 
and self-destructive textual response to what is endured as collapse of history and 
experience. The text recapitulates the tense counterpoint of essence and 
aleatoriness that materialises between the essays and the poetry. It is pervaded by 
mourning over the disintegration of organi~ ; history, yet voices the 
predicament in a mode that replicates the fragmentation to such a degree that no 
mitigation can be effected through the stylistic absorption of its tremors. "The 
Preludes" are seen to subtly engage a notion of unverbalisable experience 
,constituted in the interspace between discursive externalisation and denial. There 
are sporadic references to the Four Quartets, which text, however, has not met 
with a proper analysis. It constitutes the climactic instance of a trajectory whose 
inceptive moment goes back to Ash-Wednesday and bears the traits o~ Eliot's 
steadily increasing engagement with the notion of extra-historical transcendental 
conditioning of human experience and history. Due to the magnitude of the work, 
12 
its full treatment would exceed by far the limits of.this dissertation. Its omission 
does not detract from the consolidation of my argument since the poem constitutes 
the intensification and refineme~t of concerns that were already incorporated in 
the poetry I examine. 13 Besides, the aim is not to contrast Baudelaire and Eliot's 
entire output, but to elucidate the particular inflections that the dissolution of 
subjectivity and essence assumes in their work as well as expose the inner 
complicity of both historicism and aestheticism with essentialist construals of 
history and human praxis through a close reading of selected texts. More space 
has been allocated the French poet because I find his work significantly more 
crucial to the debunking of essentialist models of history and understanding. 
Eliot's perversion of anti-essentialist motifs that he inherited from the French 
modems, and the agonal relation of his poetry to his criticism, are intrinsic to this 
project's theoretical framework in a sense that an either more 
insular/"philological" or a purely comparative approach to his work ~ not. 
Ultimately, my aim has been to enhance what I discern as the poetry's 
integration of the tension-fraught relation of the performative, constative, figural 
and semantic strata binding the textual wholes. I will therefore sustain a critical 
attitude with regard to sanctioned configurations of circular organicity vis-a-vis 
poetic discourse. Nowhere else has the dissolution of essence and its correlative 
disintegration of subjectivity assembled its potentialities and the unsettling 
implications of its meaning as in Baudelaire and Eliot's poetry. It is to their 
13 I am not advocating a logic of preformationism here. A potential continuity or climaxing 
of concerns can only be conferred in retrospect without this conferral necessarily entailing that an 
entelechic infrastructure h~s predetermined the particular character that the discursive output will 
assume. The Four Quartets do not simply resume what lay dormant in the previous poetry in 
embryonic form. Nevertheless, I do not believe that it can make a substantial contribution to the 
hypothesis that this project"puts to the test. 
13 
enrichment of what underlies this dissolution, i.e., an endemic crisis of reason, 
that this project responds. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BENJAMIN'S TRAUERSPIEL, ALLEGORY, HISTORY 
Baroque allegory sees the corpse only 
from the outside. Baudelaire sees it from 
the inside. 
Benjamin, "Central Park" 
Allegorical representation and historical mindfulness 
Walter Benjamin's study on baroque TrauerspieZ1 offers invaluable insight 
into the intricate mechanisms of allegory in the context of an overall discussion 
that debates the divides between Classicism and (German) Romanticism. On the 
basis of this, I will relate his understanding of allegory to the particular 
inflection that Baudelaire gave it and will frame the tensional relation of 
allegory and essence into the broader context of the tropological underpinnings 
of discourse and the rhetorical dimension of (poetic) reason. 
According to Benjamin's study the primary difference between symbolic 
and allegorical representation revolves around the determining agency of 
temporality. In a language that anticipates subsequent theoretical developments 
Benjamin configures temporality in terms that relate it to the temporal cleavage 
between, and irreducible non-commensurability of, the apposite poles that serve 
as the extemallimits of the allegorical trajectory. "The distinction between the 
two modes [between the allegorical and the symbolic mode] is therefore to be 
sought in the momentariness which allegory lacks .... There [in the symbol] we 
Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London 
and New York: Verso, 1977); pages 159-235 ("Allegory and Trauerspiel") are particularly 
relevant to my argument. .. 
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have momentary totality; here we have progression in a series of moments. ,,2 In 
other words, the difference-introducing mobility of time that punctuates the 
allegorical grid comes to defuse the mystical instantaneity of the symbol and its 
centripetal containments. This difference can only have a critical bearing upon 
transcendentalist notions of religious allegory and invalidates their putative 
semantic and moral ~quilibria. 
It is essential to keep in mind, at the same time, that the allegorical 
dimension the way Benjamin understands it does not accord well with a 
conventionally understood dialecticity. Benjamin's description of the German 
baroque allegory emphasises its initial attachment to the mundane/secular world 
and its concentration on historical reality. However, the latter has eventually 
come to assume the form of a frozen, deadened facies hippocratica and be 
metamorphosed into a "petrified, primordial landscape. ,,3 Allegory a la 
Benjamin freezes historical continuity, or, rather, it is the product of a reasoning 
that fails to grasp any essential historical linearity. There is no possibility here 
of affirming a dialectic of consciousness and history with clear demarcations of 
agency and experiential (historical) contents. Characteristically, what the above 
description of history as facies hippocratica deploys is the mechanism of 
prosopopoeia which comes to configure history as a death's head. Benjamin 
uses it in a way that anticipates Paul de Man's construals of this trope in terms 
of a defensive mechanism that integrally monitors its own failure at warding off 
2 . 
Friedrich Creuzer, Symboli~ und Mythologie der alten Volker, besonders der Griechen I ~Leipflig; Darmstadt, 1819),.118; cited in Benjamin, The Origin o/German Tragic Drama, 165. 
Benjamin, The Origin o/German Tragic Drama, 166. 
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finitude.4 Baudelaire extensively uses prosopopoeia and allegory. I will 
connect Paul de Man's understanding of both tropes with Benjamin's 
configuration of the latter (as shown in the Trauerspiel study and the Arcades 
Project) since both approaches offer potentially combinable insights into some 
of the realities thematised in Baudelaire's poetry: the petrification of organic and 
historical life, and the commodification of human interaction. As will become 
evident, however, my deployment of Benjamin's vocabulary is not unqualified. 
One of the premises underlying the Trauerspiel study is that allegory can 
accommodate the fragmentation of linear history and the exacerbation of the 
socio-symbolic codes that are supposed to hold a society together. Equally 
important, the way Benjamin reads the German baroque allegory, and allegory 
in general, implies its capacity to serve as the trope-grid through which the 
poetic elaboration of signification procedures can be effected. Following the 
insights of Eugene Holland, Julia Kristeva, and Walter Benjamin I will enhance 
the thematic space that processes of meaning-production occupy in this poetry 
and the way they underlie the distinctive Baudelairean melancholia. Benjamin 
gave (Baudelaire's) melancholy its indelible historical index. I read in this 
melancholia the friction engendered by the uneasy cohabitation of intra-
historical and supra-historical parameters and their corresponding provisos. The 
supra-historical dimension will be approached, initially, via the intricate 
mechanisms of memory that the poetry depends upon and works through. My 
aim will be to reveal the contradictions that underpin Benjamin's analyses when 
he historicises without accounting adequately for inner laws of development that 
4 
See Paul de Man, "Autobiography as De-facement," in The Rhetoric of Romanticism 
(New York: Columbia University Press), 68-81. 
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language, memory, and literature obey. Primarily though, I will focus on the 
way the itinerary of memory aiming to sediment a sense of self and experience 
in the Baudelairean subject proves to be inherently abortive. The failure in 
question occurs not on account of methodological inconsistencies but because of 
the hollowing out of immanence that subtends, as much as gets instantiated in 
and through, that very trajectory. It will be argued that this voiding is the 
ineluctable effect of the semiotic character of the mnemonic labour. Inevitably, 
the above premise can only antagonise Benjamin's historicist. determinism 
which, however, in its unorthodox inflections, will still serve not only as a 
starting point but as a perpetual point of reference. 
Nietzsche overtly related the viability of historicism to the issue of 
memory and forgetfulness. He saw the former as the correlate of a hypertrophic 
archiving of event-data and their alignment into serial narratives. This storage 
process and the retrieval mechanisms that support it hamper human 
development. It is history understood as entelechic unfolding of spirit that is 
explicitly targeted here. However, as Nietzsche is quick to add, "God's 
vicissitudes on earth" is a risible version of what really constitutes human 
history, that is, the breach with determinism, the open-endedness of human 
conflict.S The contents of historical agon, according to Nietzsche, should not be 
preempted through the imposition of historical meaning in monumental 
historiography and its concomitant memory. They should be the objects of 
perpetual negotiations the same way forgetfulness should infiltrate vigilant 
memory. The capacity to live unhistorically accrues to the ability to forget that 
5 
, See Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 104. 
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is so necessary to the functioning of a healthy organism. "There is a degree of 
sleeplessness, of rumination, of the historical sense, which is harmful and 
ultimately fatal to the living thing, whether this living thing be a man or a people 
or a culture. ,,6 Baudelaire has addressed the need to forget in the midst of a 
hysterical archiving of constitutively elusive or unclaimed experiences. He has 
also linked it to turning one's back on history in order to be able to lead a 
(historical) existence at all. What ensues is not the dwarfing of historical sense 
subtending most mystificatory transcendentalisms but the probing into the very 
enabling conditions of historical understanding. "Le Cygne" engages the virtual 
and episodic memory that accompanies a sense of history perforated by 
simulacral presences on the borderline between phantasm and event. The poetry 
takes the linear storage of experience-turned-souvenir into task and leverages 
instead the possibility of doing justice to a notion of the event "beyond the 
general and the particular, the collective and the private. ,,7 It refuses to dumb 
down history into an aggregate of essence coordinates or wall it off in the face of 
finitude and "communicating singularities".8 All these anxieties permeate it and 
inflect it towards the belabouring of essence-devoid subjectivity and a notion of 
history that is not adversary to Nietzschean aleatoriness and non-sublatable 
difference. They underlie my analyses and serve as an unappeasable reminder 
of the zones that Benjamin's eccentrically historicising enterprise attempted to 
account for . 
6 
7 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, 62. 
See Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (London: i he Athlone Press, 1990), 148. 
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 150. 
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..." 
Diaiecticity, Mediation, Allegory 
The dialectical image is one flashing up momentarily. It is thus, as an 
image flashing up in the now of its recognizability, that the past, in this 
case that of Baudelaire, can be captured. The redemption which can be 
carried out in this way and in no other is always only to be won out of the 
perception of that which is being lost irretrievably. 
Benjamin, "Central Park" 
In Christine Buci-Glucksmann's words, "allegory is anti-dialectical or, to 
use Benjamin's terms, ... it is dialectic at a standstill, frozen, fixed in images.,,9 
Historical/societal mediation is not regarded by Benjamin to be endemic in the 
allegorical matrices, which, I believe, paradoxically renders them proximate to 
symbolic immediacy. Temporality is inherently linked with representation in the 
Origin of Gennan Tragic Drama whereas allegory is pertinent to the extent that it 
serves a broader problematics of the possibility and implications of 
represen tati onali ty. The "decisive category of time"lO is acknowledged 
throughout by Benjamin whereas its introduction into the field of semiotics is 
heralded by him as the "great romantic achievement." However, in this case, as in 
the case of Paul de Man and his treating the temporal dimension as allegory's 
constitutive condition, what is evinced throughout is a configuration that is at 
odds with a chronological, linear, cumulative, or even duree-like chronicity. De 
Ma!l insists on the irreducible anteriority and randomness of the preceding sign 
triggering the allegorical trajectory, whereas Benjamin counterposes Jetztzeit, a 
temporalitx of genuine presentness (and thus radical, non-dialecticised difference) 
as being compatible with allegory. His is a construal that makes sense in the 
9 
Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics 0/ Modernity, trans. Patrick 
~amiller (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 103. 
Benjamin, Origin o/German Tragic Drama, 166. 
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framework of an endangerment of the mnemonic solidarity with the past and 
reflects a crisis-oriented rationale. That this endangerment cannot be confronted 
with a voluntary, linear memory is one of his primary assumptions. The political 
dimension that underlies Benjamin's understanding of allegory and temporality 
mandates the historically adequate remembrance of all those not sanctioned by 
normative historiography, the historically repressed Namenlose' '. It is the latter 
that Benjamin will come to recognise in Baudelaire's characters, in all the 
underprivileged haunting Baudelaire's poetry that have been trampled by the 
progressivist historicism of the ruling classes. Baudelaire's mnemonic alertness 
beneath the surface aestheticism will attract him to the poet. The flash-back 
ruptures of mnemonic continua that poems such as "Le Cygne" exhibit partake of 
the Benjaminian ecstatic destructive-redemptive encounters with past life and 
experience. "To the empty linear time of the cumulative succession of events, 
Benjamin opposes the necessity of a temporal break, an interruption in time 
disclosed by the imaginaries of history." 11 It is the belabouring of equally 
irreversible temporal breaks that I discern in several of Baudelaire's poems (in 
"Le Cygne" for example) and thus deploy Benjamin's insights into the radical 
incommensurability of past and present in a qualified form. Benjamin coupled 
his notion of the monadic present with a demand for, the rehabilitation of the 
victims of past injustice and violence. This way he substantially modified the 
implied disjunctiveness of past and present that can be inferred from the non-
dialectical relation of the events that are infused with the Now-Time. "A 
-., historical materialist cannot do without the notion of a present which is not a 
11 
Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason, 44. 
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...... , 
transition, but in which time stands still and has com~ to a stop. For this -notion 
defines the present in which he himself is writing history.... [H]istorical 
materialism supplies a unique experience with the past." 12 I find the simultaneous 
accommodation of a non-transitory present moment that "blast[s] open the 
continuum of history" and the simultaneous affirmation of a trajectory within 
which the past can be recognised problematic. However, the aporia at the core of 
Benjamin's schema concerns the stunning possibility of unshackling ourselves 
from the illusion of recognising the past 'the way it was' while salvaging a 
modicum of historical memory requisite to future-oriented praxis and to the 
redress of past injustice: "To articulate the past historically does not mean to 
recognise it 'the way it really was' (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as 
it flashes up at a moment of danger.,,13 The construal of historical memory within 
a frame of trauma/danger impacts any notion of a horizontal recapitulation of 
history's contents, and concerns Baudelaire's poetry directly. 14 
Benjamin envisages a condensation of the temporal dimension and a 
concretion of time that emanates from the present. IS That this concretion is one of 
literary modernity's recurrent preoccupations hardly needs emphasising. One of 
the modes in which it has been poetically instantiated is Baudelaire's perforation 
of ideal by spleen. Temporality in the latter is perceived as a threat dissolving the 
12 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illuminations, ed. Hannah 
Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana Press, 1992), 254. 
13 Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 247; emphasis added. 
14 Cf.: "The dialectical image is one flashing up momentarily" (Benjamin, "Central Park," 
49). 
15 See "The Image of Proust," in Illuminations, 206-7: "The eternity which Proust opens to 
view is convoluted time, not boundless time .... Proust has brought off the tremendous feat of 
letting the whole world age by a lifetime in an instant." Also, "Baudelaire's work ... has 
assembled the days of remembrance into a spiritual year" (Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: 




textual characters' present, whereas in the former the defensive correspo~dances 
are mobilised in order to sediment a sense of present in the face of a perpetual 
temporal menace. There is affinity, therefore, between Benjamin's conception of 
a radical presentness that can still accommodate solidarity with the past and 
Baudelaire's enhancement of the singularity of the present, ambivalences and/or 
idiosyncratic differences notwithstanding. In both Benjamin and Baudelaire I 
encounter a present-oriented rationale. Both engage in a critique of dialectical 
linearism and historicist progressivism expressed by means of allegory in the case 
of the poet and through emphasis on allegory's historical susceptibilities in the 
case of the theorist. 16 Both, also, engage models of memory in relation to one's 
capacity to retrieve experiential contents. 
I consider the non-cumulative temporality advocated by Benjamin to be 
anticipative of de Man's temporality of sheer anteriority and randomness -minus 
the messianic dimension, though. The theological parameter in Benjamin is an 
issue that constitutes an agenda of its own, and has been responsible for a constant 
uneasiness over the possible infiltration of Benjamin's critical project by a 
salvational metaphysics. The cathexis on epiphanic moments that usually 
characterises the latter seems to accord disturbingly well with the interrogation of 
linear temporal economies. However, one must refrain from surmising that 
Benjamin's agenda was nothing but the inflection of a certain messianic theology 
to a critical mode admissive of the political dimension and attuned to pressing 
historical exigencies. I can only deposit my concern with regard to the dual 
16 
See Benjamin, "Konvolut J: Baudelaire," in The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland 
and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 337: 
"The correspondence between antiquity and modernity is the sole constructive conception of 
history in Baudelaire. With its rigid armature, it excludes any dialectical conception." 
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nature of Benjamin's rationale here. It would be excessive to attempt the 
containment of this case within the perimeters of the present project especially in 
view of the fact that it complicates the boundaries of the mystical/secular divide 
upon which an interrogation would have to depend. 
Returning to baroque allegory and Benjamin's construals of the temporal 
dimension, and as regards the lack of inter-mediation of part and whole in the case 
of an allegorical arrangement of contents, if, as de Man claims, "in the world of 
allegory, time is the originary constitutive category," then the temporal itinerary 
in question must be non-accretive, non-finalist, and therefore compatible with an 
allegorical concentration on the non-intentional elements of reality, elements not 
reducible to personological agency (and encountered in abundance in Baudelaire's 
poetry).17 Neither Benjamin nor de Man understand allegory with its concomitant 
temporality in terms of a mutuality of communicating contents serially or 
dialectically stringing out that can ultimately be subsumed under an overarching 
concept. Buci-Glucksmann eloquently formulates what she characterises as an 
Umweg [roundabout] methodology underlying Benjamin's project. This 
methodology is congruent with Paul de Man's attack on both historicism and the 
egological certainties infusing all varieties of psychologisms -New Critical or not. 
She writes, 
This Umweg, while absorbing HusserI' s critique of all historicism or 
psychologism and the neo-Kantian rejection of philosophy as a closed 
system of truth, remains no less distinct from the major philosophical 
positions of the epoch. Insofar as the object exists only in a fragmentary 
state as a non-intentional but signifying element, interpretative truth can 
result neither from an intentional historical phenomenology that recaptures 
17 See Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason, 66. She writes: "If all allegory shies away from 
Weltanschauung and focuses micrologic ally on the detail or the fragment -the non-intentional 
elements of reality as opposed to a whole that is always problematic- the philosophical method of 
allegory can only be the indirect one of the Umweg." The fragment in this case is close to 
Benjamin's Leibnizian monads, random yet encapsulating the essence of reality. 
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sedimented primal levels, nor a fortiori from lived experience in the sense 
18 .' 
of Dilthey's Erlebnis. 
Benjamin and de Man's maximisation of the potential of allegory to 
account for the alteration of the modem conceptual horizon helps grasp the 
thematic and rhetorical essentials of Baudelaire's poetry. Moreover, their 
configuration of the trope can take into account both the historical determinants of 
the artistic product and the rhetorical specificities of a poetry that exhibits its dual 
awareness of its conjunctural, historical character and its deployment of it as an 
excuse for the elaboration of intra-linguistic concerns. . History, temporality, 
memory, and awareness of the inner laws of language interweave in poetic works 
that do not hesitate to use historical fa~ades and linear modes of narrative in order 
to elaborate allegorically on language's intricate mechanisms, and contribute to its 
internal historicity. One of the foundational assumptions of this thesis, therefore, 
is that the understanding of one's historical reality and the acknowledgement of 
the autonomy of the discursive domain are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
The former, of course, is not adhered to here in terms of the linear accumulation 
of semantically appropriated and empirically verifiable events. Nor is the latter 
understood in purely aestheticist terms, that is, as a self-referential realm totally 
abstracted from social experience. A historical understanding that fails to account 
for the specificities of language is totally inadequate to' its own referents. One 
cannot quarrel with history as such, but with an understanding of it that reduces it 
18 
Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason, 66. 
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to a compendium of structural determinisms and/or primal intentionalities.19 .. The 
tension between the two conceptual frameworks in question cannot be resolved in 
terms of a dialectical synthesis. Not only is it partially constitutive of their own 
specificity but also the historical subordination of discourse to the pragmatic 
realm of communication and power deployment precludes a less assertive 
affirmation of language's genuine force within poetic modernity. What is of 
primary concern here is that Baudelaire's poetry addresses the mutual 
undermining of language and essence, and legitimates a reading that discerns the 
antagonism between the two spheres' fundaments. One of the platforms upon 
which this address is instantiated is that of a sexuality that is unhinged from any 
essentialist anchoring. 
19 In Baudelaire's poetry egological intentionality is continually put into abeyance. The 
blasting apart of historical and temporal continua that the poetry accommodates in the form of 
flash-back mnemonic interpolations and their shedding a disturbing light upon any conferral of 
significance based on immutable semantic constants, is syntonic with the critical-historical nature 
of Baudelairean imagery. Benjamin's understanding of the truly historical, non-intentional, non-
phenomenological images is particularly relevant: "[T]hey attain to legibility only at a particular 
~ time .... Every present day is determined by the images that are synchronic with it: each 'now' is 
the now of a particular recognizability. In it, truth is charged to the bursting point with time. (This 
point of explosion ... is the death of intentio, which thus coincides with the birth of authentic 
historical time, the time of truth)" (Benjamin, "Konvolut N: On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory 
of Progress," in The Arcades Project, 463). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SEXUAL EXPERIENCE AND THE METAMORPHOSES OF 
PERCEPTIONAL GIVENS: LES EPA YES 
The non-reciprocating gaze 
The sexual act in Baudelaire acquires its particular significance in the 
context of the always-imminent encroachment of asymbolia which is not simply 
the outcome of the collapse of consciousness entailed by the inherent impact of 
the orgasmic moment. I argue that Baudelairean sexuality accommodates a 
dimension of physical materiality that resists its transcendence into the realm 
where drives and/or socio-symbolic imperatives are inscribed. One of the traits 
this materiality translates into is a gaze that does not acknowledge the human 
specificity of the other. The dissolution of the reciprocal gaze that most poems in 
Les Epaves [Flotsam] implicitly negotiate impacts the subject's capacity to have 
his desire recognised and socially mediated. Ocular complementarity implicates 
the eroticised subjects in a specular symmetry of mutually recognisable 
subjectivities. The parties concerned are expected to respond to each other's 
ocular call. In this case, the opposite holds true. The non-reciprocity of the gaze 
is an explicit given of the poetry, and a factor seriously contributive to an overall 
erotic and auratic loss. The textual narrators covet the female body while 
construing it in terms of reification of the organic life within. It is within this 
construal that the rift between perception and cognition materialises. The 
-
narrators' gaze reifies the female other, objectifies her, and aims to act out the 
-.. recognition of self that the staring protagonist seeks while at the same time 
retaining the distance that is requisite to the preservation of aura. The eyes in 
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question have lost the ability to reciprocate a gaze of recognition.1 In Benjamin's 
words, "sexus [has] detached itself from eros.,,2 This loss and detachment, 
however, are not passively accepted. Baudelaire registers the clash of interests 
that underlies a mode of conceiving the other in terms that acknowledge her 
specificity and the obliteration of any trace of individuality turning the female 
presence into a corporeal terrain where imagination can exercise its rights, 
intelligence can project its phobias, and consciousness can reaffirm sovereignty. 
In the following poem, "A celle qui est trop gaie [To Her Who is too 
Gay]," from the section Les Epaves [Flotsam], the preservation of erotic aura is 
staked upon the salvaging of a minimal ceremonial distance. This is supposed to 
transpire through the transformation of the female body into a somatic ciaroscuro 
landscape. In a stunning reversal of established values, however, the qualities of 
this natural realm are presented as inimical to the speaker, who ultimately voices 
his hatred of nature as much as his admission of it as a category constitutive of his 
perception of the other. From the initial conception of the woman in natural 
terms, 
Ta tete, ton geste, ton air 
Sont beaux comme un beau paysage; 
Le rire joue en ton visage 
Comme un vent frais dans un ciel clair. 
Your head, your gestures, and bearing 
Are as lovely as a beautiful landscape; 
Laughter plays over your face 
Like a cool wind in a clear sky . 
...... , -----------
See Benjamin, Baudelaire, 149: "The expectation aroused by the look of the human eye is 
not fulfilled. Baudelaire described eyes of which one is inclined to say that they have lost the 
~bility to look." . 
Benjamin, Baudelaire, 148. 
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one passes to repulsion towards nature, and aggressivity towards the woman~ho 
is a carrier of its qualities. 
Pour chatier ta chair joyeuse, 
Pour meurtrir ton sein pardonne, 
Et faire a ton flanc etonne 
Une blessure large et creuse,3 
So as to chastise your happy flesh, 
To bruise your pardoned breast, 
And cleave into your astounded side 
A wide deep wound 
The chastisement in question reflects a sadomasochistic logic which is 
present throughout Baudelaire's work, sadomasochism being primarily an issue of 
mediation and objectification of self and other. Punishing the other amounts 
empathetically in this poetry to punishing oneself. 
The motif of the aborted gaze is clearer in "Les Bijoux": "Les yeux fixes 
sur moi, comme un tigre dompte, I D'un air vague et reveur elle essayait des 
poses, I Et la candeur unie a la lubricite I Donnait un charme neuf a ses 
metamorphoses; [Her eyes fixed on me, like a tame tigress, I With a vague and 
dreamy look striking various poses, I And candour together with wantonness I 
Gave a novel charm to her metamorphoses;]" (OC I: 158). It is a unity based on 
antitheses that prevails here: "eyes fixed" yet with a "dreamy and vague look," 
"candour" and "wantonness," continuous "metamorphoses." The fixed eyes do 
not denote an identity-acknowledging gaze, but bear the qualities of a senseless 
beast (a tigress) whose appeal to humans emanates from its threatening nature, 
3 
OC I: 156/CV: 279-80; translation Francis Scarfe's. 
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self-sufficiency, and behavioural intransitivity.4 The motif of the woman as 
lurking and self-transforming presence serves as the organising principle. The 
look emanates from a source that does not hail the other's specificity. The 
narrator's excitation rises in proportion to the specular mutability of the woman: 
u~is 
"Je croyais voir/par un nouveau dessin / Les hanches de l'Antiope au buste d'un 
imberbe [I thought I saw by virtue of a transformation / The hips of Antiope and a 
stripling's bust]." The French "bust" translates as either "bosom, chest" or, most 
significantly, "sculpture (depicting the upper part of one's body)." In the latter 
case, one witnesses the passage from nature to the reification of the human 
implied in the monumentality of sculpture, a persistent theme throughout this 
poetry. Baudelaire tries to defend the aura and remoteness of the given (ergo the 
beastly, intransitive quality of the woman) against the encroachment of volitional 
and distance-reducing gaze. Yet, his enterprise leads to the mortification of the 
physical dimension, to the gradual reification of the human body. Nature turns to 
funereal monument repeatedly in his work, and through the concrete reality of his 
dialectical images. 
Corporeal materiality and reification 
The sexual economy regulating the narratival subjects' interaction is a 
-
pointer to the wider retreat of one's capacity to absorb and process experience. 
The transformation of the female body into a space of contention where the 
physical and-mental capacities of the narrator(s) are put to the test testifies to this 
-"retreat. The characters' bodies serve as the vessel wherein sexuality undermines 
4 
See Benjamin, Baudelaire, 150: ''The deeper the remoteness which a glance has to 
overcome, the stronger will be the spell that is apt to emanate from the gaze." 
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identity instead of serving as a channel wherein the subject's truth can be 
consolidated. The distress over sexual orientation and fulfilment experienced by 
the Baudelairean subjects symptomises an incisive disarray of identity layers that 
fail to coalesce into unassailable subjectivity. Baudelaire's sexed-up characters 
exude a crossover appeal. A subversive aversion to the feminine realm coupled 
with the encoding of postcoital melancholia into virtually every character's social 
gestures overwhelms any expectation of psychosexual equilibrium. Baudelaire 
manages to feed an amazing amount of coded behaviour, decoy manoeuvres, and 
sexual innuendo into his character profiles. Visible alienation effects accompany 
the hectic erotic allure of his characters and counterbalance a pervasive sense of 
sexual entitlement partially responsible for their unsettling aura.5 
Baudelaire's sexual lingua franca is replete with instances of frustrated 
gratification, a condition that is not mere deviation but immanently inscribed. The 
texts are full of attempts of lovers manque to attain some form of fulfilment, 
sometimes via recourse to empathetic memory. All they end up with is 
consumption of sex devoid of any lining up of the cores of sexual experience into 
univalent sexuality. The "mannequin puissant" has already turned into "debris de 
squelette,,6 by the time the narrator struggles to distil some form of meaning from 
the experience he has had. The subject leases himself out as a psychotic grappling 
with the metamorphoses of perceptional givens. The fluidity of perception in this 
case marks the overwhelming of conceptual equilibrium due to the non-
commensurability of the perceived scenes with meaning-imbuing cognitive and 
5 All these observations, however, should not be read as part of a normalising reading 
detecting pathologies in this imbalance of drives and discourses. 
6 See "Les Metamorphoses du vampire," DC I: 159. 
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moral frameworks. "Les Metamorphoses du vampire" literalises the inundati9n of 
perception by a specular mobility that deprives the s-eeing subject from any 
cognitive anchoring. Again, the Baudelairean topos of the womanlbeast turning 
into soulless reified object (skeleton in this case) via the path of waning naturality 
offers a profound comment on the inherently reified character of all erotic and, by 
extension, conceptual experience. 
7 
LES METAMORPHOSES DU VAMPIRE 
La femme cependant, de sa bouche de fraise, 
En se tordant ainsi qu'un serpent sur la brai~e, 
Et petrissant ses seins sur Ie fer de son busJ(, c. 
Laissait couler fes mots tout impregnes de mus){i 
"Je remplace .............................. . 
La lune, Ie soleil, Ie ciel et les etoiles! 
........................... je ne vis plus 
Qu'une outre aux flancs gluants, toute pleins de pus! 
Je fermai les deux yeux, dans rna froide epouvante, 
Et quand je les rouvris ala clarte vivante, 
A mes cotes, au lieu du mannequin puissant 
Qui semblait avoir fait provision de sang, 
Tremblaient confusement des debris de squelette, 
Qui d'eux-memes rendaient Ie cri d'une girouette 
Ou d'une enseigne, au bout d'une tringle de fer, 
Que balance Ie vent pendant les nuits d'hiver.7 
THE METAMORPHOSES OF THE VAMPIRE 
Meanwhile the woman, uttered these words 
From her strawberry mouth, writhing like a snake 
On a brazier, and chafing her breasts on the steel of her corset, 
Musk-penetrated words: 
"I will replace ............................... . 
The moon, the sun, the sky and the stars! 
OC I: 159; emphasis added. 
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................................ 1 saw but 
A slimy gourd dripping with pus! 
1 closed my eyes in a fit of horror, 
And when 1 reopened them to the strong light, 
1 found next to me, instead of the powerful mannequin 
Which had satiated herself with blood, 
The rattling bones of a skeleton, 
Rasping like a weathercock 
Or a sign-board dangling from its iron frame, 
Which the wind swings on a winter night. 
The passage from "serpent" to "skeleton" via the intermediate "mannequin 
puissant" translates the teasing out ,of the true substance of the female partner 
through successive layers of repugnant naturality. The condition that is revealed 
underneath these layers is not deviational, but typical and exemplary. The natural 
stratum covers up the emblem-corpse in an attempt to prolong the defensive 
motion of understanding. The corpse as a model of erotic partner strikes at the 
core of an ahistorical phenomenon. The meaningless yet allegorical body points 
to reification as the transition from natural given to the concept, the diremption of . 
physis into petrified fragment. The mortification of the material. dimension 
inherent in the formation of concept undercuts any attempt to tran$;be the 
Baudelairean mortification of the human body in exclusively historicist terms as 
the effect of the market commodification of the .human body.8 This does not 
mean, however, that there are no distinct historical responses to it. Baroque 
See Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Robert 
Hullot-Kentor (London: Athlone Press, 1997),281: "One of the models of art may be the corpse in 
its transfixed and imperishable form." The reification of the deceased dating back to primordial 
times lies behind aesthetic duration, according to this hypothesis. The historical forms that this 
reification assumes, from mummification to preservation in verbal signification, translate a 
society's broader self-understanding. 
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allegory is most relevant here since it was deployed in order to grapple with the 
meaning of this transformation. Baudelaire differs from his baroque predecessors, 
however, in that he resisted the ultimate salvational leap into transcendentalism 
that they undertook.9 
In general, the non-integration of sexual experience within sexuality-
stabilising cognitive-moral ensembles that the above poem engages is 
symptomatic of the broader withering of experiential certainties. One can hardly 
speak of an experience in the proper sense of the word here. T. S. Eliot's 
Prufrockian characters are equally paradigmatic of this withering. What sets them 
apart is the tone of resignation that shows through them. The sexual act is the 
melancholic act par excellence in Baudelaire. This somatic fragmentation and 
specular fluidity vis-a-vis the female body are indissoluble from a 
problematisation of representation. I contend that they ensue on, and allegorically 
corroborate, the diffraction of the substantial unity and homogeneity of the 
represented field, which unity is indispensable for stable representation. 
The enhanced awareness of the material dimension of reality givens 
exhibited in Baudelaire's poetry, with the human body being the predominant 
paradigm, responds to the texts' engagement with the contingent character of all 
positive and ideal contents. The montage of isolated and often petrified human 
fragments, of the parts of the female anatomy that the narrators zoom in on as· if in 
seeming oblivion to the whole person, points to a hollowing of human nature that 
is not, however, mourned for. "Une Martyre," with its Delacroix~que dissection 
9 This leap and Baudelaire's resistance to metaphysical transcendentalism are treated in the 
"Allegorical melancholia, temporality and correspondences" section in chapter eight below, 178-
90. 
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of an eroticised even if bartered body, exhibits the uncanny attribution of flesh-
, 
like qualities to the woman's accessories while her mutilated body is void of any 
vestige of corporeality: "Un bas ~osatre, orne de coins d'or, a la jambe, / Comme 
un souvenir est reste; / La jarretiere, ainsi qu'un oeil secret qui flambe, / Darde un 
regard diamante [A flesh-coloured stocking, adored with gold clocks, / rests on 
her leg like a memory; / Her garters, just like a secret eye that glints, / qive off a 
gemlike glare]" (OC I: 111). The corpse-like qualities of the female body inscribe 
reification and materiality within the core of putative fertility. The whole picture 
is accentuated in counterpoint to the poetry's self-understanding in dialogiCal, 
conjunctural terms. However, it is the contiguity of two facets of bodily 
reification that are evident: reification as both the outcome of a concrete historical 
arrangement of forces, and the permeation of history and memory by the 
materiality of semiotic inscriptions, whether they be understood as language or as 
pure sense-less physicality. 
Baudelaire's insistence on the nonsensical materiality of the constitutively 
reified human body bears down upon the possibility of capturing the human 
dimension in terms of underlying essence fundaments. Also, his avoidance of a 
lexicon of unconscious-begotten forces allows reading into his work a most 
promising resistance to rendering desire answerable to transcendent laws in the 
service of psychogenetic immanence or the cultural/political imperatives of the 
social field. to The suffering of the Baudelairean characters does not consist in the 
10 
See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, Helen R. Lane, pref. Michel Foucault (London: Athlone Press, 
1984), 74. They write: "Castration and oedipalisation beget a basic illusion that makes us believe 
that real desire-production is answerable to higher formations that integrate it, subject it to 
transcendent laws, and make it serve a higher social and cultural production; there then appears a 
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frustration of their efforts to access the true nature or referent of their desire that 
can be glimpsed negatively through the veil of repression: 11 The poetry teases out 
the socially asymmetrical formations of desire, and enhances this asymmetry as 
the cause of this suffering's genesis. The social twist given to desire, however, 
never coagulates into a transcendentalism of meaning exclusively guaranteed by 
social forces. The voiding of naturality within sexuality and the melancholia it 
triggers point to the infiltration of human sexuality by a material, semiotic logic. 
The female body is gradually divested of its symbolic, natural qualities only to 
transform into a sense-void sign whose signified is the trace left behind by the 
disappearance of its meaning. The disintegration of subjectivity that the internal 
colonisation of desire by sense-less materiality solicits radicalises psychogenesis 
to such an extent that the extraction of homocentric contents turns into fictional 
pursuit. This radicalisation precludes the smooth internalisation of man by/into 
man via the bridge of sexual and/or linguistic communication. 
I use the term "semiotic" also in the Kristevan sense of the pre-symbolic 
arrangement of the somatic forces before they are invested in signification.12 
kind of 'unsticking' of the social field with regard to the production of desire, in whose name all 
resignations are justified in advance." 
11 See Ian Buchanan, Deleuzism: A Metacommentary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2000), 20. He writes: "Prohibitions are calculations ... and we are deceived if we act as 
though the true nature of what they proscribe can be read directly from what is specifically 
banned." 
12 See Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 39, 41, 42, 65, 66. It is essential to clarify that the 
"primal object" behind mourning and melancholia the loss of which is negated in and through 
language and the passage from semiosis to signification, the "ultimate cause of conveyability, 
exists only for and through discourse and the already constituted subject .... Positing the existence 
of that other language [the semiotic in this case] and even of an other of language, indeed of an 
outside-of-language, is not necessarily setting up a preserve for metaphysics or theology. The 
postulate corresponds to a psychic requirement that Western metaphysics and theory have had, 
perhaps, the good luck and audacity to represent. That psychic requirement is certainly not 
universal; Chinese civilization, for instance, is not a civilization of the conveyability of the thing 




Semiotic processes include "displacement, condensation, alliterations, vocal and 
gestural rhythms.,,13 The semiotic chora finds a subtle echo in Baudelaire's 
cadaverisation of the human body and his narrators ~ witnessing of the female 
partner's autarky and intransitivity in terms that point to'''another economy of 
female jouissance beyond the competition with the male partner's symbolic 
power. Baudelaire's female presences resist interpretative assimilation to the 
extent that they point to a wholly different economy of desire. The woman-
turned-skeleton is not simply the bodily surface whereupon the historical 
conjuncture has inscribed its parcelling and prostituting commodification of the 
human dimension, but also the realm wherein "the feminine interior (meaning the 
psychic space and, at the level of the bodily experience, the vagina-anus 
combination) can then cease being the crypt that enclosed the dead woman and 
conditions frigidity.,,14 The tense dialectic of corporeal opulence and somatic 
emaciation in Baudelaire's poetry obeys the necessity to hollow out any notion of 
inwardness wherein fundaments of essence can be ingrained. IS The female corpse-




Kristeva, Black Sun, '65. 
Kristeva, Black Sun, 79. 
I am fully aware of the potentially self-undermining aspects of Kristeva's agenda. The 
. semiotic chora must necessari~y be approached within the broader terrain that the symbolic, the 
Law, demarcates. The latter is not only prohibitive, but also generative. See Judith Butler's 
cogent critique of a latent essentialism underlying Kristeva~s schemas in ''The Body Politics of 
Julia Kristeva," in Ethics, Politics, and Difference in Julia Kristeva's Writing, ed. Kelly Oliver 
(New York; London: Routledge, 1993), 164-78: ''The female body that is freed from the shackles 
of the paternal law may well prove to be yet another incarnation of that law, posing as subversive, 
but operating in the service of that law's self-amplification and proliferation" (178). Kristevian 
signijiance has not addressed the possibility that the semiotic and the symbolic are not 
ontologically disjunct. I find' the transgression of the symbolic by the semiotic particularly 
relevant to rephrasing the constitutive crisis of reason and evidentiality that I engage in the 
examined texts, but always within the framework Foucault demarcated when he criticised sex as a 
causal principle. See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality vol. 1, An Introduction, trans. 
Robert Hurley (London: Allen Lane, 1979), 154. For a more comprehensive appraisal of 
Kristeva's project and its relevance to a transgressive politics see Suzanne Guerlac, ''Transgression 
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Baudelaire's poetry. The corpse that is revealed underneath layers of covering 
flesh as the deepest truth of the other "signifies the supervalence of the body, the 
body's recalcitrance to consciousness, reason or will.,,16 The corpse signifies the 
excess of sensuous physicality vis-a-vis cognition and reference. 
Baudelaire's radicalisation of the reified character of human experience 
and sexuality and his allegorical belabouring of it are not, however, imp~netrable 
to the dimension of the social production of individuals and desire. I regard 
Eugene Holland's writings on Baudelaire as a promising entree into the possibility 
of combining historical responsiveness with a perspective that acknowledges the 
fragile contingency of reason upon semiotic underpinnings. 17 Baudelaire's poetry 
configures sexuality not in terms of an infrastructure18but as a behavioural 
ensemble that shapes up in the crossroads between social injunctions and the 
collapse of vaulting cognitive and moral frameworks that necessarily brackets the 
former. On the oversexed yet stiff Baudelairean body one can read the inscription 
of socio-moral imperatives. Beyond that, however, this body exhibits an uncanny 
materiality that does not simply translate the reifying parcelling imposed by 
market conditions, but also the material dimension of human experience and 
in Theory: Genius and the Subject of La Revolution du langage poetique," in Ethics, Politics," and 
Difference in Julia Kristeva's Writing, 238-57. 
16 Elizabeth Gross, "The Body of Signification," in Abjection, Melancholia and Love: the 
Work of Julia Kristeva, ed. John Fletcher and Andrew Benjamin (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1990),92. 
17 See Eugene Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis: the sociopoetics of Modernism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
18 See Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 101: "We do not believe in general that 
sexuality has the role of an infrastructure in the assemblages of desire, nor that it constitutes an 
energy capable of transformation or of neutralization and sublimation. Sexuality can only be 
thought as' one flux among others, entering into conjunction with other fluxes .... But 
Psychoanalysis has produced everything --except exits." 
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sexuality that cannot be transcended into an organon of sense, instinctual drives, 
or instrumental reason. 
Baudelaire refused to dumb down the societal dimensions of sexual and 
social privation and chronicled the intertwining of lack-qua':.desire and its social 
fabrication. In the corporeality of his images and the unsettling physicality of his 
characters he gives off the notion that history is inscribed on the human body not 
only in the form of socially imposed drills but also in the way individuals relate to 
themselves, to their physicality, to their desire. 19 Deleuze is absolutely right to 
affirm that "signifiance and the signifier enjoy no privilege. ,,20 Holland's work 
testifies to the possibility of conjugating a Lacanian problematics of desire with a 
Deleuzian concern over the inundation of desire by societal apparatuses.21 
The voiding of naturality and its expansion beyond the space of 
prostitution constitutes one of the primary axes of Baudelaire's engagement with 
the body and sexuality. The non-conjunctural dimensions of reification are 
equally pressing and are inserted by Baudelaire within the deeper layers of human 
sexuality where they are seen to subtend the passage from perceived scene to 
19 See Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 112: "History is constantly being remade, but· 
conversely it is constantly being made by each of us, on his own body." Lacan's admission of the 
. linguistic parameter as formative of desire and the subject in distinction to notions of genetic and 
immanent psychogenesis, also, does not potentially preclude the effects of collectives on humans. 
His contention that "what we are faced with ... is the increasing absence of all those saturations of 
the superego and ego ideal that are realised in all kinds of organic forms in traditional societies, 
forms that extend from the rituals of everyday intimacy to the periodical festivals in which the 
community manifests itself' reads like Benjamin. See Lacan, "Aggressivity in psychoanalysis," in 
fcrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 1989),26. 
o Deleuze and Parnet,. Dialogues, 113. He continues by saying that "we should 
simultaneously study all the regimes of pure signs, from the point of view of the abstract machines 
they put into play, and also all the concrete assemblages, from the point of view of the mixtures 
they carry out A concrete semiotics is a mix, a mixture of several regimes of signs" (emphasis 
added). 
21 
. See Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 271: "To overturn the theatre of representation 
Into the order of desiring-production: this is the whole task of schizoanalysis." Holland has 
explicitly aligned himself with this task. 
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concept. I argue that this voiding of naturality, which the metamorphosis of the 
female body into senseless skeleton comes to translate, responds to concerns that 
are subsumed under a broader problematics of subjectivity. This fact necessitates 
an eclectic exploration of philosophical and methodologic~l threads that will be 
seen to subtend"Baudelaire's work and thus show it to harmonise with a broader 
address of the question of the subject. This question was asked in .. a mode 
pertinent to the examined poetry within the confines of German Romantic 
thought. The following chapter aims to look into the latter's vocabulary and use it 
as an echoing chamber within which to enhance the Baudelairean inflections of 
subjectivity and voiding of experience. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BAUDELAIRE'S INTERSTITIAL SUBJECTIVITIES: THE SUBJECT 
AND WORK 
And the massive truth flung back at us is that we have not left the 
era of the Subject.\' 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Literary Absolute 
Baudelaire and Romantic subjectivity: a selective genealogy of con~erns 
The following section embeds Baudelaire's thinking apropos of the theme 
that underlies my analyses, i.e., the poetic elaboration of modem subjectivity in 
distinction to essentialist construals of human experience and praxis, within a 
broader conceptual vista. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy have put forward a 
pertinent claim: "We still belong to the era it [Romanticism] opened up. The 
present period continues to deny precisely this belonging, which defines us 
(despite the inevitable divergence introduced by repetition)."t Their assertion 
acquires particular inflections in the context of exploring the vicissitudes of 
modem subjectivity, and in the framework of the analysis of the character that the 
latter has assumed in the case of the consensually archetypal poet of Modernism.2 
What concerns me at this stage is the way in which Baudelaire's project is 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German 
Romanticism, trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1988), 15. T. S. Eliot's disparagement of Romanticism is a characteristic instance of this 
denial. ' . 
2 With reference to German and French Romanticism and French Symbolism, the impact of 
the work done by critics such as Paul de Man, Geoffrey Hartman, J. Hillis Miller, among others, as 
well as that of the more phenomenologically-oriented criticism of Georges Poulet, Jean-Pierre 
Richard, and Jean Starobinski before them, cannot be overemphasised. See indicatively George 
Poulet, Les metamorphoses ducercle, preface by Jean Starobinski (Paris: Flammarion, 1979); 
Jean Starobinski, La melancolie au miroir: trois lectures de Baudelaire (Paris: JUlliard, 1989). 
Pioneering studies such as those of Jean Pommier, Dans les chemins de Baudelaire ( Paris: J. 
Corti, 1945); Georges Blin, ~ sadisme de Baudelaire (paris: J. Corti, 1948); Eugene Crepet, 
Baudelaire (Paris: A. Messein, 1928), among others, opened the way for a close-up on Baudelaire 
that would move beyond psycho-biographical sensationalism. Walter Benjamin's work on 
Baudelaire,' however, set completely different standards in its rigorous interlocking of historical 
and aesthetic concerns. 
41 
impregnated by radical inflections of finitude and subjectivity that resonate with 
(German) Romantic concerns.3 
In Baudelaire one can locate a poetico-critical practice that resists the. 
"" "empiricism of a psychology of aesthetic faculties,,4 in contradistinction to a long 
tradition seeing-in Baudelaire the poet-aesthete par excellence. Nowhere is the 
"postulate of consciousness as the source of ... creativity"S predicated by 
Baudelaire as such, at least unaccompanied by the bracketing of triumphant" 
geniality which partially springs from a socio-political and aesthetic awareness of 
the conditions determining the practice of poetry, his own including. This critique 
is also derived from a more or less conscious distancing of the poet from the 
cliches of a hyper-imagination mediating the vision of the transcendental order 
through the symbolic image and the organismic metaphor (vide correspondences 
and their ultimate insemination with a destabilising mnemonic aleatoriness). His 
allegorical predisposition testifies to his distancing from symbolic dialecticity. 
Baudelaire inscribed his poetic praxis within the conceptual sphere of 
Romanticism while at the same time undermining the ontology of genius. This 
way he voided the notion of a genial subjectivity that could allegedly exercise 
authorial control over the discursive realm, embedded this awareness in his 
corpus, gave in to the necessity of erecting his discourse in the mode of lyricism, 
yet ultimately exposed this necessity as a generic decoy and referential ruse. He 
See The Literary Absolute, 15. 
4 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Literary Absolute, 103. The context is the way 
Schelling and Schlegel move beyond the anthropological foundations underlying the aestheticism 
of Wolff and Baumgarten and at the same time beyond a philosophy of the cogito. 
5 Lilian R. Furst, Counterparts: The dynamics of Franco-German literary relationships 
1770-1895 (London: Methuen, 1977), 101. 
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bracketed the notion of authentic subjectivity through the dual strategy of 
exposing the social parameters to which the artistic product is accountable and 
engaging the void of immanence that lurks within every positional act, whether . 
linguistic or historical. 
\. 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy have abstracted several 
caveats that underlie the agenda of Jena Romanticism. They are relevant in the 
sense that they reveal the conceptual perspective within which Baudelaire's 
project can be subsumed: 
Fundamentally, then, it is a matter of denouncing, with regard to the 
production of work (but also with regard to its appreciation, for they. are 
inseparable), the anthropological decompositions or degradations of the 
cogito (be they of a "natural" or "supernatural" order). To recall a motif that 
we have more than simply alluded to, it becomes necessary to restore to the 
Subject of subjectity, beyond subjectivity, the creative and critical power of 
the work of art --of art as work. And it is likewise necessary to remove this 
work from any and all exterior finality -whether it, in tum, be "natural" or 
"supernatural," of the order of pleasure or morality- in order to restore it, 
precisely, to the operation of such a Subject.6 
This configuration of subjectivity without a self-transparent subject goes, 
counter to what has traditionally collapsed to sovereign authorial imagination. 
The transsubjective nature of the artwork puts the stakes on the unfolding of 
imaginative faculties that can now be seen as "[shaping] what reposes in itself 
rather than arbitrarily concocting forms, details, fables, or whatever. ,,7 The 
subject is constituted only in and through the work, and as such is not exhausted 
within egological attributes. The subject is formed in and through the realm 
demarcated by "the negativity specific to the transgression of the symbolic by the 
6 
7 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Literary Absolute, 104; emphasis added. 
Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 283. 
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semiotic" [in Kristevian terminology] turning thus from rejet [the transgression of . 
the unified phenomenological subject] into Ie sujet en proces ["the subject in 
process/on trial"]. 8 Together with the notion of finality apart from an end, the·· 
\. 
conceptual ground mentioned above informs part of the implicit inheritance upon 
which Baudelaire will refine a problematic of the self and the facticity of the 
artwork. This is an inheritance that has erroneously been construed in terms that 
emphasise the allegedly common denominator of essence underlying the faculty 
of imagination and the phenomenal capacity of the symbolic image to fill up the 
ontological void separating the realm of consciousness from that of objective 
reality. 
The self-awareness that the examined texts exhibit concerning the intricate 
mechanisms of their own production is mirrored in their treating their own 
thematics as excuses for the belabouring of tensions and polarities innate to 
language. The mutual antagonism as much as illumination between constatation 
and performance, symbolicity and allegory, metaphoricity and random 
juxtaposition of semantic matrices and/or serial metonymy, is an integral part of 
Baudelaire's story. This textual self-awareness, however, points to an economy of 
productive forces that exceeds the field of human intention and points to a 
necessity and an astonishment that transpire as and within language. This is the 
meaning of this poetry's self-referentiality which should not be reduced to a 
thematic self-enclosure, stylistic intransitivity or recalcitrance to the social 
See Suzanne Guerlac, "Transgression in Theory," 242-3. The work where this notion of 
the subject as the retroactively constituted space wherein signifiance materialises is Julia 
Kristeva's seminal Revolution in Poetic wnguage, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), 105. I find a certain compatibility between Lacoue-Labarthe's notion of 
the Work-in-Progress with its correlative subject as the human form that this interminable process 
assumes, and Kristeva's sujet-en-proces. 
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dimension. Baudelaire's text is transparent to what Lacoue-Labarthe construes as 
the self-productivity of the (German Romantic) literary work, in the sense that the 
geneses and vicissitudes of its forms are treated explicitly through being given 
\. 
allegorical and/or symbolic facets as much as through the mutual undermining of 
the two tropological modes. 
A dialectical model accounting for the inter-constitution of form and 
content is too equilibrial for this poetry, even in the Adornian version.9 The 
fortunate mediation of form with content, their putative mutual immanence, works 
them up as the realm where universal notional fundaments are still applicable. 
Baudelaire's thematic undercurrents highlight the fragile nature of this conceptual 
universality and align it with a positivism of contents that translates hegemonic 
moral and political imperatives. The entwinement of form and content ineluctably 
involves the tracing back of the material/signifier to the notional/signified. The 
immediate result is the contraction of the void between the spheres in question 
into a traversible terrain of mutually recognisable essences. However, form never 
fully assumes the determinations of its own concept by turning into the latter's 
integral attribute, and it is this difference that Baudelaire articulates in the mode of 
a lyrical voi~e that portends its own demise. The poetry probes into the 
irreducible qualitative difference that imperils the dialectical relation of the two 
spheres, and renders the tension between them interminable. 
9 See "Draft Introduction," in Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, esp. 332-359. 
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The mutual non-containment of nature and consciousness: "Obsession" 
The examined poetry works on the immanent tension between conceptual, 
transcendentalism and materiality (of both the 'linguistic register and what is 
referentially targeted). This tension is instantiated in the way history and 
temporality seem to be hollowing out each other in several of the poems ("Le 
Cygne" being an example) as much as in the intensification and final 
fragmentation of the materiality of both the physical realm and the metropolitan 
tableaux. This latter occurs in distinction ~ to a gradual emphasis on the 
ethereal/immaterial dimension of the poetic image and the disincarnation of its 
intentionality. The poetry does not organise this distinction in the mode of a 
cumulative dialectic, however, which would entail the exit from the crisis that 
sustains its impetus. It integrates the affirmation of the ontological primacy of the 
natural object with the latter's infiltration by attributes that derive from the realm 
of abstraction, thus forcing it to submit to an irreversible denaturalisation. The 
following poem voices this infiltration which occurs in the mode of simultaneity. 
OBSESSION 
Grands bois, vous m'effrayez comme des cathedrales; 
Vous hurlez comme I' orgue; et dans nos coeurs maudits, 
Chambres d'etemeJl deuil ou vibrent de vieux rales, 
Repondent les echos de vos De'~: profundis. 
I 
Je te hais, Ocean! tes bonds et tes tumultes, 
Mon esprit les retrouve en lui; ce rire amer 
De l'homme vaincu, plein de sanglots et d'insultes, 
J e I' entends dans Ie rire enorme de la mer. 
Comme tu me plairais, 0 nuit!~ans ces etoiles 
Dont la lumiere parle un langage connu! 
Car je cherche Ie vide, et Ie noir, et Ie nu! 
46 
Mais les tenebres sont elles-memes des toiles 
OU vivent, jaillissant de mon oeil par milliers, 
Des etres disparus aux regards familiers. (OC I: 75-6) 
OBSESSION 
Immense woods, you terrify me like cathedrals; 
You roar like an organ; and in our accursed hearts, 
Those chambers of eternal mourning where --
Ancient death-moanings fill the air, the echoes of 
Your De Profundis reverberate in the space. 
I hate you, Ocean! Your waves and agitation 
Fill up my own mind; this bitter laughter 
Of the vanquished man, replete with sobs and blasphemy, 
I hear it in the enormous grin of the sea. 
How you would please me, 0 Night! Without these stars 
Whose light speaks a language known! 
Because I search for the void, the black, and the bare! 
But the shadows themselves are canvases 
Where live, leaping by the thousand in front of my eyes, 
Beings long vanished in their familiar gaze. 
"Obsession" integrates the inter-penetration of natural object and human 
consciousness in a way that deprives both of their ontological self-sufficiency. At 
the same time, the voiding of the natural dimension spills over into the 
imaginative faculty whose capacity to exist independently of the extrinsic world 
seems initially to be affirmed. Human consciousness is ultimately seen to ~e 
depleted of the plenitude of content, or rather to desire this voiding: "Because my 
quest is for the void, the black, and the bare!" This oscillation in the status of 
both the natural object and the consciousness that perceives it cancels the 
modalities of a soothing dialectic of mutually complementing zones. Natural 
predicates come to be contaminated by the abstraction of human/social creation 
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["Vast woods, you terrify me like cathedrals"], whereas nature must be voided of 
anything that can remotely be imbued with meaning ["How you would please me, 
o Night, without those stars I Whose light speaks a language I understand!"]. 
\. 
There is no equilibrial dialectic between sensory object and conceiving 
consciousness here but a struggle between antagonistic forces that leaves the latter 
perpetually suspended under the threat of extinction. In this -case one does not 
encounter the ascending movement that signals the distancing of consciousness 
from terrestrial nature but, on the contrary, the intemalisation of earth-bound 
matter within consciousness. This integration does not lead to repose or the 
aggrandisement of the conceiving powers, but to the transposition of natural strife 
and chaos into an entity that can be called "consciousness" yet can no longer be 
defined in terms of particularised, meaning-assorting presence. The images of 
levitation and fall that geometricalise moral-cum-political struggles have given 
way to the disincamation of human consciousness that is effected for the sake of 
an ultimate depletion of positive contents. to The whole operation transpires not 
by virtue of the enhancement of the capacity of the mind to transcend its 
entanglement with earthly matter and thus effect an awareness of itself to the 
second degree. This consciousness has nothing in common with the faculty that 
allegedly posits its own contents in and through a transparent dialectic with the 
natural world. It cannot function as a metaphor of the desired commensurability 
of language and matter and is therefore powerless to inhabit the concept of 
cognitive wholeness that it promises. 
10 For a characteristic instance of the relativisation of moral polarities through their shading 
off into an ensemble of geometrically opposed forces, see "Hymne a la beaute" (OC I: 24-5). 
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Baudelaire's poetry resists the assuagement of tension that a non-
ambivalent crystallisation of the realm of the con"cept in and through its dynamic 
instantiation in the form would offer. This resistance, which is thematised in the 
\. 
above poem in the form of the mutual incomprehension" anc;l recalcitrance of 
matter and consciousness, points negatively to what I regard as an endemic quality 
of avant-garde poetry, namely the labour to accommodate linguistically the 
possibility of aconceptual experience. Mallarme's poetry can legitimately be read 
as belonging in this constellation of thought, whereas Pound's Pisan Cantos point 
/' 
to the labour to grasp reality before, and beyond, the interference of intellective 
complications. The tension mentioned above will serve as the focus of the 
ensuing analysis of the mortification of the physical and historical bodies in 
Baudelaire. 
In concluding this section, it must be restated that Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy's contentions vis-a-vis (German) Romantic theory have been deployed in 
an attempt to embed Baudelaire's poetic practice in a conceptual vicinity within 
which issues of subjectivity and creativity were addressed in non-egological 
terms. This poetry does not shun away from the task of integrating the 
tropological sedimentation of its meaning and the inherent instability of cognitive 
referentiality as primary concerns. " The poetic treatment of concerns that are 
intrinsic to language is an integral interest of literature-cum-Ianguage and not the 
exclusive property of a specific historically recognisable period or genre. The 
succeeding slackening of the awareness of the language-immanent cognitive 
instability, which took place in the name of a symbolist rehabilitation of lost 
meaning and presence, was not destinal. It constituted only one of the open 
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avenues that could be traversed, and the one most reluctant to measure up to the 
extremity of the primary texts, for that matter. The negative valorisation here 
concerns the New Critical, organicist reception of the symbolist texts, of course, 
\ 
rather t)1an the poetry itself. 
Tilottama Rajan's insistence on the fact that the dissolution of lyrical 
autotelism is the work of Romantic texts themselvesllis especialiy apposite to the 
exploration of genealogical links 12and the understanding of a textual practice 
which, as Rajan explains apropos of several Romantic paradigms, interweaves 
lyrical and discursive paradigms and thus transforms lyric from a monological to a 
dialogical form. 13 The dialogical dimension of Baudelaire's poetry has been 
emphasised by commentators such as Ross Chambers, Richard Terdiman, Barbara 
Johnson, Barbara Blood, and others, and will be discussed further on especially in 
terms of the texts exhibiting an unusual awareness of their historical controlling 
premises and conjunctural character. It will be argued that this awareness renders 
all accusations of a self-reflexivity allegedly barring access to the historical terrain 
irrelevant and self-serving. 
Baudelaire's narratives dramatise the hiatus between what is told and the 
telling of it,14in other words the gap between constatation and performance, and 
thus acquire the character of an endeavour that has implications far wider than 
those traditionally ascribed to literature. This endeavour should not be made to 
11 See Tilottama Raj an, "Romanticism and the death of Lyric Consciousness," in Lyric 
Poetry Beyond New Criticism, 198. 
12 The term "genealogical" has been deployed throughout in the sense that Michel Foucault 
gave it in The Archaeology of Knowledge, among other texts. It is a matter of notional 
associations and not of empirically verifiable rapports. 
13 See Rajan, "Romanticism and the death of Lyric Consciousness," 200. 
14 See Rajan, "Romanticism and the death of Lyric Consciousness," 196. 
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collapse into a transcendentalism of form or concept, or into an ensemble of 
mediated reflections of reality grids in the texts. Baudelaire's poetry, and this is 
perhaps the most significant link it has with the Jena theorists, is unable to 
\. 
produc_e the concept of semantic rehabilitation that it promises .. This inability has 
been posited by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy as a distinct characteristic of texts 
.' 
produced by Friedrich Schlegel and is related to the excess of the creative process 
vis-a-vis "the general theoretical (or philosophical) power of which it is 
nonetheless the completion.,,15 What fissures the aesthetic closure and self-
reflexiveness diagnosed in the case of Symbolism is exactly this non-perfectibility 
of the writing process and the way it is textually engaged through an allegorical 
and imagistic abundance aptly present in Baudelaire. The intercalation of micro-
narratives in several of the poems ("Le Cygne," for example) serves the purpose 
of accentuating the non-closure, and the non-cumulative force, of the writing 
process. The dialectic of auto-organisation and auto-dissolution distances the 
texts from the organismic syntheses of New Criticism and its homologisation of 
intending consciousness and referent. In short, the Baudelairean text is not 
conducive to a 'New Critical ideality. One of the factors that bars this ideality is 
the poet's special understanding of memory. In Baudelaire memory serves both 
as a defence against the excessive stimuli of modem life and as an agent that 
dissolves identity. Its dual character has been analysed by WaIter Benjamin and 
his analyses will now serve as a further pivotal point. 
15 See The Literary Absolute, 92. The force of transcendentality, that is, a movement which 
is asymptotic in relation to its enabling premises, and which never succumbs to a 
transcendentalism of concept, is admirably delineated by the authors. Their analyses seem to 
enhance the prospects for a future re-elaboration of the relations between the German Romantics 
and French Symbolism. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ELLIPSES OF MEMORY 
This is the use of memory: For liberation 
\ T. S. Eliot, "Four Quatrets" 
The deterioration of communal experience and crisis-oriented reason 
Walter Benjamin distinguishes, in his "On Some Moti~s in Baudelaire," 
between Erlebnis ("lived time") and Erfahrung (inner experience). 1 What 
characterises modem life, according to him, is the disintegration of the socio-
symbolic realm and of collective patterns of remembering. A collective horizon 
of values and a communal imaginary that mediates remembrance contribute to the 
preservation of a commonality of interests. Within this framework the distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary recollection loses its polar character. Ideally, 
the two modes of recall should be entwined so as to preclude the irruption of 
traumatic psychic inscription through the successful temporal and cognitive 
integration of experience. Benjamin writes: 
Where there is experience in the strict sense of the word, certain 
contents of the individual past combine with material of the 
collective past. The rituals with their ceremonies, their festivals ... , 
kept producing the amalgamation of these elements of memory over 
and over again. They triggered recollection at certain times and 
remained handles of memory for a lifetime. In this way, voluntary 
and involuntary recollection lose their mutual exclusiveness. 2 · 
According to Benjamin's diagnostic schema, the ritualistic character of this 
collective recalling has succumbed to the fragmentation of experience under the 
modem arrangement of forces. I concur that the examined poetry testifies to the 
1 
2 
Benj amin, Baudelaire, 117; also 113-17. 
Benjamin, Baudelaire, 117. 
52 
decline of experience and serves as a sensitive register of it. I also believe, 
however, that it constitutes a defence against it (self-undermining ,since it 
thematically and rhetorically predicates its owp failure), and an illu'sory 
compensation for the loss of collective traditio.ns,3 I must also deposit my 
scepticism towards the nostalgia for a pre-Iapsarian plenitude of collective 
experience and memory that, at least by implication, Benjamin seems to project 
onto Baudelaire's poetry, and longs for himself. The loss of organismic 
collectivity whose demise Benjamin is so ready to accuse Baudelaire of not 
properly lamenting4 is treated by the poetry as a reality that cannot be restricted 
within particular historical constraints. Les Fleurs du mal is not a poetry of 
nostalgia for a lost conceptual afflatus but a sensitive chronicle of the inner strife 
of language to accommodate the perpetual slippage of historical experience and 
the impossibility of a plenitude of historical and conceptual presence. 
The Freudian framework upon which Benjamin bases his observations is 
rendered conspicuous by him, even if in a typically ambivalent way. The premise 
underlying the whole Freudian schema as read by Benjamin consists in the non-
retentive character of the conscious mental processing of stimuli. The 
incompatibility between consciousness alertness and the retention of memory 
traces is emphasised along with the . corresponding realisation that trauma results 
upon the miscarriage of the protective shield of consciousness. This latter allows 
the inscription of a memory-trace directly in the unconscious.s The decline of 
communal horizons of understanding erodes the protective barriers of collective 
4 
5 
See Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 113. 
See, characteristically, Baudelaire, 172. 
See Benjamin, Baudelaire, 113-7. 
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consciousness and memory that would ideally help the subject process experience 
and successfully absorb its traumatic impact. If "Baudelaire made it his business 
. . 
to parry the shocks," as Benjamin c1aims,6 then it is in, the "Spleen" series that this 
defence is more eloquently substantiated in the fo~ of a temporality and memory 
of Erlebnis. The experiences therein are meant to string out into a coherent and 
cognitively accessible ensemble to which the subject can relate as their bearer. 
However, the facticity of this defensive temporality, the imminent encroachment 
of corrosive time and the poetic narrator' s ~istrionic defensive postures, 
recapitulate the ambivalent theme of a temporality that threatens existence while 
still constituting the latter's ultimate line of defence vis-a-vis traumatic impact.7 
The following poem is exemplary in the intensity of its thematic commitment. 
L'HORLOGE 
"Remember! Souviens-toi, prodigue! Esto memor! 
(Mon gosier de metal parle toutes les langues.) 
Les minutes, mortel folatre, sont des gangues 
Qu'il ne faut pas lacher sans en extraire l'or! 
"Souviens-toi que Ie Temps est un joueur avide 
Qui gagne sans tricher, a tout coup! C'est la loi. 
Le jour decroit; la nuit augmente; souviens-toi! 
Le gouffre a toujours soif; la c1epsydre se vide. 
"Tantot sonnera l'heure ou Ie divin Hasard, 
Ou I' auguste Vertu, ton epouse encor vierge, 
Ou Ie Repentir me me (oh! La demiere auberge!), 
OU tout se dira: Meurs, vieux lache! II est trop tard!" 
(OC I: 81) 
Benjamin, Baudelaire, 114. 6 
7 Temporality receives a persistently ambivalent treatment in Baudelaire's poetry. Being 
the enemy of man, the destroyer of stability, the harbinger of decay and death, it stil~ 
communicates contents of liberatory transience, and of the inevitable erasure of the pain that 
human experience entails. It feels occasionally as if it rescinds the experiencability of the world 
and thus shields the subject from protracted suffering. In its disjunctive force, it guarantees the 




"Remember! Souviens-toi, spendthrift one! Esto Memor! 
(My metallic throat speaks all the languages.) 
The minutes, merry mortal, are seams \ 
That you shouldn't drop before distilling all their gold! 
"Remember that Time is an avid gambler 
That wins in every blow! It's the nature of the game. 
The day is declining; night increases; remember! 
The bottomless pit is always thirsty; the clepsydra runs 
dry. 
"The hour will shortly strike when divine Chance, 
Or austere Virtue, your still-virgin spouse, / 
Or even repentance itself (oh! the last resting place of 
all!), 
Where everything will scream: Die, you old coward! 
It's too late!" 
The keen perception of time points to the purely defensive character of 
consciousness, a condition that relates to the modem subject's determination of 
reality in terms of crisis. The agility characterising consciousness aims at 
intercepting shocks. The crisis--oriented reason that subtends the modem 
experience, then, is integral to Baudelaire's poetry. That Modernity conceives of 
external reality as inherently threatening and as immanently fissured by an always 
imminent collapse of representation, is a common topos. The way, though, this 
conception is integrated into the poetic practices of the era, and, most 
significantly, the way it is coextensible with the intensification, aestheticisation, 
and the eventual bankruptcy of the political domain that is contemporary to us, 
has been largely unexplored. Baudelaire's circumscription of temporality and 
subjectivity acquires a particular sense-inflection when seen within this 
perspecti vee 
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The archaeological belabouring of this cris"is-oriented angle would take us 
back to tragic Greece via Nietzsche, the German Romantics, of cours~, and 
German philology. What was formulated in the Hellenic realm as crisis-oriented 
reason and embodied in tragedy, ritual, and the mysteries, has been bequeathed to 
~CO~t­
Modernity through the mediation of the German Romantics. .; Labarthe and 
Nancy's archaeological tracing of this crisis-fissured reason back to the Greeks is 
particularly revealing of the pervasive character of the predicament and the 
flexibility of its forms in the face of subsequent historical appropriations. 8 
One of the various inflections that the reason/unreason dichotomy has 
assumed in the poetry of Baudelaire is Christianity versus Satanism. This 
binomial arrangement should not be understood as a negative reaffirmation of a 
religious orthodoxy. Satanism in Baudelaire, the project of evilification, stands as 
the ultimate point of a trajectory that started with the agenda of beautification and 
crossed through spleen intensification. It acquires its particular modalities in the 
light of the necessity for the polarisation of the thematic kernels that make up the 
narratives. This necessity is strategic and becomes unavoidable in the context of 
thematic elaborations that revolve around the loss of experiential coherence, as 
has already been argued. Intensification, within which religious divisions 
polarise, makes up for the loss of essentiality at the level of social reality and its 
textual transcriptions. 
8 See The Literary Absolute, 10: "What comes to light is well-known: a previously 
imperceptible hiatus in Greek "classicism," the traces of a savage prehistory and terrifying 
religion, the hidden, nocturnal, mysterious, and mystical face of Greek "serenity," an equivocal 
art barely detached from madness and "orgiastic" (one of Schlegel's pet words) fury. In sum, 
tragic Greece. Like HOlderlin during the same period -but differently, although Schelling 
ensures the tradition, and in a "dialecticizing" mode that will follow a well-known course from 
Hegel to the young Nietzsche- the Schlegels invent what becomes known (under various names) 
as the opposition of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. " 
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"La Vie anterieure" I: the reconstitution of past life apres-coup 
The loss of essentiality that Baudelaire's poetry registers is textually 
integrated through a narrative mode whose binding premise is that of involuntary 
\ 
memory. The latter constitutes a medium that is allegedly flexible enough to deal 
with the disintegration of social experience and distil some form of meaningful 
core from its fragments. Th"e paradoxical character of the whole endeavour, 
however, becomes apparent when one considers that this mode of remembrance 
can primarily accommodate traumatic experiences, that is, experiences that were 
not processed properly by consciousness because of their traumatic impact.9 
Involuntary memory constitutes the correlate of a mode of reasoning that 
conceives reality as inherently fissured by crisis. Within this context, moving 
from the remembrances of the ideal to the marmoreal quality of splenetic time, 
from the gradual exposure of the facticity of the former to the threatening 
character of the latter, a narrative is stabilised wherein this difficult relation 
between reminiscing and the exposure to reifying temporality is put into relief. 
In many of Baudelaire's narratives what is targeted by memory is an 
earlier life which, however, in itself constitutes the effect of apres-coup 
elaborations. Within this mnemonic exertion the erection of screen memories 
aiming at holding the void of experiential content at bay serves as the organising 
principle. Additionally, the effort to re-sediment a minimally 
9 See Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 114. He writes: "Only traumatic experience 
resonates deeply enough in memory to become the stuff of characteristically modern lyric poetry." 
10 See J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. Donald 
Nicholson-Smith (London: Karnac Books and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1988), 410-11: 
"Freud, coming back to the distinction between screen memories and other childhood memories, 
goes so far as to raise a more general question: are there memories of which we may truly say that 
they emerge from, or merely memories which are related to, our childhood?" It is the latter 
problematic that I have retained in my liberal usage of the term. 
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functional socio-symbolic realm is apparent within the diegeses. The obvious 
wilfulness of the effort, however, and the thematically embedded awareness of its 
factitiousness, gear memory away from a pursuit that would seemingly involve an 
'\ 
encasement of essences. In the case of "La Vie anterieure," for example,' the 
thematised previous life is internally punctuated by the awareness of the theatrical 
--
character of the depicted landscape as much as by the reduction of past life to an 
exotic scene, a topos of artificiality and constructiveness. 
C' est la que j' ai vecu dans les voluptes calmes, 
Au milieu de I' azur, det vagues, des splendeurs 
Et des esc1aves nus, touj( impregnes d' odeurs, 
Qui me rafraichissaient Ie front avec des palmes, 
Et dont l'unique soin etait d'approfondir 
Le secret douloureux qui me faisait languir. (DC 
I: 17-8) 
There I lived in calm voluptuousness, 
Surrounded by azure, waves and splendours 
And naked slaves giving off perfumes 
Who refreshed my brow with palms, 
And whose only care was to penetrate 
The secret sorrow of which I pined away. 
The reified and factitious nature of the remembrance indicates an unusual 
textual awareness. It concerns the intentional character of the effort to muster and 
sediment the power of remembrance in the mode of alertness against the 
inscription of traumatic memory-traces and the surrounding disintegration of the 
socio-symbolic order. The construction of an artificial realm of Erlebnis (lived 
time) thematically accentuates the primary disjunction between the latter and 
ErJahrung (lived experience with a core of inalienable experiential content). It 
also implicates the impossible dialectic between a serial temporality underlying 
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the splenetic experience and the atemporal character of correspondences, 
synaesthetic or not. Regardless of whether the correspondences are predicated in 
the mode of simultaneity or not, (Benjamin clain:s that they partake of the 
" 
temporal dimension),11 the spleen poems presuppose an awareness of temporality 
that differs from the ritualistic reconstruction of past experience, actually lived or 
faked as such, characterising correspondences and the ideal pO~~S.12 "La Vie 
Anterieure" is particularly relevant because it encapsulates this tension between 
anamnesis deploying the correspondences as "data of remembrance,,13and the 
Nachtriiglichkeit as it were (re) construction of an experience of ideal Erlebnis the 
factitiousness of which is rendered conspicuous by the mode of narrative (the 
explicitly non-realistic orientalism of the depicted scene). As Claire Brunet 
writes, "where correspond~nces ceased to be evident, one still had to extract and 
unfold them." Their true character is that of an "imperative" rather than a fact. 14 
"La Vie anterieure" imparts the mnemonic endeavour's contribution to 
making up the experiential referent. It textually enhances the process whereby the 
latter shapes up in the anaclitic moment as an object of understanding. Reality 
referents of past iife come to be constituted at the moment of mnemonic labour, 
11 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 141: "There are no simultaneous correspondences .... The murmur 
of the past may be heard in [them]." 
12 It is not easy to disentangle the spleen from the ideal poems. It is relatively safe to 
classify "La Beaute," "L' Ideal," "La Vie Anterieure," "Les Phares," "Elevation" and 
"Correspondi-nces," of course, under the former category. Still, with poems such as "L'Albatros," 
"L'Homme et la Mer," "Hymne a la beaute," things get complicated. Even the more "bright" 
poems of the ideal agenda are not free from a violent imagery that pits forces against one another. 
The dimension of agon is present throughout. There is also a subterranean dialogue between 
poems that belong in differing sections, yet whose meaning is transformed when read in 
counterpoint. "L' Invitation au voyage," for example, emanates sinister undercurrents when read 
in juxtaposition to "Un Voyage a Cythere." 
13 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 141. 
14· Claire Brunet, "Presentation," in Charles Baudelaire, Critique d'art suivi de Critique 
musicale (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), xxxvi. "Correspondances" (OC I: 11) has served as the 
perpetual point of reference upon which most symbolist-aesthetic hermeneutics have converged. 
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ergo the pervasive sense of deja vu that many Baudelairean narrators voice. IS "Le 
secret douloureux [ro.i"'~\.\.\ sec.("e.t l" afflicting the subject of narrative cuts across 
the idyllic serenity of the staged scene and extemalises the unsettling sensation of 
\ 
reified experience that impinges on the phoney equilibrium of past experience, 
fantasy, and memory. It brings to the fore the undergirding factitiousness of the 
-
anaclitic character of the "remembered" event, its constitutiveness, the transparent 
staging of its perjurious nature. It is telling that the melange of "sea-swells," "the 
images of the skies," and, most significantly, the "hues of sunset mirrored in my 
eyes," (OC I: 18) transpires in the mode of simultaneity. This latter bears upon 
the fabrication of the remembered event as an act of consciousness consummated 
within language. The mnemonic labour is productive rather than animated by a 
retentive fixation that aims to preserve the past. The sadness perforating the 
pseudo-pastoral scene emanates from the latent negotiability of the past and, most 
important, the destruction of the essentialist teleology that mandates the 
preformation of the future in past registrations. On the contrary, " ... the past 
dissolves in the present, so that the future becomes (once again) an open question, 
instead of being s'pecified by the fixity of the past ( ... the primal event, the 'first' 
event in the double articulation of Nachtriiglichkeit)." 16 The text resonates with 
the assumption that "all memories are screen memories, screens which it makes 
no sense to look behind in search of the 'original, primal' trace.,,17 The "previous 
15 I take up the issue of the formative power of anamnesis with regard to the essence of the 
remembered event in counterpoint to John Forrester's comments on Freud's notion of the 
premonitory dreams. "[T]he discovery was that premonitory dreams are constructed in the 
moment they are remembered: they are forms akin to deja vu; and most significantly, their being 
rendered null as dreams demonstrates clearly how, for Freud, the dream is dissolved by the 




Forrester, Seductions of Psychoanalysis, 206. 
Forrester, Seductions of Psychoanalysis, 206. 
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life" is the effect of an on-going production of contents in the interest of 
sustaining the semiotic machine of language, metonymic desire, and diacritical 
memory. 
'\ 
Correspondences and imperilled memory: "La Vie anterieure" II 
The vie anterieure opens up the temporal abyss 
in things; solitude discloses the spatial one 
before human beings. 
Benjamin, "Central Park" 
Benjamin quotes from the poem discussed so far in order to highlight the 
temporal character of correspondences and possibly salvage them from a 
metaphysic of nostalgia and a transcendental restorative consciousness. He 
writes: "There are no simultaneous correspondences, such as were cultivated by 
the Symbolists later. The murmur of the past may be heard in the 
correspondences, and the canonical experience of them has its place in a previous 
life.,,18 Benjamin is ambiguous here, in the sense that he holds the rich 
connotations of his observations in suspense. "The correspondances are the data 
of remembrance -not historical data, but data of prehistory. What makes festive 
days great and significant is the encounter with an earlier life. Baudelaire 
recorded this in a sonnet entitled 'La Vie anterieure'. The images of caves and 
vegetation, of clouds and waves which are evoked at the beginning of this second 
sonnet rise from the warm vapour of tears, tears of homesickness.,,19 Pace 
Benjamin, the homesickness in question is a sham rendering apparent in a 
negative mode the dystopian nature of the power of remembrance engendered by 
18 
19 
Benjamin, Baudelaire, 141. 
Benjamin, Baudelaire, 141. 
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the ideal. The encounter with an earlier life is entirely phantasmatic. 
As regards the correspondences and their transformation in the itinerary 
leading from the project of beautification20 to that o! spleen intensification, the 
temporal condensation which Benjamin implies ("the correspondances are the 
- .' 
data of remembrance") is always accompanied by the stripping of content that is 
consequent upon the collapse of socio-symbolic experience. It is to the latter that 
the temporal oscillation between accessing a past scene and fabricating one in the 
present is germane. The narratives, therefore, do not engage temporal 
/" 
differentials in the name of a nostalgia for the plenitude of a communal calendar. 
Baudelaire's poetry exhibits the awareness of the latter's mythic character. 
The temporal fluctuations in the Baudelairean text, the "flash-back" 
character of mnemonic sequences and their non-historical nature,21are always 
implicated into what Eugene Holland traces as "[t]he absolute loss of connection 
between instinctual drives and both social and personal meaning," and the 
prevalence of an "ego-defensive anxiety.,,22 The same mechanism is operative in 
the case of shock-defence strategies deployed in the correspondences programme, 
but also in differ~nt ways preempted in the spleen/ideal difficult dialectic.23 
Holland calls for the historical understanding of the anxiety over meaning-
20 For the meaning of beautification in Beaudelaire's poetry see Holland, Baudelaire and 
Schizoanalysis, 13-1: "Beauty, on this conception, is a function of poetic imagination alone, 
deriving its value solely from the investment of poetic desire, regardless o/the nature o/the object 
itself' (emphasis added). Even the rotting corpse of a prostitute will serve as an aesthetic source of 
amazement for the textual narrator in "Une Charogne" (OC I: 31-2). 
21 See Benjamin, Baudelaire, 143. He writes: "In the spleen, time becomes palpable; the 
minutes cover a man like snowflakes. This time is outside history, as is that of the memoire 
involontaire. But in the spleen the perception of time is supernaturally keen; every second finds 
consciousness ready to intercept its shock" (emphasis added). The "flash-back" character of 
memory relates to the necessity to ward off the traumatic impact of improperly screened 
experience and replicates the primary characteristic of shock which is its suddenness. 
22 Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 268-9. . 
23 See Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 268. 
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recognition and the successful coding/decoding in -the social register, and links 
this demand and possibility with the primacy of exchange-value over use-value. 
This is a perfectly legitimate gesture, yet it concerns only one facet of what is at 
" 
stake. Th~ mnemonic leap into previous life, "the murmur of the past," is not one 
that solicits testimonial certainties. "La Vie Anterieure" makes a scene out of the 
compulsion to return to past life, but this enterprise is shorn of any hope of 
retrieving any autarkic gist of experience. Therefore, the scene described cannot 
be embedded in a causal sequence. In "L'Ennemi" (DC I: 16) the effort to 
,/ 
"reclaim the flooded land" of youthful experience proves to be utterly futile: "Et 
qui sait si les fleurs nouvelles que je reve / Trouveront dans ce sol lave comme 
une greve / Le mystique aliment qui ferait leur vigueur? [And who knows if the 
new flowers of which I dream / Will ever find in this soil as thoroughly washed as 
the seashore / The mystic manna that will give them strength?].,,24 The rhetorical 
question reaffirms the unavailing character of any endeavour to "rassembler a 
neuf les terres inondees, [reclaim the flooded land]," meaning the realm of 
anterior experience that has now been covered with successive layers of 
Erlebnisse. 
It would be superfluous to point out that it was Benjamin who first 
fathomed the historical and political dimensions of Baudelaire's work along with 
the poetry's grappling with the reification of both reality givens and aesthetic 
language. His analyses have also revealed the historical dimension inherent in the 
modem anxiety over meaning-recognition that Baudelaire admirably exemplifies. 
In "Baudelaire or the Streets of Paris" he writes apropos of technology and 
24 OC I: 161 CV I: 69; translation Francis Scarfe's. 
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aestheticism that they "[b]oth abstract from the social reality of man.,,25 These 
views are well-known and amply commented upon. However, the "Now-Time" 
dimension that subtends Benjamin's unorthodox historicism is relevant to his 
" 
understandjng of Baudelaire's work as well. The experience of time that he 
associates with remembrance is not horizontal or cumulative but interspersed by 
ecstatic moments that rupture the temporal continuum.26 It accommodates an 
extra-historical or transcendental element that could help qualify the palindromic 
movement between resignation and anticipation und~rlying Baudelairean spleen. 
The leaps of memory with their destruction of linear continua are in a state of 
mutual illumination vis-a-vis this heterogeneous' temporality: "[E]xperience 
[Erfahrung] [accompanies] one back into the far reaches of time, fills and divides 
time.,,27 However, and this is where I diverge from Benjamin, he projects 
characteristics of psychologicallpersonological memory onto the social terrain. 
He affirms the possibility of a collective non-linear memory solicited by, and 
reinforcing, a collective understanding. The "days of remembrance [Tage des 
Eingedenkens],,28mentioned above, the calendar, festival days that are supposed to 
reflect a community's solidarity with its own past and affirm its accumulated 
experience, are points of intersection within the temporallhistorical continuum that 
are both an integral part of it and also come to fissure it from the outside.29 
25 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 172. 
26 See Benjamin, ''Theses on the Philosophy of History," 255: "[The materialist historian] 
grasps the constellation which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one. Thus he 
establishes a conception of the 'time of the now' which is shot through with chips of Messianic 
time." 
27 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 136. 
See Benjamin, Baudelaire, 142. 
See Benjamin, Baudelaire, 139: "These significant days are days of completing time .... 
28 
29 
They are days of recollection, not marked by any experience. They are not connected with the 
other days, but stand out from time" (emphasis added). 
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Benjamin is anxious to conjoin involuntary memory with a remembrance that will 
be useful to collective patterns of self-understanding. He wants to preserve the 
possibility of social intervention while upsetting the-!inear time of historicism. 
The scheq1a, however, does not unfold unencumbered. Baudelaire's "spiritual 
year,,30encases no accumulated experience or common essence through which to 
reach collective understanding. Days of remembrance do not necessarily promote 
the critical consciousness of one's political conditions. They may equally foster 
the illusion of social solidarity. Baudelairean memo!y, on the contrary, brackets 
the injunctions of collective imaginaries by exposing their factitious character. 
Benjamin's criticism of Proust's non-volitional aesthetic remembrance is 
relevant to Baudelaire too. For Proust "redemption is [his] private ShOW.,,31 
Benjamin wants it both ways. He wants to use a model of involuntary memory to 
offset historicist horizontal patterns of temporality and history, but this model 
must be shorn of its individualistic, atomistic dimensions. The danger always 
lurks, however, that a spurious collective will ultimately be asserted. The step 
from Baudelaire and Proust's privative non-volitional remembrance to a non-
horizontal collective memory and understanding is more of a gap. It ultimately 
hinges on one's faith in the possibility of an epiphanic destruction of time and 
essence continua: "he [the historian who "grasps the constellation which his own 
era has formed with a definite earlier one"] establishes a conception of the present 
as the 'time of the now' which is shot through with chips of messianic time. ,,32 




Benjamin, Baudelaire, 142. 
Benjamin, Baudelaire, 145, fn. 80. 
Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 255; emphasis added. 
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ec-stasis/exit from time and history. On the contrary, it reveals non-volitional 
memor~ as a non-dependable model of self-understanding, while refusin.g to 
subscribe to collective modes of remembering and making sense of one's reality. 
The sorrowful memory of "la vie ant6rieure," w~ich obviously is nobody's 
appurtenance in the privative sense, reflects an act of interminable mourning. 
Baudelaire's melancholic remembrance, however, is not necessarily debilitating. It 
translates the awareness of historical impasses as much as the haphazard and 
perilous character of all mnemonic endeavours to rel31te to the past and cement a 
sense of present. It is dislodged from the comforts of experience restoration and 
does not succumb to any symbolist mystique, either. 
Baudelaire's mnemonic project reveals that the salvaging of the past 
through volitional memory jeopardises its essence by turning it into empty 
souvenir. Involuntary memory, on the other hand, feeds upon a constitutively 
imperilled form of experience. Its unpredictable character renders it incompatible 
with the exigencies of political vigilance. It can never assume the form of a 
solidaristic memory. Adorno writes that "just as no earlier experience is real that 
has not been loosed by involuntary remembrance from the deathly fixity of its 
isolated existence, so conversely, no memory is guaranteed, existent in itself, 
indifferent to the future of him who harbours it; nothing past is proof, through its 
translation into mere imagination, against the curse of the empirical present. ,,33 
Neither mode of memory is adequate to the restoration or preservation of past 
experience. Baudelaire's poetry problematises the essence of the latter category 
and reveals the impasses of both non-testimonial and collective memory. 
33 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. 
Jephcott (London: Verso, 1974), 166; emphasis added. 
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The splenetic experience reverberates with a melancholic elongation of the 
present coupled with the sense of an imminent rupture that will upset the whole 
temporal schema. This rupture is both desired and dreaded. An ecstatic moment 
). 
that is alw.ays imminent and fends off the closure of the mnemonic continuum 
seems to be lurking behind the ennui of elongated present. However, it is 
impossible to read within this pendulum-like temporal movement any epiphanic 
vestiges, and this is what sets the two temporal schemas apart within a compatible 
terrain. The epiphanic dimension seems to be constitutive of Benjamin's 
/' 
engagement with temporality and history and as such makes it impossible to align 
his thought with straight versions of historicism or equate it with Baudelaire's 
radical, even if negative, affirmation of the finitude effects of temporality. It is 
impossible to adequately address here the tension between Benjamin's insistence 
on a certain version of historical determination and the supra-historical or even 
messianic dimensions of his thought, but the tension must be registered. 
Ultimately, I consider Benjamin's work to point beyond the mutual 
closure of rhetorical and historicist concerns and, therefore, consider it legitimate 
to draw on his complex elaboration of the two spheres without a sense of 
contradiction. His complication of stereotypical notions of historical and 
mnemonic vigilance inexhaustibly ren~ws his relevance to Baudelaire. One has 
only to tum to his insistence on involuntary memory and his advocacy of its 
relevance to a critical historiography in order to realise the complexity and 
profundity of his engagement with a new historical rationality. It would admit of 
the aleatory dimension while not compromising political and mnemonic vigilance 
and an ethics of solidarity with those discarded by the impetus of progressivist 
67 
historicism. Following Nietzsche's suspiciousness towards injunctions to 
comme!llorate and their correlate standardised hypertrophied archiving me~ory, 
he purveyed the notion of a critical historiography that, would zero in on images 
instead of, stories. 34 This is not an experimental or impressionistic collage of 
phenomenally antithetical conceptual paradigms, but the leverage of a critical 
relation to one's history that moves beyond the facile and illusional anamorphosis 
of past injustices and rumination of past discontent. 
Baudelaire's project did justice to the dual character of memory. and 
melancholy by concocting a melancholy memory that was not blind to its 
impasses and destructive potential. He did not normalise catastrophe nor did he 
construe it as an overwhelming condition that preempted all responses to it but 
that of naIve awe. The poetry made a critical use of what Benjamin implies by 
Eingedenken [solidaristic memory] but refused to put faith in privileged monadic 
moments that would allegedly rupture the continua of history, time, and organic 
memory. Its images hanker after experiential coherence while simultaneously 
problematising the transmissibility of experience and the assumption that it 
comprises an inalienable core to be distilled after successive temporal layers have 
been removed by involuntary memory. This is the gist of "La Vie anterieure." 
Eugene Holland summarises some facets of the point in question, 
adjusting them to his vocabulary, this way: "The rapid pace of change and the 
predominance of exchange-value in market society decode what Benjamin calls 
34 See Benjamin, "Konvolut N: On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress," 462: 
"What distinguishes images from the 'essences' of phenomenology is their historical index .... For 
the historical index of the images not only says that they belong to a particular time; it says, above 
all, that they attain to legibility only at a particular time .... [E]ach 'now' is the now of a particular 
recognizability." 
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'the handles of experience' protecting the psyche, thereby generating additional 
anxiety in its defence. The modernism that registers the prevalence of anxiety 
over gratification is a function of the market existence.,,,35 However, the historical 
" 
inflection ~ith which the whole discussion is invested by the two is a reality to 
which I can only respond through situating Baudelaire's aestheticism and politico-
historical awareness in terms of a relation between mutually undermining kernels, 
even if it is not a case of an absolutely exclusive opposition. The logic of 
chronological annexation to which Holland seems to !ldhere mitigates the edge of 
Baudelaire's insights since it negatively affirms the possibility of a futural exit 
from the crisis. Beneath the rhetoric of crisis lies a soothing reassurance as to the 
temporary nature of the catastrophe. The examined poetry, however, does not 
sustain for long the reassuring illusion of a conceptual or political equilibrium a 
venir since it codifies the failure of the protocols that would guarantee it. When it 
comes to Benjamin, I must register again his procrastination in deciding between 
an analytical mode privileging the determinative role of historico-economic 
infrastructures and a discursive mode that translates a viable sensitivity to 
tropological specifics. He conjugates the two modes without resolving their 
antagonism. He does so, however, in a way that reveals and enriches the content 
of this tension while enhancing the potentialities of both a historicist and an 
aesthetic stance. 
35 Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 269. 
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"Le Balcon": the mnemotechnics of love 
.The prevalence of anxiety over gratification36 registered in several of the 
poems indicates the ambivalent nature of the shock-def~nce strategy consisting in 
the strategic alliance of ideal and correspondances. Eugene Holland summarises 
the paradoxical nature of the whole endeavour: 
The shock-defense is not without serious consequences: the process "of 
assigning to an incident a precise point in time in consciousness at the cost 
of the integrity of its contents" in effect turns the incident "into a moment 
that has been lived (Erlebnis) (p. 117);37 it thereby "sterilize[s] the incident 
for poetic experience" (p. 116). Baudelaire thus appears as a lyric poet 
whose conditions of experience threaten to preclude the possibility of 
writing lyric poetry. Baudelaire's response to this challenge, according to 
Benjamin, is the doctrine of correspondences, an "attempt to establish 
. . . . f ~ ,,38 
expenence In a cnsIs-proo lorm 
The inherently unreliable nature of the correspondences has to do with the 
contradictory address of the shattering of experience in a lyrical form that tries to 
retain the cohesion lost at the level of disintegrated reality. The inevitable 
instability of the process shows through the angle of allegorical memory whose 
referents spring from deceased experience [Erfahrung] disguising itself as 
Erlebnis.39 It is what Benjamin calls the remembrance of the Griibler, a memory 
in which "human knowledge ... is something piecemeal -in an especially 
pregnant sense: it is like the jumble of arbitrarily cut pieces from which a puzzle is 
36 The impossibility of sexual gratification in Baudelaire's poetry should be linked to the 
laboriousness of cognitive pursuits. One reflects the other. The pervasiveness of sex that the 
characters' tortured ambivalence comes to denounce mirrors the tyrannical nature of cognitive 
stability that inhabits the narratives in the mode of a thematic desideratum overtly recognised as a 
socially sanctioned channel of power imposition. The poems addressed to the poor, the prostitute, 
the pervert, and the pariah parade this denunciation quite overtly. 
37 Holland cites from Benjamin, Baudelaire, 117. The same applies to the following page 
references. 
38 . Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 140. 
39 See Walter Benjamin, "Central Park," trans. Lloyd Spencer and Mark Harrington, New 
German Critique 34 (winter 1985), 49; cited in Max Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 181. 
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assembled. ,,40 This construal of memory amounts to a mode of remembering 
whose organising principle is that of a defence against ego-dismantling shocks 
and their traumatic inscription in consciousness. The\fragmentary and strained 
character of the memory morsels betrays a poetry that ~vertly belabours the nature 
of mnemonic inscriptions. Baudelaire's poetry is about the tension between the 
voluntary/involuntary character of memories and the axes of Erlebnis and 
Erfahrung, and includes within its thematic space the retroactive attempt at 
mastering and/or preempting traumatic memory resi~ues. The deflation of the 
traumatic incidents' contents through their being given a specific point in a serial 
temporal schema signals what has been focalised above in terms of the effects of a 
Grubler memory. This operation causes the mortification of past-matrices and the 
reified character of memory-traces: the traumatic content disintegrates and at the 
same time the souvenirs get embedded in a pseudo-temporal narrative grid aiming 
at alleviating suffering by defusing the memory-traces of their pathogenic, ego-
shattering force. The intellect can thus tum the traumatic incident into "a moment 
that has been properly lived (Erlebnis),,41 and has therefore been cognitively 
appropriated. Its (traumatic) content will have been exhausted as an object of 
consciousness through the act of inscription. The way this inscription, however, 
exceeds the boundaries of classical representational models of reflexion in 
Baudelaire becomes apparent when one concentrates on the idiosyncratically 
distortional character of his imagery. The wilful character of this integration is 
apparent in this poetry that tries to tum conditions adversarial to lyric poetry into 
Benjamin writes: "The relic derives from the corpse; the souvenir from deceased experience 
[Erfahrung] which calls itself euphemistically Erlebnis." 
40 Walter Benjamin, "Konvolut J: Baudelaire," 368. 
41 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 117. 
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enabling ones. The texts try to make a narrative out of a condition that defies 
narrati val embedment since it brackets the protocols of essence that would sustain 
it. The standardised response to trauma mandates tpat traumatic experiential 
contents must either be relegated to the realm of the unverbalisable or he 
ingrained in a horizontal temporal schema. The non-commensurability between 
traumatic experience and larger explanatory and temporal frameworks that is 
constitutive of the trauma itself is thus supposed to be filled up. 
In "Le Baleon" a mnemotechnics that can b~ subsumed under a broadly 
conceived exertion of Erlebnis is instantiated in the form of an injunction to 
remember: "Je sais l'art d'evoquer les minutes he}euses' Et revis mon passe blotti 
dans tes genoux [I know the art of evoking the moments of happiness' And relive 
my past nestled at your feet].,,42 The wilful character of reminiscing is accentuated 
by the ambivalently ironic repetition of the quoted phrase accompanied by an 
emphatic exclamation mark at the end of the strophe. The result is that what 
initially reads like a reminder of a capacity ends up as an ironic realisation of 
one's ability to artificially reproduce a semblance of immediacy through the 
mnemonic recall of past happiness. This is far removed from the conservative 
response to trauma mentioned above. The last strophe, when approached under 
this light, reads like a recapitulation, of a pervasive theme, i.e., the wilfulness 
behind the narrators' mnemonic acts, the laboriousness of their anamnestic 
immersions, the effort to tum vanishing experience into retrievable essence, that 
is, Erlebnis experience: "Ces serments, ces parfums, ces baisers infinis , 
Renaitront-ils d'un gouffre interdit a nos sondes,' Comme montent au ciel les 
42 Baudelaire, DC I: 37/CV, 101; translation modified. 
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soleils rajeunis I Apres s'etre laves au fond des mers profondes? 1-0 serments! 0 
parfums! 6 baisers infinis! [Those vows, those perfumes, infinity of kisses I"':'Will 
they ever be reborn from a fathomless underworld I Li~e suns refreshed rising up 
to the sky.! After their cleansing in the deepest of seas? I 0 vows, 0 perfumes, 0 
infinite kisses!]." The concluding question should be read literally as what it is, a 
question concerning the feasibility of the whole restorative endeavour, and not as 
a rhetorical decoy that would re-affirm the recapturing of past scenes suffused 
with a hypothetical contentment. In Baudelaire Erlebnis must be created ex nihilo 
r 
since Erfahrung was never really there in the first place. This insight is integral to 
the texts. But this knowledge is powerless to posit what it targets as an artificial 
mnemonic plenitude or hinder the reactionary process of the transformation of 
experiential void into lived time (Erlebnis). "Le Ba1con" is ironic of all efforts to 
ground the retrieval of a hypothetical self-presence in the mode of nostalgia for 
the past. 
Baudelairean memory and Hegelian Gediichtnis 
Cynthia Chase has commented on Baudelaire in a way that engages the 
issues of memory and representationality and links them with Hegelian 
Gediichtnis. She contends that in Baudelaire's text "representation is represented 
as the activity of producing signs, which Hegel also calls Gediichtnis.,,43 What 
must be emphasised in the case of the latter is that it is "entirely unlike the mutual 
complementarity and interpenetration of form and content that characterizes 
43 Cynthia Chase, "Getting Versed: Reading Hegel with Baudelaire," in Decomposing 
Figures: Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), 113-138. 
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symbolic art.,,44 In short, it renders impossible -the passage from signifier-
sedimentation to cognitive phenomenalism. Paul de Man, upon whose construal 
of Gedachtnis I have drawn, writes apropos: 
'\ 
Memorization (Gediichtnis) has to be sharply distinguished from 
recollection and from imagination. It is entirely devoid of images 
(bildlos), and Hegel speaks derisively of pedagogical attempts to teach 
children how to read and write by having them associate pictures with 
specific words. But it is not devoid of materiality altogether. We can learn 
by heart only when all meaning is forgotten and words read as if they were 
a mere list of names .... Thought is entirely dependent on a mental faculty 
that is mechanical through and through, as remote as can be from the 
sounds and the images of the imagination or from the dark mine of 
recollection, which lies beyond the reach of words and of thought. 
The synthesis between name and meaning that characterizes memory is 
an "empty link [das leere Band]" and thus entirely unlike the mutual 
complementarity and interpenetration of form and content that 
characterizes symbolic art (Enz. III, par. 463, p. 281). It is not aesthetic in 
the ordinary or in the classically Hegelian sense of the word. However, 
since the synthesis of memory is the only activity of the intellect to occur 
as sensory manifestation of an idea, memory is a truth of which the 
aesthetic is the defensive, ideological, and censored translation [emphasis 
added]. In order to have memory one has to be able to forget remembrance 
and reach the machinelike exteriority, the outward turn, which is retained 
in the German word for learning by heart, aus-wendig lemen.45 
De Man can legitimately proceed on the basis of the above to a statement 
germane to this discussion on memory and its link with the broader issue of 
subjectivity and essentiality in Baudelaire: "Memory effaces remembrance (or 
recollection) just as the I effaces itself." A critique of the symbol follows that 
exposes its false convergence of sign and nature. "The faculty that enables 
thought to exist [Memory/Gedachtnis] also makes its preservation impossible. 
The art, the techne, of writing which cannot be separated from thought and from 
memorization can only be preserved in the figural mode of the symbol, the very 
44 
45 
Paul de Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," Critical Inquiry 8 (1981-82): 73. 
De Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," 772-3. 
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mode it has to do away with if it is to occur at all." What must be stressed here in 
relation to Baudelaire is that this kind of memory renders the interiorisation of 
experience abortive. It is antithetical to it. In the way it shapes Erinnerung, 
). 
therefore, . Baudelaire's work deals with the material inscription and eventual 
forgetfulness of ideal contents.46 In the mechanical, wilful, staged memories that 
the textual protagonists labour to cement, the covering up of the primal gap 
between memory and ideal content is played out. The mnemonically accessed 
anterior experience retains only the formal decoru~_ of past life. What is more, 
Baudelaire's poetry accounts for the merely gestural retention of life contents in a 
narratival mode that exposes the necessity of sustaining the binomial character of 
the inscription and its subsequent bracketing through the stratagem of a lyrical 
voice that is non-monological (another "contradiction" that translates the above 
relation). 
I have already shown that "La Vie anterieure" registers the tension 
between Erfahrung (a putative inner experience, non-exhausted by a conscious 
appropriation of contents in its inceptive moment, inscribing indelible memory-
traces) and Erlebnis (a hypothetical (re)lived time). The defensive and ideological 
form that both forms of memory and experience can take in order to protect the 
ideality of contents against the agency of material (and more mechanical) 
mnemonic inscriptions bears the name of aesthetic correspondences, the 
"defensive, ideological and censored translation" of which de Man speaks. It is 
their primary role to preserve the interiority and recuperability of contents against 
46 See de Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," 773-4. The internal antagonism 
between material inscription and content abstraction/ideality is given therein a thorough 
elaboration. 
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the encroachment of material inscriptions (i.e.; signs) through hiding the 
"dependence of the progression from perception to thought ... on the mental 
faculty of memorization" [Gediichtnis].47 Baudelaire's, text reads at times like a 
mnemotechnics of fabricated experience, as in "Le .. Balcon" where the "main" 
information/memory is immersed in a spatial background in such a way as to have 
the mnemonic content acquire the character of a mechanically produced scene. 
The textual narrator must suspend the ideal/conceptual content of the recalled 
scene in order to remember it at all. The fact that the poem closes with an ironic 
reminder of its own wilfulness and laboriousness ("Je sais l'art d'evoquer les 
minutes heureuses! [I know the art of evoking happy moments !]") and with a 
literal question as to the feasibility of the mnemonic endeavour (!ICes serments, 
ces parfums, ces baisers infinis, / Renaitront-ils d'un gouffre interdit a nos sondes, 
[Those vows, those perfumes, those infinite kisses, / Will they ever be reborn 
from a fathomless chasm]"), translates the knowledge that memory is a labour and 
injunction that does not by itself suffice to secure self-presence and self-
witnessing. The recall labour in Baudelaire is inherently hindered not only, or 
exclusively, by the collapse of mnemonic collectivity (as Benjamin contends), but 
also by the lack of a foundation of essence in the present that would ideally 
guarantee a modicum of experiential coherence from which the mnemonic 
trajectory could safely emanate. At least in Baudelaire, and this is not 
insignificant, memory is not blind to the unhappiness of the others even though it 
is a memory without a properly sustaining I. This is the meaning of the ethicality 
of Baudelairean remembrance. His non-egological remembrance stages its own 
47 De Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," 772. 
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failure to recapture and/or posit the experiential origin, as well as its own refusal 
to be manipulated into an injunction of commemoration that would partake o'f the 
ethical dimension and be complicit with historicist progressivism. Still, exilic 
memory is explicitly aligned with the politically excl.uded in the last lines of "Le 
Cygne.,,48 
Baudelairean memory rehearses the conflict between a symbolic unfolding 
of corresponding essences and a serial metonymic mnemonic delirium that fails to 
anchor its own referents adequately. This inadequ~cy is reflected in the poetic 
narrators' perpetual working through of hermeneutic hypotheses in a condition 
that approximates a zero-degree referentiality. In "Un Voyage a Cythere" (OC I: 
117-9/ CV, 222-5) the dlmythologisation of the classical Hellenic topos gradually 
yields ~to an allegorical nightmare that recognises itself as such ("Le coeur 
enseveli dans cette allegorie [My heart was buried in that allegory]"). What 
started as the pursuit of a lost paradise has now turned not only into an "Eldorado 
banal" but a scene of death and decay, death of the human in the midst of a 
triumphal vociferous nature. The reminiscing narrator acknowledges the 
allegorical potential of the decaying hanged man's corpse and the whole scenery: 
" ... et j'avais, comme en un suaire epais / Le coeur enseveli dans cette allegorie" 
["as in the shrouds of death / I had my heart buried in that allegory"], yet desires 
to construe the whole image in terms of symbol: "Dans ton ile, 0 Venus! Je n'ai 
trouve debout / Qu'un gibet symbolique ou pendait mon image ... [In your island 
Venus I have found nothing / But a symbolic gallows with my own image hung 
48 
"Je pense aux matelots oublies dans une tIe, I Aux captifs, aux vaincus! ... a bien d'autres 
encor! [I think of sailors forgotten on a desert island, I Of the captives, the vanquished! ... and 
many more!]." 
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upon it]." The tension between the two tropes is -glossed over by the thematic 
intensity, the ocular fervour and rhetorical fluidity of the text that manage to 
deflect attention from the antagonism of purely intra-Jinguistic phenomena. In 
Paul de Man's terms, the same way the I disguises it~elf as a symbol whenever it 
speaks of anything but itself in terms of sign,49(that is, whenever it poses as ego) 
allegory is transformed into symbol for the sake of sustaining a sine qua non of 
referentiality, i.e., a minimal and allegedly non-arbitrary connectedness of 
intention (even if ultimately frustrated, as in this case) and encountered 
phenomenal reality. The final lines of the poem, however, deploy the mode of 
prayer in order to condense negatively the hiatus between intention and praxis. 
The disgust that the narrator experiences whenever he contemplates his "heart and 
body" accommodates the irreparable gap between the two spheres: "-Ah! 
Seigneur! Donnez-moi la force et Ie courage I De contempler mon coeur et mon 
corps sans degofit! [0 Lord give me the strength and courage I To contemplate my 
heart and body without disgust!]." This gap, however, is not cognitively 
exhausted in the moral realm but translates a "deeper" predicament: that of the 
randomness and temporal dispersion of experiential kernels and the defensive 
infusion of sense and specular phenomenality in an inherently meaningless 
trajectory. In the "symbolic gallows". of the text the narrator recognises his own 
hanging self, in the sense of someone whose aspirations to the plenitude of 
experience have been negated. It is this suffering (" J e sentis .... I Comme un 
vomissement, remonter vers mes dents I Le long fleuve de fiel des douleurs 
anciennes; [I felt .... I the long stream of gall of my past sufferings [rising] like a 
49 See De Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," 770. 
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vomit to my teeth,] ") that the text engages in the guise of the exotic voyage. The 
Cytherean utopia is the scene where the interplay of moral disgust and ocular 
intensity translate the friction between an allegori~al unhinging of virtual 
experiential contents and a putative symbolic sedimentation of mutually 
reverberating semantic kernels.so 
As regards the specular economy of Baudelaire's texts, most memories or 
encountered scenes revolve around a solid material basis. "Le Cygne" enacts the 
submission of concrete remembrance to a metamo~?osis of perceptional givens 
that, however, does not detract from the edginess of the former ("Je ne vois qu'~n 
esprit tout ce camp de baraques, / Ces tas de Japitaux ... ./ La s'etalait jadis une 
menagerie; [Only in my mind's eye can I see those miserable huts .... / A 
menagerie used to sprawl down there;]"). The contrast between the realistic 
archiving of past reality that flares up in a near-ecstatic moment and a fluid 
"historical" framework that is there to imbue it with significance, lends many of 
the poems their poignancy. As Paul de Man writes, "Memory starts in a concrete 
perception,,,Slin an itinerary that purportedly leads back to an originating cause or 
event. "[T]he perception is, as it were, the epiphany of the accumulated memories 
that give it meaning." The dialectic of memory and perception that de Man so 
aptly depicts, however, does not consolidate a symbolist chora wherein the exile 
from origin would be eradicated, but comes to erode this topos by shading off, in 
the case of Baudelaire at least, into an interplay of fabricated scenes and a 
petrifying material look. This interplay resists the containments of both idealism 
50 This poem is also an instance of a metaironic pure poetry. It perfects the transparency of 
the relation to nature to interhuman rapport that "Le Voyage" posits too. See Paul de Man, 
"Allegory and Irony in Baudelaire," in Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism, 106. 
51 De Man, "Image and Emblem in Yeats," in Rhetoric of Romanticism, 198. 
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and realism. In chapter six (pages 118-20) I refer to"Augenschein, this subliminal 
stare that resists intellective intervention. Memory in the examined texts does not 
serve as a reconciling agent that helps negate the distance separating the exiles 
from their- retreating origin, but on the contrary exaggerates the difference 
between consciousness and matter that all essentialisms try to bridge. 
Remembrance in Baudelaire emanates from a material basis and seems to be 
contained in a material perception.52 However, memories gradually inflect 
towards an exacerbation of the material dimension only to end up as 
attributes of a condition wherein the human parameter, i.e., consciousness as a 
begetter of memories, has been cancelled. What one gets in the end is a difficult 
to reconcile combination of phenomenally antithetical dimensions. On the one 
hand, an intensification of materiality (that should ideally point to an engulfing 
human consciousness working through its own experiential material) and, on the 
other hand, the transparency and disincarnation of memories/images that are 
primarily ocular yet cognitively silent. This silencing of mnemonic content does 
not signal the triumph of a transcendental imagination that has moved beyond the 
actualities of material positing. The movement here is one of a mutual and 
simultaneous hollowing out of essential attributes to such a degree that a 
dialectical sublation of the antagonistic itineraries is impossible. Neither an 
ethereal imagination nor an attachment to the material world come to organise the 
narratives but, quite to the contrary, the undermining of phenomenalist and 
transcendentalist matrices relating to each other in a pseudo-dialectical mode. 
The material basis of Baudelairean memory always fails to anchor the 
52 See de Man, "Image and Emblem in Yeats," 199. 
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remembered scenes in a testimonially verifiable reality. It serialises its own 
givens in the mode of metonymy and then proceeds to bind them through'the 
deployment of metaphorical and symbolic embedments that cannot, however, 
conceal the intrinsic formal concerns pressing in the guise of diegesis. "Le 
Voyage a Cythere" is ingrained with the antagonism between allegory and symbol 
and resorts to the stratagem of the lyrical voice that is suffused with the awareness 
of its own demise in order to unfold as the formal terrain of this tropological 
conflict. The conflict shapes up through the decoy of a lyrical consciousness that 
is supposed to lament the loss of the archetypal paradise. That Cythera is from the 
beginning exposed as a cliche, and even prior to the sight of the hanging corpse 
that resumes in its frigid materiality the conflict between matter and 
transcendence, points to the intra-textual awareness of its own devices and guises, 
as well as augurs the blockage of an ultimate hermeneutic exit. 
Recapitulation: Erlebnis versus Erfahrung 
The climactic point to which this expose must lead is the tense dialectic 
between Erfahrung and Erlebnis in the context of the disintegration of. ideal 
contents in the case of the latter and their non-retrieval in the case of the former. 
Erlebnis in Baudelaire (that is, memories obeying the imperative of a more or less 
conscious emergence) tries to disguise itself as Erfahrung (that is, fully lived 
experience sustaining a minimal distillation of retrievable experiential essence) 
even though the relation between the two is to a certain extent one of mutual 
obliteration.53 The immediacy that Erfahrung is synonymous with is contravened 
53 See Benjamin, "Central Park," 49: "[T]he souvenir [derives] from deceased experience 
(Eifahrung) which calls itself euphemistically "Erlebnis." See also Baudelaire, 145: "The 
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whenever a retroactive act like that of (wilful) mnemonic retrieval occurs. The I 
that is supposed to sustain this act functions in terms compatible with a canoriical 
notion of symbolicity since, in de Man's terms, it represents as a determined 
relationship to the world (that between the recall. and the putatively lived 
experience) what is in reality purely arbitrary.54 The I of memory can only state 
itself as what it is not, that is, as a symbolic catalyst of temporally disjunct 
experiences, in order to sustain the illusion of a transcendental bridging of 
experiential instances. We encounter here a tension ~etween the wilful advent of 
memories and the spontaneous retrieval of hypothetical inner, 'lived' experiential 
contents. Rainer Nagele's words acquire a relevant inflection in the context of the 
above: "Erfa~ng [in Baudelaire] is laid bare as Erlebnis. Yet it is the gesture of 
laying bare the Erlebnis without any borrowed robe of Erfd:Gtmg that gives the 
Erlebnis the weight of Erfahrung".55 Baudelaire's uniqueness consists in the fact 
that he rendered obvious the transparency of inner experience (non-mediated by 
consciousness in its inceptive moment, allegedly recuperable through the agency 
of correspondences, the experience of non-volitional memory, of Erfahrung) to 
the meaning-disintegrating material inscription of a memorisation (Gediichtnis) 
that has to forget its content in order to sustain itself in the form of Erlebnis. The 
[Bergsonian] duree from which death has been eliminated has the miserable endlessness of a 
scroll. Tradition is excluded from it. It is the quintessence of a passing moment that struts about 
in the borrowed garb of experience." 
54 See Paul de Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," 770: "As we saw, the I, in its 
freedom from sensory determination, is originally similar to the sign. Since, however, it states 
itself as what it is not, it represents as determined a relationship to the world that is in fact 
arbitrary, that is to say, it states itself as a symbol. To the extent that the I points to itself, it is a 
sign, but to the extent that it speaks of anything but itself, it is a symbol. The relationship between 
sign and symbol, however, is one of mutual obliteration; hence the temptation to confuse and to 
forget the distinction between them." 
55 Rainer Nagele, "Poetic Ground Laid Bare: Benjamin Reading Baudelaire," in Walter 
Benjamin: Theoretical Questions, ed. David Ferris (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 
1996), 138. 
82 
agenda of correspondences transparently translates, in de Man's words, a 
philosophy of intemalisation of "Er-innerung as the ground of the aesthetic as 
well as the historical consciousness. Erinnerung, ~ecollection as the inner 
gathering and preserving of experience, brings history and beauty together in the 
coherence of the system."S6 The utter negativity of the aesthetic and historical 
experience voiced in the poetry of Baudelaire emanates from his confronting the 
collapse of the socio-symbolic order, and from the melancholia with which he 
faced, and, I argue, welcomed, the reduction of ll!eaning to vacant rhetorical 
gesturality. The impact of Baudelaire's poetry is partly due to his deployment of 
ironic allegory in order to render visible the reducibility of inner experience to 
sense-indifferent material inscription. This reduction is revealed in the particular 
quality of Baudelaire's mnemonic scenes that frame the narratival conflicts, that 
is, their abrupt character, distortional imagery and figural excess. It is also 
evident in the latter's capacity to engulf the "main" information and divest it of 
experiential coherence and/or a putative commensurability to phenomenal reality 
("Le Balcon" comes to mind here). 
The same logic impels the defensive character of Baudelairean beauty that 
is revealed through its marmoreal character and susceptibility to metamorphoses 
("Les Metamorphoses du vampire" ,and "La Beaute" are two characteristic 
instances of this ingrained instability). Beauty shapes up with intensely material 
attributes in distinction to a long tradition of aesthetic poetry that translates it in 
primarily ethereal/transcendental terms. Beauty in Baudelaire is made to sustain 
and codify the shock over the realisation that language is "unable to give a 
56 De Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," 771. 
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foundation to what it posits except as an intent of consciousness.,,57 This is the 
meaning that its transitoriness embraces. As such it comes to uphold a mediatory 
role. The funereal beauty that "La Beaute" depicts ha~ lost all the plasticity of 
human life: The rupture of an ideal content that w<?uld be uncontaminated by 
material inscription is here put into relief. 
J e suis belle, 0 mortels! ~omme un reve de pierre, 
Et mon sein, ou chacun s'est meurtri tour a tour, 
Est fait pour inspirer au poete un amour 
Eternel et muet ainsi que la matiere. (Oe I: 21) 
I am beautiful, 0 mortals! Like a dream in stone, 
And my breast, on which many a man has bruised himself, 
Is made to inspire in the poet a love 
Eternal and silent like matter. 
Beauty turns into soulless matter and thus condenses the antinomy of 
every content that must lose its ideality at the very moment it becomes materially 
expressible. In other terms, it metaphorises the text's own abnegation of the 
Abgrund, the non-foundation that subtends it. Additionally, it is the shock over 
the unassimilability of modem experience that is relevant here. The facticity of 
inner experience that Baudelaire engages in his bracketing critique of the 
imperatives of organic Erinnerung points to his acute awareness of the split 
between socio-symbolic and imaginary registers underlying the' 
ErlebnislErfahrung divide. It also ramifies into the zero-degree referentiality that 
his tactics of metonymic seriality and contentless intensification instantiate. 
57 Paul de Man, "Intentional Structure of the Romantic Image," in Rhetoric of Romanticism, 
6. Cynthia Chase refers to and rephrases this point in "Getting Versed," 134. 
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"Le BaIcon," "L 'Horloge": fabricated memories and the female body 
Cynthia Chase contends that in "Le Soleil" the difference between 
metaphor and metonymy breaks down and what we are left with is the display of a 
power of signification that exceeds the play of tropes. The power to assemble' 
lists is materialised here, as in the case where memorisation archives its 
trophies/souvenirs. It is especially in the Spleen poems that enumerative 
metonymic series are more evident. In Eugene Holland's words: "instead of 
invoking the metaphoric axis of remembrance, splee~_ intensification invokes the 
metonymic axis of seriality."s8 In "Le Balcon" these themes assume clearer 
contours in a way that explicitly links a problematic ,of temporality with that of the 
function of memory. A chronological confusion from the very beginning of the 
poem accentuates the ambiguity between the present and the possible 
remembrance of a scene. 
Mere des souvenirs, maitresse des maitresses, 
6 toi, tous mes plaisirs! 6 toi, tous mes devoirs! 
Tu te rappelleras la beaute des caresses, 
La douceur du foyer et Ie charme des soirs, 
Mere des souvenirs, maitresse des maitresses! (OC I: 
36). 
Mother of memories, lover of lovers, 
You who are all my pleasure! All my obligations! 
You will remember the beauty of caresses, 
The warmth of the hearth and the charm of evenings, 
Mother of memories, lover of lovers! 
The employment of the future tense, "tu te rappelleras, [you will remember]" adds 
to the chronological confusion in a way pregnant with implications regarding the 
58 Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 133. 
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anamnestic act. I.-D. Hubert thinks of the destinatrice as a "catalyseur 
mnemonique" and proceeds by focalising the peculiar dialectic of the perceived 
external world and the intensified sensations -in this case the sensation of smell, 
, 
which has been connected with the agency of correspondences.59 However, "Ie 
croyais respirer Ie parfum de ton sang [I thought I was inhaling the aroma of your 
blood]" inscribes this interplay within an effort at overcoming the boundaries 
separating nature from consciousness. This overcoming is impossible, however, 
and the mode of its postulation is transparent to this awareness. Moreover, as 
Hubert writes apropos of the phrase "Que l'espace est profond!", "en 
approfondissant [both in the appreciation of the aggrandisement of space and the 
intensification of sensation] on cree des souvenirs ou bien on les retrouve [by 
going into previous life one creates memories or retrieves them].,,6o The 
difference, however, between retrieving and creating memories is enormous. It 
partakes of the difference between Erfahrung and Erlebnis. The gap between the 
two realms precludes to a significant extent the consolidation of a historically 
viable Erinnerung. Occluding the difference amounts to an act of mystification. 
The last two strophes of the poem encapsulate the whole problematic. 
Ie sais l'art d'evoquer les minutes heureuses, 
Et revis mon passe blotti dans tes genoux. 
Car a quoi bon chercher tes beautes langoureuses 
Ailleurs qu' en ton cher corps et qu' en ton coeur si 
doux? 
Ie sais l'art d'evoquer les minutes heureuses! 
Ces serments, ces parfums, ces baisers infinis, 
Renaitront-ils d'un gouffre interdit a nos sondes, 
59 J. -D. Hubert, L'Esthetique des "Fleurs du Mal": Essai sur l'ambiguite (Geneve: Pierre 
Cailler, 1953), 180-1. 
60 Hubert, L'Esthetique, 181. 
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Comme montent au cielles soleils rajeunis 
Apres s'etre laves au fond des mers profondes? 
--0 serments! 0 parfums! 0 baisers infinis! (DC I: 37). 
I know the art of evoking happy moments" 
And live my past again nestled at your knees. 
For what would it avail to seek your languorous beauty 
Elsewhere rather than in your beloved body and tender 
heart? 
I know the art of evoking happy moments! 
These vows, these perfumes, the infinite kisses, Vlb~ 
Will they be reborn out of an abyss where no t:u 
Ever penetrates, Like reborn suns traversing the sky 
After being purified in the depths of bottomless seas? 
o vows! perfumes! Infinite kisses! 
Hubert comments as follows: "There seems to be a conflict between the 
non-reversibility of time and the return of memories which can only be mitigated 
by poetic creation. We do not know whether the abyss remains inaccessible to 
p~~Ji1~t.. h b··· I b ~ecause t e past cannot return or ecause poetIc memory IS Invo untary y 
nature --and therefore must be awaited. ,,61 The uneasy co-integration of the 
irreversibility of time and the process of retrieving memories coincides temporally 
with the "vows," the "perfumes," the "infinite kisses," and the narrator's nestling 
in the woman's body in the midst of a questioning of the possibility of the 
memories ever returning in the same form. This questioning indirectly echoes that 
of the feasibility of retrieving memories to the extent that woman is construed as a 
vehicle through which the anamnestic act comes to be consummated. This way 
memory is seen to be contingent, extrinsically determined and materially 
mediated. The corporeal mediation of remembrance in and through the female 
body accords well with the intercalation of the natural dimension that appears in 
61 Hubert, L'Esthetique, 182. 
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the form of the sun with its beauty and warmth, the profundity of space, and the 
intensification of sensation evinced through the paradoxical "respirer Ie parfum de 
ton sang." "Le Ba1con" blurs the distinction between natural and mental 
1 
\ 
processes while at the same time maintaining the dividing line between them. At 
the same time, the temporal instability already mentioned along with the 
revelation of the facticity and non-naturality of memory retrieval ("Je sais l'art 
d' evoquer les minutes heureuses") point to a condition wherein both memories 
and natural things are wilfully invested with significance instead of being 
regarded as inherently meaningful. The indirect awareness that seems to be 
gradually crystallising is that of an immanent tension between the immediacy of 
nature (the profundity of space, the warmth of the sun) and the mediate character 
of memory retrieval (through the mediation of the woman's physical presence). 
This is an awareness that depletes the pseudo-conjunction of the natural and the 
mental dimensions that is imparted as a first impression. The putative immediacy 
of memory can only be affirmed negatively under the sign of a remembrance 
triggered through, and nestling in, the other's body. Therefore, its fulfilment is 
inherently abortive and intra-textually acknowledged as such. Baudelaire 
inscribes the process of memorisation in the language of natural process and 
reinscribes the language of natural process in a discourse designating an activity 
that is instantiated within the symbolic chora and therefore eludes natural 
determinations. The anamnestic labour is bound to be represented as natural by 
necessity. The whole endeavour tries to ground memory and language in the 
sphere of perception.62 "Le Ba1con" can be seen as one of a series of poems 
62 The whole analysis of "Le Balcon" is indebted to Cynthia Chasels corresponding 
discussion of "Le Soleil" in "Getting Versed: Reading Hegel with Baudelaire," 131-2. Cynthia 
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negatively engaging the relation between phenomenalist cognition, memory 
retrieval and/or fabrication and, by extension, reference. 
The metaphoric axis of remembrance is invoked in the poem only to be 
'\ 
undermined by the indirect revelation of the facticity and materiality of the. 
reminiscing process which comes to be mediated by the woman's body. Knowing 
the art of evoking happy memories collapses the recuperation of inner experience 
to a wilful Erlebnis operation that itemises and serialises souvenirs. This must be 
borne in mind whenever an attempt is made at elucidating an operation that 
consists in the fabrication of screen memories disguised as products of genuine 
retrieval. This process is not exceptional and its factitiousness is revealed when it 
is counterpointed to remembrances that flare up in a context of crisis.63 Freud at 
some stage held the view that all memories are screen memories, "screens which 
it makes no sense to look behind in search of the 'original, primal' trace. ,,64 The 
remembered event is entirely free of empirical moorings, and is never sufficient in 
itself. This is what "Le Balcon" exemplifies. 
Holland emphasises the fact that during the programme of "recuperation 
through memory of an integral self mystically linked to a supernatural world, the 
Chase transcribes de Man's views on the mystificatory character of all programmes aiming at 
collapsing language to an attribute of perception in a way that, when it comes to concrete readings 
of literary texts as is the case here, can only be described as highly productive. In no way does her 
continuous connection with de Man imply her reduction to the mere status of an epigone. 
63 I am alluding to Benjamin's Thesis VI: "To articulate the past historically does not mean 
to recognize it 'the way it really was' (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up 
at a moment of danger" (Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 247). This monadic, 
rupturous memory does not upset the fixity of the past only through the epiphanic juxtaposition of 
primal events and their truth, but also through the dissolution of the past in the present "so that the 
future becomes (once again) an open question" (Forrester, Seductions of Psychoanalysis, 206). 
64 Forrester, Seductions of Psychoanalysis, 205. See "Screen memories," in Sigmund Freud, 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James 
Strachey, colI. Anna Freud, 24 vols. (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of 
Psychoanalysis, 1953-74), vol. 3,304-22. 
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figure of woman predominates.,,65 I cannot follow the psychoanalytic trajectory 
that legitimises his statement here, but can only concur with the empiricaJIy 
verifiable reality of his observations to the effect that the female body/presence 
, 
,\ 
seems to be the mediating vessel par excellence when it comes to all (always. 
abortive) attempts at a self-retrieval via memorisation. The female body 
functions as the chora wherein the conflict between naturality and artificiality is 
played out. This conflict is never instantiated in the mode of dialectical 
successivity but in that of simultaneity. As such it defies resolution. 
Memory and temporality are mutually imbricated in "L'Horloge," as well, 
a poem that instantiates what Holland calls the "decoding of subjectivity. ,,66 It is 
organised around the inter-containment of multiple prosopopoeiae to the effect 
that "the Second" and "Now" address the protagonist from within the central 
quotation serving as the backbone of the poem and reproducing the address of the 
clock. 
"Trois mille six cents fois par heure, la Seconde 
Chuchote: Souviens-toi! -Rapide, avec sa voix 
D'insecte, Maintenant dit: Je suis Autrefois, 
Et j' ai pompe ta vie avec rna trompe immonde! (OC 
I: 81) 
"Three thousand and six hundred times an hour, 
The Second whispers: Remember! Swift, 
With its insect's voice,. Now says: I am already 
Other, 
And I have drained your life with my hideous 
suckers! 
Holland rightly contends that this way the text "effectively underscores its 




Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 178. 
Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 104 
Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 105. 
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strategy whereby a tropological awareness implodes the naturality of conjunctions 
intratextually is evident here. Holland's analysis of the poem focuses on the 
allegorical vicissitudes of the personification of the timepiece. The questioning of 
, 
the allegorical figure's status is taken up by the rhetorical mode in which the· 
attribute "doigt [finger]" can be seen to refer either to the finger of the "dieu 
sinistre," the time-god, or to the pawl of the clock itself. 
Horloge! dieu sinistre, effrayant, impassible, 
Dont Ie doigt nous menace et nous dit: "Souviens-toi! 
Les vibrantes Douleurs dans ton coeur plein d' effroi 
Se planteront bientot comme dans une cible; (OC I: 81) 
Clock! Sinister god, terrifying, impassive, 
Whose finger threatens us and says: "Remember! 
Throbbing Sadness will implant itself inside your 
Terrified heart as if striking a target. 
We encounter here an ambivalent personification and an allegory of 
admonition. The latter is finally seen to evoke the force of memory because of its 
syntactical deployment and not because of its semantic content. "Souviens-toi" is 
not an imperative of memory, an inducement to remember, but a reminder of the 
ego-dismantling and memory-dispersing agency of time. 
"Souviens-toi que Ie Temps est un joueur avide 
Qui gagne sans tricher, a tout coup! c'est la loi. 
Le jour decroit; la nuit augmente; souviens-toi! 
Le gouffre a toujours soif; la clepsydre se vide. 
(DC I: 81) 
Remember that Time is an avid gambler 
Who wins without cheating at every tum! It's the 
law. 
The day is waning; night spreads; remember! 




It is interesting that in this case Ie gouffre [abyss, pit, chasm] is explic.itly 
associated with time. The wealth of spatio-temporal ~esonances that this term 
). 
carries have given it a prominent place in Baudelaire's topography wherein it has 
encased the tensions inherent in the poetry's treatment of the ethical dimension 
more geometrico.68 The explicitness with which it is linked to time "in this case is 
particularl y illuminating. 
Holland argues that "far from successfully resuscitating memory or even 
recommending the attempt, the poem warns of the inevitable defeat of memory by 
time, instead. The descriptive passages intercalated between the repeated 
command to 'remember' thus appear not as motives of recalling the past, but as so 
many features of what it is that needs always to be kept in mind: time is an avid 
gambler who wins without cheating, 'a tout coup!' (1.18) -at every stroke (of the 
clock), at every throw (of the dice) ... ,,69 Therefore, what is thematised through 
the deployment of the allegorical mode is the "categorical rejection of memory 
and of the prospect of recuperating the identity of self metaphorically by reuniting 
past and present." What is evinced is the awareness and allegorisation of an 
"eclipse of memory and integral subjectivity,,7othat contains within it in a 
sublative mode the defensive intensification of things and sensations and an echo 
of the thrills of evilification. Within the enclosure of Baudelaire's psychopoetics 
68 Guilt in Baudelaire's poetry is often articulated through images of ascent and fall. There 
is nothing new or radical in that. However, the continuous reversals of moral values point to a 
logic of structurally preserving moral equilibria irrespective of their content (see especially the 
Revolte section [DC I: 121-5]). Morality in Baudelaire is postural. It serves as the terrain 
whereupon the imbrication of moral imperatives and political asymmetry is brought to relief. 
69 Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 106-7. 
70 Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 106-7. . 
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this containment manages to synthesise several tension-ridden themes into a 
discursive ensemble whose uneasy yet balanced coexistence of kernels cannot but 




"LE CYGNE": THE MUTUAL UNDERMINING OF HISTORY AND 
MEMORY 
There is a first, or an early moment which is unique, of 
shock and surprise, even of terror ... a moment which can 
never be forgotten, but which is never repeated integrally; 
and yet which would become destitute of significance if 
did not survive in a larger whole of experience. 
T. S .. Eliot, "Dante" 
I: Infinitisation of the mnemonic trajectory 
The coexistence of an allegorical mode of content organisation and the 
treatment of memory as a macro-theme underlies "Le Cygne" and renders it 
apposite to the preceding discussion. In Holland's words, socio-symbolic 
transformation triggers a "memory-based mode of recognition so central to the 
correspondences program."} The central concern around which the text is 
organised is the disjunction between voluntary and involuntary memory and 
whether its overcoming is feasible, meaningful or desirable. From the opening 
lines the allegorical signified "Le Cygne" is presented as part of an experience 
that integrates it as the relay of an anterior meaning. The recollection of an earlier 
scene in which a swan had escaped from its menagerie cage occurs within a 
framework positing the speaking subject in the temporal mode of the present. 
Gradually, and bearing in mind the shock-effect of the apostrophe that marks the 
beginning of the poem, an apostrophe pointing to a historical past, the text 
crystallises through a seriality of anteriorities. 
Andromaque, je pense a vous! Ce petit fleuve, 
Pauvre et triste miroir ou jadis resplendit 
L'immense majeste de vos douleurs de veuve, 
Eugene Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 158. 
94 
Ce Simoi's menteur qui par vos pleurs grandit, 
A feconde soudain rna memoire fertile, 
Comme je traversais Ie nouveau Carrousel. 
Le vieux Paris n'est plus (la forme d'une ville 
Change plus vite, helas! que Ie coeur d'un 
mortel); (DC I: 85). 
Andromaque, I am thinking of you! This narrow stream, 
Insignificant sad mirror where once shone 
The immense majesty of your widow's sadness, 
This false Simoi's that swells by your tears, 
Has suddenly enriched my fertile memory, 
As I was crossing the new Carrousel. 
Old Paris is no more (a city's form 
Changes, alas, faster than a mortal's heart); 
Nathaniel Wing writes about the analeptic character of this narrative 
wherein an earlier scene, that of the swan, is intercalated and interrelated to the 
allegorical signified Andromaque.2 The supposedly fertile memory upon which 
the allegorical relais can be deployed is gradually depicted as being unable to 
contain the rapidly metamorphosing landscape of Paris. It is admitted from the 
beginning that memory cannot keep pace with the accelerating rhythms of urban 
metamorphosis, therefore is unable to accommodate one of the primary 
parameters of modem experience, that is, mutability. It is exactly this inability 
which resonates with the problematics of the voluntary/involuntary nature of 
memory. The haphazard character of the associational trajectory that characterises 
non-volitional recall, and the laborious nature of remembrance distinguishing 
conscious recollection, address unsuccessfully the transformation of contents and 
2 Nathaniel Wing, ''The Danaides Vessel: On Reading Baudelaire's ~o~es," in The 
Limits of Narrative: Essays on Baudelaire, Flaubert, Rimbaud and Mallarme ( faltambridge 
University Press, 1986), 14. 
95 
the unhinging of historical referents guaranteed by temporality. Now, the serial 
acceleration of meaning3 accruing to the realisation that "tout pour moi devient 
allegorie" legitimises the hypothesis that what is involved here is not only what 
.\ 
Wing underlines as "a radical loosening of the relationship between the signifier 
and signified, suggesting the terrifying possibility that any person, object or 
relationship can mean absolutely anything." I believe that the overdetermination 
of the allegorical mode of conceiving reality implies by extension the 
disanchoring of the anamnestic faculty from the metaphorical network that is 
supposed to ground and bind the associations between present stimuli and 
memory-grids. A rhetorical instance of this disanchored memory is that of "Un 
vieux Souvenir [qui] sonne a plein souffle du cor! [An old memory that winds its 
horn]" in the midst of a "foret [forest]" where the narrator's spirit is "exiled." It is 
impossible to stabilise the permeation of the verbal unit je pense it by a potential 
je me souviens de. Thought shades off into memory and memory to the 
fabrication of scenic fragments triggered by an empathetic need for identification, 
a need that, as will be argued later on, has political implications. Nathaniel Wing 
summarises the reality of the metonymic seriality that the poem exhibits as a 
consequence of the intermeshing of conscious thought and memory as follows: 
The supposedly rational, monosemic or polysemic figure [the figure of the 
negress, the orphans, the narrator's memory, etc.] functions, then, in a 
curious and unsettling manner, to inscribe the predicament of a thought 
caught in an open and endless displacement. Poetic thought is no longer 
delimited by the semantic horizon of the allegorical signified; it breaks that 
horizon by the repetition of an endless continuity. Each allegorical figure 
reiterates the impossibility of retrieving a lost origin; the loss which is 
allegorized here is that which is always already absent. The "object" ("ce 
qui ne se retrouve jamais ... "), moreover, is not easily compensated for by 
See Wing, "The Danaides Vessel," 15. 
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the language which figures its displacement, for language is here powerless . 
to restore the plenitude of an original presence.4 
Each allegorical figure reiterates the impossibility of binding the 
\ 
mnemonic -referents in a symbolically sensible way. Recourse to memory 
enhances self-alienation through memory's relentless seriality and displacement 
of the points-de 'rep)re that would sediment the associative trajectory into a realm 
of recognisable and cohesively-bound contents. Holland, apropos of the 
Andromaque invocation, contends that "the Poet's memory appears here not as 
agent but as a direct object, suddenly fertilized by Andromaque's little river. The 
Poet remains undecidably as much the object as the subject of these thoughts in 
the explanation offered later in the poem: 'Aussi devant ce Louvre une image 
m'opprime: I Je pense a mon grand cygne .. .I ... et puis a vous,jAndromaque ... "'s 
A logic of mutual inflection of its constitutive parts governs the whole sequence 
wherein the intercalation of allegorical microrecits contributes to the lingering 
sense of self-alienation. Memory is the main agent of these alienating effects 
since it operates in the wake of the incapacitation of the metaphoric axis that 
could bind its contents and gear its effects toward the recoding of socio-symbolic 
experience. The experience of a rapidly changing Paris cannot be commensurate 
with a cumulative series of memory chains. 
I argue that the signified swan elaborates upon the incessant pursuit of 
meaning within a framework of allegorical representation. In the first chapter I 
stressed the visibility of the arbitrariness characterising the relation of the 
allegorical poles. The facticity and non-naturality of the allegorical trajectory 
4 
5 
Wing, "The Danaides Vessel," 15. 
Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 159; original emphasis. 
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constitute an integral part of every allegorical "theme" and testify to an enhanced 
semiological awareness ingrained in the trope. Timothi Bahti chronicles the 
particular character of this allegory as perceived by Ha~s Robert Jauss as follows: 
\ 
"Instead of the allegorical representation of a prior, or beuer, a timeless truth 
within or through reality --the Platonic tradition of allegory-- the allegorical 
imagery is here in a negative or discordant relation to its significance, inverting 
allegorical truth into a self-referential sense of lost significance and, together with 
this, inverting worldly representation into the representation of its absence. ,,6 The 
swan allegorises the loss of denominational control. What his reproaches to God 
instantiate ( "Comme s'il adjressait des reproches a Dieu! [As if he reproached 
God himself]") is "the ethical language of persuasion [that] has to act upon a 
world that it no longer considers structured like a linguistic system but that 
consists of a system of needs.,,7 The fact that the source of this pursuit of memory 
and meaning assumes the form of an animal (the swan) relates to the intemallink 
of. this demand with the ideology of need that connects it directly to naturality. 
The muteness of the bird, on the one hand, reinforces the pathos with which this 
demand is usually articulated whereas, on the other hand, it undermines the 
equation between naturality and language that is the common topos behind the 
putative inevitability of the referential dimension. In distinction to an economy of 
metaphorical naturality (vide correspondences) "allegory speaks out with the 
6 Timothi Bahti, Allegories of History: Literary Historiography after Hegel (Baltimore; 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992),213. Bahti summarises approvingly Hans Robert 
Jauss' contentions in Asthetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik, vol. I (Munich: W. 
Fink, 1977),295-342. 
7 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), 
209. 
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referential efficacy of a praxis."s Praxis should be understood here in the sense of 
an act that incorporates the awareness of its conjunctural, arbitrary and consensual 
character. In "Le Cygne" the praxial and disjunctive c,haracter of the allegorical 
). 
articulation is rendered readable through the textual schematisation of the 
disruptive intertwining of trope and persuasion in the form of the errant bird. 
"[T]out pour moi devient allegorie" recapitulates the already apparent agency of 
the trope whereas the errancy of the swan makes a scene of the system of needs 
that underlies the ethical language of persuasion (the swan's reproaches). The 
whole itinerary is sustained in the temporal mode of simultaneity, and not as a 
succession of conflicting moments. The trope must be entwined with the 
language of need if it is to be staged at all. There is no moment of ultimate 
synthesis, however, since the relation is neither dialectical nor serially temporal. 
Within this framework the tension between retrieving the essence of (past) 
experience and the disintegration of experiential and mnemonic contents through 
the allegorical staging of this experience organises the text. 
"Le Cygne" II: rnetafigural awareness 
Concerning the issue of memory, Eugene Holland writes apropos of "Le 
Jeu" and "Le Cygne" that "there, the Poet cannot simply subscribe to meaning and 
memory, since they are decoded [i.e., dissolved], but cannot entirely abandon 
them either: they are transformed by the supplement of melancholy, which 
generates the multiple allegories of exile comprising part II of the poem.,,9 
Baudelaire's melancholy, however, is not the negative indicator of a nostalgia for 
8 
9 
De Man, Allegories of Reading, 208. 
Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 169. 
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what was once there but has now succumbed to adverse conjunctures. Nor 'is it 
sustained by an immutable subjectivity as a bearer of the abject experience. The 
transparency of an ideally retrievable lived experience to non-testimonial 
\ 
memory-chains inevitably leads to the evacuation of a subjectivity that unfolds 
co-extensibly with the anamnestic act. The supplement of melancholy is called 
upon to restitute an affective pseudo-cohesion of the self. tO It combines with 
figures of love and sexuality and the languages of affection and trauma which in 
Baudelaire include their own mortification. Melancholia is the binding condition 
that puts love, sex, and affection into relief, together with the phoney 
presumptuousness of need that the memory of the swan stages only in order to 
simultaneously disperse. 
"Le Cygne" belabours the impossibility of memory as metaphor of 
experience in the context of an errancy and displacement of perceptional and 
mnemonic givens. The text can stage this errancy while containing a metafigural 
awareness indicated by "tout pour moi devient allegorie." While the bankruptcy of 
a metaphorical grounding of memory is thematised, the demand for it is voiced 
through the language of pathos and is attributed to the swan's reproach. The text 
contrasts two ways of eliciting the essence of memory, a metaphorical and an 
allegorical one, while at the same time registering the difficulty, or impossibility, 
of opting for one of the two in a way that would leave no residue of ambiguity. 
This difficulty is staged "by means of a distinction that corresponds to the 
difference between metaphor and metonymy, necessity and chance being a 
legitimate way to distinguish between analogy and contiguity. The inference of 
10 See Kristeva, Black Sun, 19: "Indeed, sadness reconstitutes an affective cohesion of the 
self, which restores its unity within the framework of the affect." 
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identity and totality that is constitutive of metaphor is lacking in the purely 
relational metonymic contact."ll Finally, the text can be seen as staging the 
failure of memory and metaphoric recognition when it comes to distilling 
\ 
meaning from the rapidly metamorphosing urban tableaux. In Holland's words, 
"The rejection of nature in favour of artifice leads to anxiety-based recognition, 
but decoded recognition [a recognition whose framework of- perceptional 
commonality has been shattered] fails to find meaning in the street scenes.,,12 The 
''Tableaux parisi ens" will register the introvert move toward domestic scenes 
ensuing upon the aforementioned failure and the subsequent focusing upon desire 
as the means of meaning-encoding. 13 
Ross Chambers' analysis of "Le Cygne" links the themes of memory, 
temporality, and melancholia in a fecund way especially since he relates all the 
above to a problematisation of referentiality.14 The immersion into memory and 
melancholia is seen by Chambers to be an endemic trait of the modem subject and 
symptomatic of a historical conjuncture. 15 Memory lies at the origin of the 
11 De Man, Allegories of Reading, 14, apropos of a passage in Proust where the preference 
of metaphor over metonymy is supposed to be a given. He then proceeds to demonstrate the 
vulnerability of this avowed preference and the self-contradictory character of the disclosure that 
gives it voice. In the case of "Le Cygne" it has already been argued that no such preference is 
offered as a starting point. Yet de Man's analysis is particularly apposite to this discussion 
because of the relevance of the conceptual categories he deploys and the associations he 
establishes between them. 
12 Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 166. 
13 See the introductory poem, "Paysage," correctly translated by Francis Scarfe as 
"Townscape" (OC I: 821 CV I: 169). The city of Paris is observed from the interior of an attic. The 
poem sets the conceptual angle from which the rest of the tableaux set off. The enabling enclosure 
within this interior space is affirmed in the concluding lines: "Et quand viendra l'hiver aux neiges 
monotones, 1 Je fermerai partout portieres et volets 1 Pour batir dans Ie nuit mes feeriques palais 
[And when winter comes with its monotonous snows, 1 I will close all doors and shutters 1 To 
build my nocturnal fairy palaces]." See Benjamin, "Konvolut I: The Interior, the Trace," in The 
Arcades Project, 212-227, for a thorough analysis of the meaning of this enclosure. It is seen 
therein as a trait of characteristic bourgeois inwardness in the face of social conflict. 
14 See Ross Chambers, "Memoire et Melancolie," in Melancolie et Opposition: les debuts 
du modernisme en France (Paris: Librairie Jose Corti, 1987), 167-186. 
15 Chambers, "Memo ire et Melancolie," 176. 
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melancholic experience and it is within this framework that the textual 
determination of it as "fertile" acquires a particular, and ironic, significance. The 
historicist undertones of Chambers' rationale are gradually revealed as he moves 
.\ 
\ 
from the realisation of the false epiphany and pseudo-euphoria accompanying the 
intertwining of the "double souvenir" (that of Andromaque and the swan) to the 
understanding of the enabling conditions of Baudelaire's strategies. Apropos of 
the counterpoint between "Le coeur d'un mortel [The heart of a mortal]" and the 
rapid changes of nineteenth-century Paris, and their mutual submission to 
temporality and death, Chambers writes that "this gap between man and his 
material environment is embarrassing in itself since it comes to wall in the subject 
in his heart and spirit ("I see only in my mind's eye this complex of huts"), in the 
sense that it alienates him from the material and social forms ot culture --if this is 
what is implied by the word 'city' -- whose transmutations are a manifestation of 
history. II 16 These observations are paradigmatic of a critical methodology that 
combines rhetorical with historical awareness. It underscores, at the same time, 
the self-reflexive character of the texts in question as much as integrates an 
awareness of the historical denominators at play. They will serve as the bridge to 
the discussion of the overtly political analyses of Richard Terdiman, who seems to 
have exhausted the terrain of the historico-political determinations of the 
Baudelairean poetry while exhibiting a rare sensitivity to the rhetorical exigencies 
of the texts and their inner laws of development. In his own way, he also seems to 
affirm that memory is de facto implicated whenever the understanding of broader 
historical contexts is involved. 
16 Chambers, "Memoire et Melancolie," 178; original translations throughout. 
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"Le Cygne" III: exilic memory and the ruination of experience 
According to Ross Chambers the power which is supposed to fecundate 
.\ 
\ 
memory in "Le Cygne" derives from a temporal mode which ingrains all three of 
the principal figural syntagmata ("je", Andromaque, the swan) with a post-
lapsarian 1'l:egativity. They follow upon a temporal caesura [coupure]: 
Andromaque as the victim of the destruction of Troy, "je" as submitting to the 
effects of a reconstruction of Paris that has already started. In Chambers' words: 
"Therefore, if fertile memory seems at first sight to be a means of transcending 
the temporal caesura from which suffers the present, it also reveals itself to 
confinn this caesura by producing the figures that evoke a time when either the 
fall was already consummated (the case of Andromaque) or change was already 
on the way (the case of the swan).,,17 An exilic memory is affirmed through the 
invocation of the historico-mythical figure (Andromaque) and the poetic 
narrator's recollection of the errant bird. This memory cuts across, as Chambers 
concludes, the production of sense and the construction of identity as much as 
it underscores the negativity permeating a putatively fecund memory. He specifies 
1\ 
the workings of remembrance in terms of an attempt at containing the entropic 
disruptive force of time.18 Besides, the poetic text itself is interspersed with terms 
that connote not the overcoming of temporality but a labour within time. Terms 
such as "tombeau vide [cenotaph]," or the "echafaudage [scaffolding]," with their 
resonances of spatial cavity and profundity, are negative markers of the 
17 
18 
Chambers, "Memoire et Melancolie," 179. 
See Chambers, "Memo ire et Melancolie," 179-80. 
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groundlessness of temporality. 19 Baudelaire frequently resorts to the stratagem of 
deploying spatial and temporal categories in such a way as to have them 
supplement, illuminate and/or undermine one another. 
-, 
\ 
As-regards the temporality which is indirectly visible in the vocabulary of 
amorphous and profound space and in the interstices between flash-back 
memories, and the particular undercurrents that it assumes in the framework of the 
voiding of mnemonic and historical contents, Keith Ansell-Pearson's words 
apropos of Deleuze's expounding of an ordinal/intensive time20can by association 
shed some light on it. Ansell-Pearson thinks of it as "a form of time which 
introduces into being a revelation of the formless, the order of chaos and 
metamorphosis, and in which the ground of time (memory) is superseded by 'a 
universal ungrounding which turns upon itself and causes only the yet-to-come to 
return ("effondement universel qui tourne en lui-meme et ne fait revenir que 
l' avenir"). 21 The examined texts challenge us to rethink this intensive time, or this 
intensive experience of time,22in the context of the traditional, and dysfunctional, 
demand that memory act as a systemic, and essentially historical, 
19 See Michel Foucault, ''Theatrum Philosophicum," in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press), 193-94: "[Time is not] a succession of present instances that 
derive from a continuous flux and that, as a result of their plenitude, allow us to perceive the 
thickness of the past and the outline of a future in which they in turn become the past. ... [Time] 
recurs as singular difference; and the analogous, the similar, and the identical never recur. 
Difference recurs." 
20 Keith Ansell-Pearson, Germinal Life: The difference and repetition of Deleuze (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1999), 103. 
21 Ansell-Pearson, Germinal Life, 103; citing from Gilles Deleuze, Difference and 
Repetition, trans. P. Patton (London: Athlone Press, 1994),91. 
22 Foucault calls it "convoluted time," the same way Benjamin does ["Theatrum 
Philosophicum," 193]. See Benjamin, "The Image of Proust," 206: "The eternity which Proust 
opens to view is convoluted time, not boundless time. His true interest is in the passage of time in 
its more real --that is, space-bound-- form, and this passage nowhere holds sway more openly than 
in remembrance within and ageing without. To observe the interaction of ageing and remembering 
means to penetrate to the heart of Proust's world, to the universe of convolution." 
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metaconsciousness. The temporality that subtends an experience that 'has 
succumbed to a relentless metonymic relais cannot be harnessed to the stringing 
out of moments in a horizontal succession of experiential grids. The contractile 
, 
\ 
force of memory vis-a.-vis time is a given. However, what one encounters in "Le 
Cygne" is not a simple contraction of the temporal realm accompanied by a 
sampling of essentially interconnected experiential and temporal cores. The 
hysterical leaps of thought from one semantic terrain to another without any 
apparent common denominator but that of loss and exile, are indicative of a time 
experience of sheer intensity yet no duration in the classical sense of the term. 
The matrices do not cohere into an experiential ensemble that can be objectified 
by consciousness nor do they unfold as a sequence of related or even randomly 
communicating events. 
The impression of successivity that emanates from the narrative is the 
outcome of the unavoidable organisation of discourse in terms of diachrony. The 
text struggles to communicate the undoing of this successivity and its correlative 
temporality in the mode of a schizoid abandonment to random metonymy. From 
"Je pense a. la negresse, amaigrie et phthisique [I think of the negress, famished 
and phthisic]" to "A quiconque a perdu ce qui ne se retrouve I Jamais, jamais! [To 
whomever has lost what will never be found again I Never, never]" to "Je pense 
aux matelots oublies dans une lIe I Aux captifs, aux vaincus! ... a. bien d'autres 
encor! [I think of the sailors forgotten on a desert island I The captive ones, the 
vanquished! ... and so many more!]," one encounters the itinerary of a thought 
that cannot track its referents back to a cognizing consciousness. It can no more 
enchain them to experiential crucibles that can achieve historical or 
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personological recognition. The text is not organised. around the traditional logic 
of the evolution of binomial series of consciousness referents and reality givens 
engaged reciprocally. The narratorial voice(s) fail to entrench the intractable 
reality-aper~us into a cognitively domesticated realm. There is a crisis of 
evidentiality here to which the dispersive fragments of thematised experience 
testify. The logic of their relatability is dissensual, which is different from simply 
admitting the polyvocal character of the narrative. The latter is a common topos 
of literary modernity and as such even overspills to texts that aim to conflate 
consciousness and reality in a harmonious symmetry of forces. There is nothing 
special or intrinsically radical in polyvocity in itself. In this case, however, it is 
coterminous with the grafting of experiential contents onto a metonymic 
randomness and singularity that turns every referent into an hapax logomenon 
(absolutely singular, non-referential, non-signifying, literally "only once said"). 
The intractable grids of experience do not gravitate towards an over-arching 
consciousness that could synthesise them into a historically or egologically 
appropriated posited content. The radical destratification of these crucibles 
imperils their cognitive working through. 
The clogging up of cognitive appropriation is belaboured in exemplary 
fashion in "Les Sept Vieillards," a poem that construes reality in terms of the 
eternal return of the same. No explanatory framework can help the narrator make 
sense of what he perceives as an endless procession of identical yet void of 
substance hideous figures. It is this absence of an encasing framework of value 
that equally jeopardises the passage from perception to cognition in "Le Cygne," 
yet this absence is never imbued with the positive valorisation of something once 
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fully owned and therefore potentially retrievable in the future. Baudelaire's 
melancholia is not the negative indicator of a nostalgic consciousness that desires 
the blockage of temporal dispersion, and the stasis of cognitive saturation. "Paris 
\ 
change! Mais rien dans rna melancolie / N'a bouge! [Paris changes! But nothing 
has moved in my melancholy!]" points to the poet's reluctance to glorify memory. 
It is not the retention of what used to be that is signalled here by -this "rien n'a 
bouge" but the refusal to let memory act as a reconciling agent of temporally 
distinct moments. The sublimity of exile is overtly affirmed in the following lines 
["Je pense a mon grand cygne, avec ses gestes fous / Comme les exiles, ridicule et 
sublime"]. The ironic dimension endemic in the distancing from origin and 
history is also subtly present (in this "ridicule"), distance from self and other 
being an essential ingredient of irony itself. 
The antinomian character of the text implodes a linear model of time. The 
Deleuzian temporality mentioned above, which can only be decontextualised and 
glimpsed momentarily at this stage, can be related to what Richard Terdiman has 
given a more historically-aware twist: a mnemonic crisis configured in terms of 
the non-integration of recollections with consciousness?3 The question whether 
this is a degraded temporality determined by the exigencies of capitalism 
(Terdiman) or whether this experience of the time of Abgrund presupposes and 
accrues to the prior demystification and abandonment of essentialist conceptual 
categories (Deleuze, Foucault, de Man), is central to my elaboration of the poetry. 
I contend that Baudelaire struggled with the disintegration of experiential contents 
that the capitalist mode of societal organisation bequeathed to his generation 
23 Richard Terdiman, "Deconstructing Memory: Representing the Past and Theorising 
Culture in France since the Revolution," Diacritics 15 (winter 1985): 15. 
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within a distinctly French framework of social and ideological mobility that 
allowed for the understanding of social upheavals in political and historical terms. 
The melancholy nature of his poetry responds to the sedimentation of the market 
, 
\ 
order and its devastating impact on large segments of the French society without, 
however, Baudelaire resorting to compensatory fictions of a pre-lapsarian state 
and an organismic socially-binding memory that would allegedly unite all social 
participants into meaningful and solidaristic totalities. The dispirited nature of his 
poetry responds to the impossibility of cementing a sense of self and experience in 
essentialist terms. This response cannot but impinge on the nature of the 
historical awareness that emanates from his narratives. Baudelaire combines an 
understanding of historical specificities with the welcoming affirmation of the 
dispersion of cognitive positing and historical grounding of experience. The 
recognition of loss in the midst of a historical-turned-phantasmagorical setting in 
"Le Cygne" affirms the perpetual slippage of historical frameworks into a 
constellation of loosely bound images unfettered from testimonial 
accountability.24 
There are no nostalgic traits in Baudelaire's poetry except as targets of 
critique. Utopian spaces are depicted as exotic scenes where aspirations, passions, 
and an eventual horror and disappointment over their social cancellation, are 
played off against one another.25 The works exude mournful undertones over the 
24 Again Lacanian psychoanalysis is relevant here. See Lacan, "The function and field of 
speech and language in psychoanalysis," 48: "In psychoanalytic anamnesis, it is not a question of 
reality, but of truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by conferring 
on them the sense of necessities to come, such as they are constituted by the little freedom through 
which the subject makes them present." Enhancing the primacy of the truth value of events that 
constitute part of one's history necessitates the bracketing of the dimension of its empirical 
verifiability and veracity. This is exactly what the examined text shows. The contingency of this 
value upon the preservation of personal or collective imaginaries becomes sharper. 
25 See "Le Voyage," OC I: 129-34. 
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disintegration of horizontal temporality without affirming its correlate calendar 
memory. Time is enemy to man yet even the correspondences agenda is 
acknowledged as being vulnerable to it. At the same time, there is a liberatory 
\ 
dimension -inherent in this corrosive temporality. Time guarantees the non-
commensurability of temporally disjunct experiences and breaks the 
psychological causality chains that perpetuate human suffering. Embracing the 
temporal dimension entails accepting the radical randomness and irreversibility of 
events. This randomness goes counter to the tyrannical causal enchainments that 
lie behind desperation. The Baudelairean ambivalence towards temporality is 
constitutively unresolvable.26 
An equally ambivalent understanding of recollection that aims to assert the 
power of involuntary memory to salvage experiential contents while 
acknowledging the fragile facticity of the remembered scenes is at play. This is 
the meaning of the attempted creation of lived experience (Erfahrung) out of the 
materials of voluntarily retrieved/constructed mechanical contents (Erlebnis). For 
Baudelaire, the impossible task of making poetry out of the elaboration of 
contents that had been registered more or less involuntarily after having eluded 
the protective shield of conscious filtering was assigned to him at a particular 
historical conjuncture when the anyway ambivalent contact with social reality was 
given an even more emphatic form of shock. Protection against the modem 
bombardment of visual-tactile and conceptual stimuli and the compulsive 
26 The same applies to death and finitude. See "La Mort des pauvres [The Death of the 
Poor]" [OC I: 126], where death is the great consoler. Death marks the irreversible rupture of the 
causality that brings suffering to the destitute. Much as it reads like a Christian-like eulogy of 
death as a portal to the other world, this poem is in league with the Revolte transmutation of 
values. Death consoles because it brings an end to prolonged pain and injustice, not because it 
opens the gates of heaven. 
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belabouring of contents distilled through experience, .was the norm against which 
lyrical poetry could continue to be written. Baudelaire imbued this poetry with 
the cynicism and bitterness of one who struggles to affirm residual experience 
while registering the disintegration of socio-symbolic codes and, therefore, the 
weakening of the ability to process reality and distil experiential contents out of it. 
The ambivalent responsiveness and social awareness that his poetry exhibits 
testify to his irresolute relation to history, memory, and the hypothetical 
possibility of extricating some experiential potential out of them. This oscillation 
is a response to concrete historical conditions yet transcends in its potency of 
awareness the historicist containments that Terdiman, among others, would have 
us believe that the texts incur. 
Richard Terdiman's cited essay is instrumental when it comes to situating 
the particular inflections that memory acquires in Baudelaire's work as theme or 
stratagem. Modernist investments in memory are seen by Terdiman to constitute 
climaxes in a long trajectory the inceptive moment of which he associates with 
Hegel. In a way the whole ErfahrunglErlebnislErinnerung matrix discussed 
above is inherently potentiated and determined by the dynamics and constraints of 
the Hegelian noosphere. However, the mnemonic harmony that Terdiman equates 
with the dialectic of past and present leading to Hegelian Recollection is absent in 
the case of Baudelaire's modernity. According to Terdiman's schema, the Spirit's 
triumphant self-absorption at the end of History, the common topos of classical 
Idealism, the epiphanic harmonising of self and world, past and present, have 
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given way to a radical incommensurability of mind and (historical) reality and an 
irredeemable disjunction of past and present.27 
Terdiman seems to homogenise the polyvalence of the Hegelian reasoning 
1 
\ 
apropos of -memorylRecollection. This introduces a note of schematic facility into 
00 
his expose, which inevitably detracts from the overall rigour of his analyses. 
Alienation is a factor that is inherent in the processes of conceptualisation and 
memorisation in Hegel, and an understanding of the latter in terms of 
homogeneous operations without internal divisions may gloss over the complexity 
of the Hegelian mnemonic dynamic. In the light of all this it is relevant to note 
that the caesural memory engaged by Baudelaire can be discussed in categories 
that are not inimical to Hegel's vocabulary a priori?8 I can only point to the 
relevance of this issue here. 
Terdiman's schemas are invoked here with all these reservations in mind, 
and not as indisputable guiding lines. I must register my distance from the 
implicit value judgements that can be inferred from his work since he holds 
Baudelaire, and the poetic avant-garde in France in general, accountable for what 
he regards as a historically determined abstraction from the social being of man, 
See Terdiman, "Deconstructing Memory," 14 passim. 27 
28 It is relevant to note that Paul de Man's doctoral thesis on Mallarme mobilised Hegelian 
concepts, or rather the whole thesis seems to move within Hegel's conceptual sphere. The whole 
issue is reducible to what kind of reading one makes of Hegel (especially the Phenomenology). 
Despite the antithetical stance employed by several branches of post-structuralist theory it is 
openly avowed or covertly assumed by leading philosophers and theorists that the current 
conceptual struggle with idealism, historicism, difference, is a labour within, and not simply 
against, Hegel's universe. This is not only due to the overwhelming inclusiveness of his 
philosophy, but also to the intrinsic nature of his project. See Paul de Man, "Mallarme, Yeats, and 
the Romantic Predicament" (PhD diss., University of Harvard, 1960,); Jacques Derrida, "From 
Restricted to General Economy. A Hegelianism without Reserve," in Writing and Difference, 
251-77. Behind an understanding of Hegel that accommodates difference lie, of course, Alexandre 
Kojeve and Jean Hippolyte. See Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: lectures 
on the Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1980) and Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. 
Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974). 
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which he lumps under the term "aestheticism." Terdiman fails to comprehend the 
social dimension behind this allegedly monological poetry and insists on its non-
transitive character. Voicing a genuine historicist concern, he resists the notion of 
., 
\ 
a meta-awareness that exceeds the boundaries of a specific historical era. 
However, the poetic self-reflexiveness that he regards as inimical to the historical 
understanding of one's own enabling conditions constitutes a subtle. interweaving 
of contestatory discourses (therefore historically aware of their own conjunctural 
positioning vis-a.-vis hegemonic normativity) and a resistance to the implicit 
--
teleological finalism of all historicisms that ultimately aim to bind discourse 
exclusively to the propositional sphere. Baudelaire's poetry is not aesthetic in the 
narrow sense. It neither hypostasises an independent consciousness (in either the 
phenomenological sense of the sovereign producer of meaning or that of a textual 
idealism that cancels historical contingency) nor advocates the primacy of a 
sovereign referent that would subdue human activity to a unidimensional 
empiricism. It accommodates, and here is another facet of Terdiman' s objection, 
an infinity of semiotic, psycholinguistic and, by the same token, social 
antagonisms that prefigures the Nietzschean notion of the perpetual clash and 
mutation of powers. In its resistance to referential and semiotic closure this 
poetry does not accord well with the conservation of what is dialectically 
preserved and overcome. 
Baudelaire's poetry can be seen as prefiguring themes and rhetorical 
tactics that put philosophical, literary, and historical continuity in question (the 
poetry of Celan, for example, and Adorno's doubts as to the feasibility of culture 
after the crisis of experience culminating in the Shoah). It can equally be regarded 
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as part of a trajectory whose origin can archaeologically be traced back to the 
"beginning" of the Enlightenment. However, much as it is tempting to place 
Baudelaire within a horizontal literary history one must account for the fact that 
, 
\ 
the collapse of experience to which his poetry responds problematises 
.. 
retroactively this linear history. The modem crisis of representation, the gap 
between perception and cognition that his poetic production enacts .. and responds 
to, cannot be reduced to mere symptoms of an otherwise untouchable historical 
infrastructure. The loss of experiential transmissibility that he works through has 
a direct bearing on the possibility of adhering to a developmental historicity. The 
poetry mandates that the relation between past and present be put under 
negotiation, if not erasure. 
The Spleen cycle, particularly, chronicles the deterioration of linear 
memory in addition to the defensive measures deployed to counter this mnemonic 
collapse. Terdiman focuses on the complementarity of hypertrophic memory and 
an abortive reminiscing in a state of underdevelopment. He correctly determines 
"exorbitance" and a certain "catastrophization of memory" as the primary 
determinants of Spleen?9 The "eclipse of memory and the renunciation of the 
lyric subject,,30 are explicitly elaborated upon whereas in the beauty/ideal poems, 
he believes, they underlie a tense dialectic of metaphoric correspondences and 
metonymic serialities with regard to anchoring the trajectory of desire. I partially 
concur with Terdiman with the proviso that the possibility of sustaining a lyrical 
subject harmonising its enunciation with its "inner self' through beautification is 
thematised by Baudelaire as inherently abortive and is subsumed under the project 
29 
30 
Terdiman, "Deconstructing Memory," 16. 
Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 86. 
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of a formalist intensification that transpires at the expense of ideal content. This 
project aims at preserving the contours of referential discourse within the 
framework of a hollowing out of meaning and the deterioration of the socio-
symbolic -anchoring validating it. Terdiman has gi ven the latter a 
chronological/historical index (the aggressive capitalism of mid-nineteenth 
France), which, I argue, fails to account for Baudelaire's refusal to-affirm a pre-
lapsarial era of mnemonic, temporal, and historical afflatus. My intention is not to 
affirm disproportionately the supra-historical dimensions of Baudelaire's poetry, 
or poetry as such, but to direct attention to the insight solicited by the poetry, 
namely that the voiding of experience imperils the very possibility of assigning 
historical indexes. Restricting this poetry to a reflexive response to contemporary 
contingencies glosses over its complexities in the interest of annexing it to a 
cognitively and historically familiar zone. The hermeneutic act that aims at this 
integratist cognitive equilibrium addresses its textual referents in the mode of 
constative appropriation. This mode is doubly inadequate in this case since it is 
the very feasibility of the hermeneutic endeavour that is explicitly called to task 
by the texts. 
Setting off with the narrator's palindromic memory one ends up with "a 
series of imagistic memories that can know no anecdotal or narrative end: time, 
under the allegorical structure of ancient and modem, new and ever-the-same, will 
know no historical, ex post facto narrative construction, but rather only the 
iterative or repetitive 'je pense a,' with each thought being of the unchanging loss 
brought about by changing time. ,,31 History in "Le Cygne" is presented in terms 
31 Bahti, Allegories of History, 217. 
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of a non-recoverable, non-historicisable ever-retreating original (ergo the 
metonymic drive), which makes it impossible to achieve any safe vantage point 
from which history can be reconstituted as the recounting of once witnessed 
\ 
events.32 Historical experience remains unclaimed.33 
Intervallic memory instantiates a mode of Andenken that fails to transmute 
history's phantasmatic presences (Andromaque) into meaningful historical 
presences. With regard to this perpetual moratorium against history, Benjamin 
and Nietzsche converge in their stressing the traumatic underpinnings of 
recollection. "Only that which hurts incessantly is remembered" writes the latter, 
whereas the former affirms that "[a]nything about which one knows that one soon 
will not have it around becomes an image. ,,34 The suffering in question does not 
relate to the specific content of memory so much as to the nature of the mnemonic 
itinerary which is similar to the allegorical ascription of non-essence a 
representational import. "Le Cygne" recounts its discordant relation to its own 
significance, the internal chasm precluding the spilling over of the awareness of 
historical loss into a meta-awareness. The suffering in 
32 Baudelairean memory, with its flash-back ruptures of experiential continua, bears down 
upon the notion of history as anagnorisis/recognition of an always absent scene. Eliot's The Waste 
Land can legitimately be read as a sceptical comment on the possibility of this recognition. 
Revisionist memory can serve as a critical model of historical understanding since both rely on, 
while the former belies, the possibility of witnessing and/or recapturing the essence of events 
apres-coup. Memory underwrites, and inevitably voids, history as recognition of the empirically 
verifiable and teleologically preordained. The protocols of mnemonic emergency that the textual 
subjects deploy to override the alienating effects of fading essence bind the subjects' behaviour to 
a clique mentality that parades its own defensiveness. Their intervallic and censorious memory 
fails to articulate any essence of personal or collective encoding of experience. 
33 See Bahti, Allegories of History, 224: "Benjamin's Gedachtnis or Andenken, Baudelaire's 
"Je pense a," and Hegel's Denken are signs of holding on to loss in and as language that figurally 
means --and repeatedly, ceaselessly reminds of-- the loss of its meaning, even as historians and 
their narrative history would represent literally or historically the forgetting of this loss in an 
amnesia that calls itself a recovery." 
34 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, 42; Benjamin, "The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire," in Baudelaire, 87. 
115 
question is not the exclusive property of a specific individual but frames empathy 
and imaginary identifications. Andromaque's mourning blends with the narrator's 
disenchantment in a peculiar grid of identifications that cuts experience free from 
"' , 
the subject and reveals trauma --and experience as such-- to be ingrained within 
language, to be tropes of language. Trauma becoming abstract and detached from 
its experiential environment allows for its transmissibility, not however in terms 
of a traumatic essence which is encapsulated within the event. The textual 
narrator's identification with Andromaque corroborates the hypothesis, which 
Cathy Caruth puts forward, that trauma is an individual experience that exceeds 
itself.35 All this transpires in the framework of the co-inhering of all (traumatic) 
experience in language. Shoshana Felman writes that "a 'life testimony' is not 
simply a testimony to a private life, but a point of conflation between text and life, 
a textual testimony which can penetrate us like an actual life. ,,36 The 
incommensurability between trauma and its enveloping cognitive and moral 
environments is what triggers off the traumatic impact itself, and necessitates the 
incubation of the latent experiential core in the midst of maturing cognitive 
conditions. The accessibility of trauma is an effect of its constitutive imbrication 
in discourse and testifies to the transferential power the latter enables. However, 
the textual narrator's enhancement of the loss and mourning that the female figure 
and the swan embody constitutes a working-through of the traumatic material that 
has nothing to do with identifications in the egological sense. What shapes up 
35 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996), 136; cited in Amy Hungerford, "Memorizing Memory," in The 
Yale Journal o/Criticism 14.1 (2001): 83. 
36 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, M. D., Testimony: The Crisis 0/ Witnessing in 
Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York: Routledge, 1992), 2; cited in Amy 
Hungerford, "Memorizing Memory," 73. 
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here is a performative memorization without memory, the performance' of 
mnemonic scenes without a hypothetically accessible experiential deposit of 
contents to offset the radical particularity of the anamnestic enactment's referent.37 
, 
" 
Not far from de Man's Gediichtnis, this purely performative memory relates to the 
iterative negativity of allegory. It exhibits its awareness of the destruction of the 
semantic core of its targets in a mode close to allegory's "yield[ing] ... its 
meaning as the display of its very allegorical structure. ,,38 The meaning of the 
anamnestic object is seen here to be attained only through the denial of the 
mnemonic sign. It can be extracted at the cost of the depletion of the latter into a 
readable grid of significations. This way, the disjunction between sign and 
meaning that allegory and memory embrace as their true theme is hushed up. But 
not for long. "Le Cygne" puts an irrevocable embargo on the filling up of the 
chasm between mnemonic sign and its significations not least by enhancing the 
virtual character of the anamnestic enterprise. The impossibility of remaining 
faithful to the materiality of memory's referents and distilling a semantic core out 
of them at the same time is worked through in a mode which is that of allegory "as 
[both] fulfilling and denying [the connection between sign and its meaning].,,39 
The female figure as allegory of loss and transience relates to the heroine 
of "A une passante" (OC I: 92-3) with "sa jambe de statue." Both elicit the 
understanding of the temporal passage of presence as relentless process of 
undialectical, literal passing away. The marmoreal nature of their posture points 
37 
38 
See Hungerford, "Memorizing memory," 83-88. 
Bahti, Allegories of History, 264. 
39 Bahti, Allegories of History, 287: ''The 'doubled insight' into allegory as fulfilling and 
denying connects sign and meaning in the very manner of disconnection or discord, as the (new, 
doubled) sign of allegory." 
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not to an emergence of presence as and in stasis in an ideal abstraction from the 
temporal order, but to the ruination of the cognitive core of experience in the 
midst of a suspended, "frozen" witnessing. The same logic governs "La Beaute" 
, 
\ 
(OC I: 21),.where beauty presents itself as "uti reve de pierre [a dream of stone]." 
Elissa Marder writes apropos of the former poem that "'A une passante' stages a 
strangely embodied, immobilized, and undialectical death where private mourning 
meets the banality, the lieu commun, of the public space. The passing woman 
never quite dies, but rather becomes a figure for death's immobile movement.,,40 
It is the same logic that embeds the narrator's memories in "Le Cygne" within 
successive layers of historical ruins and relays of losses, from Troy to present-day 
Paris. The same counterpoint of transience and petrifaction is played out in this 
poem where history is reduced to an architectural palimpsest. The principal 
characters' memories blend empathetically, the rubble of Troy fuses with a fluid 
and rapidly metamorphosing Paris, and all this transpires in the frame of a non-
dialectical affiliation of allegorical antiquity to modernity. It is non-dialectical 
because the ruination of experience and its cognitive potential is endemic in 
history as such and cannot be exclusively appended to a particular era.41 
The dazzling transformation of the city to which the narrator testifies 
along with his traumatic inability to process it cognitively are pointers to the 
latency inherent in experience. In Cathy Caruth's words, "The historical power of 
the trauma is not just that the experience is repeated after the forgetting [in the 
form of unsolicited mnemonic resurgence], but that it is only in and through its 
40 Elissa Marder, "Flat Death: Snapshots of History, " Diacritics 22 (fall-winter 1992): 142. 
"The correspondence between antiquity and modernity is the sole constructive conception 




inherent forgetting that it is first experienced at all. And it is this inherent latency 
of the event that paradoxically explains the peculiar, temporal structure, the 
belatedness of ... historical experience. ,,42 The latency in question, the cleavage 
\ 
between the perception of the event and its cognitive assimilation in overarching, 
settings, educes the textual subject's allegorical construal of reality by dissolving 
the linear unfolding of unobstructedly archived reality tokens. The chasm in 
question impacts on any notion of horizontal history and unimpeded witnessing. 
"Tout pour moi devient all6gorie" voices the impossibility of assigning experience 
a cognitive appendix that will graft it onto a wider frame of understanding. 
Everything turns allegorical of everything else as a result of an endemic 
deficiency of semantic containment. Allegory takes off whenever the symbolic 
binding of witnessed and/or represented event and constative appropriation 
remains unfulfilled. However, the awareness that emanates from the poem does 
not re-establish the closure of cognition but reiterates the semantic voiding of the 
text while thematically gesturing to it through the allegorical mode. Paris changes 
" ... plus vite, h6las ! que Ie coeur d'un mortel," which again points to an 
inherently hindered testimony. Testifying to change presupposes a pivotal 
immobile vantage point from which change can be registered. The narrator is 
integrally deprived of it. The ocular reciprocality between subjects themselves 
and subject and reality givens requisite to the negotiation of quotidian reality has 
devolved to a screening of semiotically juxtaposed impressions. The poem's 
narrator does not see anything in the pragmatic sense but just teases apart a 
mnemonic nexus into which insight into the constitutive chasm separating one's 
42 Cathy Caruth, "Unclaimed Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History," Yale 
French Studies 79 (1991): 187. 
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bearing witness from accounting for the witnessed event in cognitively and 
pragmatically satisfactory terms has been interwoven: "Je ne vois qu~n esprit .... 
Je pense a .... La je vis .... Je vois ce malheureux .... Une image m'opprime ... " 
-, 
\ 
Seeing here is equivalent to remembering. What is lacking throughout is the 
primal historical referent that would ideally bind the remembered scenes into 
reciprocally illuminating strung out serial components. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE MATERIAL GAZE AND THE BAUDELAIREAN SUBLIME 
Baudelaire's dual engagement with aesthetics and history 
\ 
This chapter aims at refining concerns 'that were elaborated in the previous, 
ones, i.e., the defensive and self-defeating character of a mnemonic cohesion of 
the self, the semiotic parcelling of historical linearity, and the impact of the 
allegorical gaze. The analysis of two parameters that I consider to be of cardinal 
purport in the poetry of Baudelaire, i.e., the non-cognitive gaze and the urban 
sublime, will frame these concerns. Baudelaire condenses the contours of modem 
subjectivity in his elaboration of its central themes and aporias: the defensive 
character of memory and, by extension, consciousness itself, the tropological 
underpinnings of reason, the precariousness of a rationality corroded by a desire 
formed at the interstices between psyche and culture, the mnemonic pseudo-
cohesion of the self, the transgression of the symbolic chora by material semiosis, 
the irreversible aggravation of socio-symbolic codes. Awareness of the non-
historical causes of self-alienation and mnemonic and sexual reification solicits 
the understanding of a social commonality of values in terms of a categorical 
imperative outside the boundaries of natural philosophy. The coercive character 
of this imperative is ultimately put into relief through the poetry's address of the 
tensional enmeshment of intra-historical and linguistic forces that obey the laws 
of their own historicity. Baudelaire writes as if in the grip of the awareness that 
every linguistic mooring is dependent upon, and therefore fissured by, a series of 
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elusive points de capiton.1 The impossibility of anchoring them is the supra-
historical source of his melancholia. In his lyrics physical love is accompanied by 
what Paul de Man diagnosed as a true and non-deluded mourning, one that can 
1 
,\ 
"allow for non-comprehension and enumerate non-anthropomorphic, non-elegiac" 
.' 
that is to say, ... historical modes of language power.,,2 In their agonal striving 
for physical gratification and mental stability his characters are denied not only a 
desire-appeasement expected to follow upon their physical and mental exhaustion, 
but also the cognitive satiety accompanying the motions of understanding. The 
agon of Baudelaire, and the task that his modernity mandates, is the acceptance of 
this physical and mental "funereal monumentality," the semiotic materiality of 
language and body, while resisting an always accompanying "paranoid fear,,30ver 
the loss of cognitive plenitude. 
The texts condense most of Modernity's tensions in a way that enhances 
the uneasy dialectic between an understanding of historical conjuncture as being 
foundational of the subject and an insight into the supra-historical parameters that 
frustrate the reduction of both subject and literary event to an effect of historical 
juncture. I have already traced in the Baudelairean melancholia the effects of the 
latter insight coupled with a concrete evaluation (and not simply an instinctive 
grasping) of the surrounding political reality. WaIter Benjamin and Max Pen sky 
chose to read in this sorrowful poetry the political impotence of someone who 
ultimately accepts the abstraction from the social being of man associated with 
See Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 126: "[The points de capitan] are the 
linguistic form of the neurotic symptom. It is this interplay of metaphoric and metonymic axes 
that structures the unconscious like a language (as Lacan says)." 
2 Paul de Man, "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric," in The Rhetoric of 
Romanticism, 262. 
3 See de Man, "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric," 259. 
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aestheticism.4 Theirs is not an unqualified or unwavering verdict, however, which 
points to their resistance to some of their own assumptions that can equally be 
discerned in the critical evaluations of Richard Terdiman. The qualifications in 
question approximate a sheer contradiction at times. The tension in these analyses, 
relates to Baudelaire's working through of the tropological infrastructure of 
historical existence, and to the inner antinomies of a certain reception of it that 
purports to be sensitive to both the political and rhetorical determinations of the 
examined texts. The necessity that the theorists in question faced was to do 
justice to Baudelaire's aesthetic specificities while never losing focus on the 
broader historical vista. The fact that Baudelaire's aesthetic understanding does 
not collapse into political and/or existential paralysis is an issue that partakes of 
the political dimension. Baudelaire's centrality as the de facto modem poet and as 
an author of inexhaustible implications for what we conveniently label as "post-
modernity," i.e., our own present, emanates from his dual and simultaneous 
engagement with aesthetics and history in a way that necessitates the re-
negotiation of both terrains. His poetry countenances the valorisation of the 
historical dimension as formative of subjectivity and the irreducible materiality of 
language as a force that exceeds historical constraints and internally responds to 
the exigencies of its own historicity.s This chapter will conclude with an 
affirmati ve recapi tulati on of the conflictual investments 
4 See Walter Benjamin, "Baudelaire or the Streets of Paris," in Baudelaire, 172: "[T]here 
springs the conception of the total work of art which attempts to isolate art against the 
development of technology. The rites with which it is celebrated are the counterpart of the 
distractions which transfigure the commodity. Both abstract from the social being of man. 
Baudelaire succumbs to the infatuation of Wagner." 
5 These constraints are understood here with the canonised denotations of the term. See 
Derrida, Writing and Difference, 290: "History has always been understood as the movement of a 
resumption of history, as a detour between two presences." 
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permeating Baudelairean subjectivity as framed by thi~ dual engagement. 
A final theme that will be treated here is the Baudelairean gaze, a 
particular way of seeing that undercuts the passage from perception to 
apperception/cognition. I argue that the factor that effects this blockage and helps 
undermine perception as a portal to essence, is the sublime, or rather the urban 
inflection that Baudelaire gave it in his poetry. I contend that he iso-the first poet 
who denaturalised the sublime and stared at city constructs with the sense of awe 
and cognitive innocence that had been exclusively preserved for the non-human 
sublime creations of nature. The enigmatic character of his urbanism, and the fact 
that it does not degenerate into reflexive prosaicism, has a direct bearing on the 
metamorphosis of the sublime. I will emphasise its urban modalities and 
perforation by elements of the grotesque present in the form of a dissective 
concentration on the moribund and distorted body and a pervasive irony that aims 
at, and effects, a profound humiliation of the human dimension. It remains to be 
seen how the Baudelairean gaze fails to render perception and conception 
commensurate and fulfil the demand for a scopic recuperation of the fragmented 
realities under the auspices of a perceiving macro-consciousness. I contend that 
this "failure" is negatively inscribed within the textual agenda as an enabling 
condition and signals, but does not lament, the inability to imbue the object of 
vision, and the subject as carrier of vision, with cognitive stability. 
The starting point is Benjamin's ambiguous remarks on the predominantly 
optic character of the allegorical interest: "In allegory the original interest is not 
linguistic but optic. ,,6 Paul de Man's novel reading of the Kantian sublime 
6 Benjamin, "Central Park," 52. 
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emphasising the latter's materiality and its purely "architectonic" and non-
phenomenalist perception of reality, frames my analysis. Cynthia Chase, 
Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Susanne Gearhart, Susan Buck-Morss, Linda Marie 
, 
\ 
Brooks, Paul de Man, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, among 
others, have contributed to a new awareness of what is involved in the Romantic 
specular organisation of reality. Their contributions converge on the modem 
controversion of phenomenalist models of representation that Baudelaire's poetry 
anyway debunked.7 In this respect, his significance for poetic modernity lies in 
his working up the nature of representation on a basis that would do justice to the 
agency of imagination and memory away from a belief in either a documentaristic 
or a hyper-imaginative specular replication of reality. Finally, it must be stressed 
that this theoretical reorientation vis-a-vis the sublime and its corrosive impact on 
subjectivity could not have been undertaken without the prior exertion of a 
distinctly Franco-American critical labour that has effected the rehabilitation of 
Romanticism and the revelation of its conceptual wealth and relevance for the 
understanding of modem subjectivity and representation.8 
"Les Sept Vieillards": the rift between perception and cognition 
LES SEPT VIEILLARDS 
Fourmillante cite, cite pleine de reves, 
Ou Ie spectre en plein jour raccroche Ie passant! 
Les mysteres partout coulent comme des seves 
Dans les canaux etroits du colosse puissant. 
7 Bibliographical references to works by the authors mentioned above will be given in the 
following sections individually. 
8 The names of Paul de Man, Barbara Johnson, Rodolphe Gasche, Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy immediately spring to mind, along with those of the critics whose work 
I have drawn upon and whose interests orbit around the project in question. 
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Tout a coup, un vieillard dont les guenilles jaunes 
Imitaient la couleur de ce ciel pluvieux, 
Et dont l'aspect aurait fait pleuvoir les aumones, 




Son pareille suivait: barbe, oeil, dos, baton, loques, 
Nul trait ne distinguait, du me me enfer venu, 
Ce jumeau centenaire, et ces spectres baroques 
Marchaient du meme pas vers un but inconnu. 
A que I complot infame etais-je done en butte, 
Ou que I mechant hasard ainsi m'humiliait? 
Car je comptai sept fois, de minute en minute, 
Ce sinistre vieillard qui se multipliait! 
Aurais-je, sans mourir, contemple Ie huitieme, 
Sosie inexorable, ironique et fatal, 
Degoutant Phenix, fils et pere de lui-meme? 
--Mais je tournai Ie dos au cortege infernal. 
Exaspere comme un ivrogne qui voit double, 
Je rentrai, je fermai la porte, epouvante, 
Malade et morfondu, l'esprit fievreux et trouble, 
Blesse par Ie mystere et par l'absurdite! 
Vainement rna raison voulait prendre la barre; 
La tempete en jouant deroutait ses efforts, 
Et mon arne dansait, dansait, vieille gabarre 
Sans mats, sur une mer monstrueuse et sans bords! (OC I: 87-8) 
THE SEVEN OLD MEN 
Swarming city, city full of dreams, 
Where the apparition meets the passer-by in full daylight! 
Mysteries flow everywhere like vital sap 
In the narrow veins of this mighty colossus. 
Suddenly, an old man whose yellow rags 
Resembled the colour of rainy skies, 
And whose appearance would have invited showers of alms, 
Were it not for the wickedness glinting in his eyes, 
Appeared in front of me ... 
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His double followed him: beard, eye, back, stick, rags, 
No single feature could distinguish this ripe centenarian 
Ejected from the same Hell, and these baroque phantoms 
Walked with the same pace towards some unknown destination. 
. What infamous conspiracy was I the victim of? 
What evil chance humiliated me? 
For I counted, minute by minute, 
This sinister old man mUltiply by seven! 
Could I, without dying, have looked on yet a.n eighth one, 
A pitiless, ironic, fatal double, 
Disgusting Phoenix, son and father of himself? 
--But I turned my back on this infernal procession. 
Irritated like a drunkard that sees double, 
I returned to my place, and closed the door, wasted, 
Sick and depressed, my mind feverish and troubled, 
Hurt by the mystery and absurdity of the whole affair! 
In vain did my reason try to compose itself; 
The tempest frustrated all its efforts, 
And my soul danced, danced, like some old barge 
Without mast, on a monstrous and shoreless sea! 
"Les Sept Vieillards" addresses the non-commensurability of perceived 
and cognised referents in the form of the return of the same (the procession of 
seven identical old men haunting the narrator). A reality that has been reduced to 
the formulaic repetition of the same-as-difference confronts the dazzled spectator, 
difference being produced in this case only by the movement of repetition. A 
parallelism can be drawn between this movement of repetition and language's 
own production of semantic difference in and through the repetition of 
morphological units in the midst of differing environments. In both cases 
meaning can be produced only if one is willing to abstract from the materiality of 
the signifying unit and saturate the gap between the discursive and/or experiential 
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instances with a symbolic logic of inter-communi~ability on the basis of a 
commonality of essence. This is exactly what the narrator in "Les Sept 
Vieillards" proves unable, or unwilling, to do. "Aurais-je, sans mourir, contemple 
Ie huitieme / Sosie inexorable, ironique et fatal / Degoutant Phenix, fils et pere de 
lui-meme? / Mais je tournai Ie dos au cortege infernal [Could I, without dropping 
dead, have looked at the eighth / an inexorable, ironic and deadly double' / 
repulsive Phoenix, son and father of himself? / But I turned my back on that 
infernal procession]." What proves to be infernal is the consanguineous 
generation of identical figures, of identity rather, on the basis of a common 
underlying essence ["son and father of himself']. Filling up the gap between the 
apparitions with the hypothesis of a subtending generative essence repeating itself 
ad infinitum would amount to the resolution of the hermeneutic unresolve and its 
accompanying cognitive tension. This is what all semantics affirm when they 
assert the mediation of linguistic form with meaning in terms that still give 
primacy to the latter. This resolution is not offered by the text. On the contrary, 
what one gets is the delirious multiplication of meaningless formations 
confronting the narrator's consciousness as an irresolvable enigma: "Vainement 
rna raison voulait prendre la barre / La tempete en jouant deroul;ait ses efforts / Et 
mon arne dansait, dansait, vieille gabarre / Sans mats, sur une mer monstrueuse et 
sans bords! [In vain did my reason try to compose itself / The tempest frustrated 
all its efforts, / And my soulf danced, danced, like some old barge / Without mast, 
on a monstrous an' shoreless sea!]." Reason proves unable to reproduce the 
illusional stratagem that constitutes one of its enabling premises, that is, the 
saturation of the cleavage separating temporally and ontologically disjunct 
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experiential crucibles from one another through the. deployment of generative, 
cumulati ve, causal chains. 
It is telling that this predicament of consciousness and reason is once more 
.\ , 
metaphorised in quasi-natural terms. The "old barge ... on a monstrous shoreless 
sea" related to the narrator's soul, points to reason's abandonment in the midst of 
inimical natural elements. Recourse to nature constitutes a common topos of 
Romanticism especially in the case of consciousness trying to borrow from nature 
the attributes of immutability, imperturbability, and cognitive appeasement that it 
lacks when confronted with its own paradoxes and constitutive aporiae. In this 
case the natural element is threatening, overwhelming in its expanse, 
"monstrous." The limitlessness of the sea corresponds to the impossibility of 
containing the entropic reappearance of the figural apparitions. What fails here is 
the canonistic dimension of pure reason vis-a-vis an experience that puts in 
inverted commas the larger explanatory frameworks rendering the cognitive 
absorption of aperfus possible in the first place. Reason as a begetter of concepts 
ensuing upon the perception of reality-givens aborts. In other terms, the reason 
that purports to think the idea of the world as the unity of objective experience, 
and the concept of the soul as the common point of reference of the wholeness of 
internal experience, is de facto ineffectual. It is not only that reason cannot know 
the Ding an Sich in the Kantian sense, but that it fails to proceed from perception 
to satisfactory cognition. The inherent difficulty voiced by the poetic narrator is 
not the one that critical philosophy configured and ultimately resolved through the 
ultimate affirmation of Reason's transcendentalist self-canonisation. Baudelaire's 
poetry deprived itself of the consolations of the latter. The absolute unity of 
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consciousness presupposed in order to have a subject is here shattered and with 
this shattering the very capacity to cognitively assimilate reality is imperilled. The 
Baudelairean subject cannot respond to this challenge with a pre-critical, 
, 
, 
charismatic; intuitive insight that would render redundant the process of cognition 
through the mediation of concepts. The intuitive grasp of essential cosmic unities 
was never really there in Baudelaire. In Hegelian terms, "Les Sept Vieillards" 
thematises the impossibility of bringing the phenomenological trajectory of 
consciousness into fulfilment. The narrator fails to make the successive 
impressions cohere into a cognitive whole. He cannot translate his experience into 
a proposition free from semantic unresolve. The latter is not an indication of a 
hypothetical abundance of hermeneutic options but, quite to the contrary, marks 
the clogging up of the hermeneutic endeavour as such. There is literally nothing 
to interpret when confronted with a spectacle that puts one's axiological 
frameworks into abeyance. In this case, the perpetual multiplication of the same 
does not accrue to a recognisable underlying essence of experience, nor is it 
circumscribed within a testimonial framework, which could help the narrator allay 
his fears and proceed with a minimal conceptual negotiation. The rift between 
perception and cognition is irreversible and, most significantly, not regarded to be 
conjunctural (it is not attributed to drunkenness, for example, or to a pathology of 
the organs of perception). The succession of decrepit figures that so startles the 
poem's narrator is experienced as a series of shocks and inexorable forceful sights 
that constitute an integral given of the city. The configuration of space ("the 
houses seemed to stretch upwards by the mist .. .1 a dirty yellow fog flooded the 
whole of space ... ") makes it not only impossible to immerse the frightful 
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spectacle into ~ assuaging framework, but comes to. corroborate the cancero'us 
amplification of the experience through the elongation of architectural forms and 
the stifling penetration of solid space by the fluid indistinctness that fog stands 
., 
, 
for. One gets a similar liquidation of synthetic experience in Eliot's configuration. 
of space in "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" ("The yellow fog that rubs its 
back upon the window-panes, I The yellow smoke that rubs its muzzle on the 
window-panes, I Licked its tongue into the comers of the evening"). . The 
perceptual configurations of the text point to a crisis-fissured experience and, 
equally important, to a characteristically defensive posture and anticipatory mood 
on the part of the narrator ("Je suivais, roidissant mes nerfs comme un heros I Et 
discutant avec mon arne deja lasse [I was making my way, heroically steeling my 
nerves and arguing with my already weary soul]II).9 The need to intercept shock 
is here affirmed in the manner of a certain readiness that presupposes the 
inherently threatening impact of metropolitan reality. 
Ultimately, the perception of the seven disturbing figures cannot be 
subsumed under an over-arching concept that would ideally imbue them with a 
minimal propositional content. The narrator's perceptional referents never accede 
to the chora of conceptual abstraction (the human figures are not metaphors), 
whereas his communicative intent, fails to fulfil what it promises, i.e., the 
unravelling of the semantic enigma posed by the tyrannical proliferation of the 
other-as-same. The narrator is faced with the task of conceiving of difference 
differentially and disregarding the common denominators of its manifestations. to 
9 OC I: 87 ICV, 177; emphasis added. 
10 See Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," 182. Repetition would then "cease to function 
as the dreary succession of the identical .... [It would produce] a meaning-event by repeating a 
phantasm." 
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Faced with the unhindered amplification of the figure(s) he succumbs to the de-
familiarising effects of a homomorphic figural series without content import. The 
figure is now beyond the hermeneutic grasp and unseats all heuristic processes. It 
is presented-in all its barrenness as pure form devoid of intellective complications 
and totally exogenous to the transcendental dimension inherent in the concept. 
There is no symbiosis of perception and cognition in this quantal- zone where 
material form/signifier exposes and ironises the necessity of enveloping it~elf with 
the folds of meaning in order to exist at all. It is a mockery of meaning, however, 
judging from the narrator's reactions and the inconclusiveness of his interpretative 
gestures. The ironic parameter intrinsic to the text11 seals off the narrative from a 
hypothetical recuperation of lost content at the level of intent and/or metafigural 
awareness of the belabored aporia. 12 The poem turns into an allegory of the 
endemic rift between the perceptional and conceptual organisation of reality vis-a-
vis a consciousness that is only functional enough to register its own incapacity to 
render its referents and phenomenological impetus commensurate. It never 
monumentalises its insights into the crippling effects of this rift, however, and 
thematises the blindness inherent in any passage from perception to cognition as 
enabling of communication. 
11 Concerning irony, see Paul de Man, "The Rhetoric of Temporality," in Interpretation: 
Theory and Practice, ed. Charles S. Singleton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 173-209, 
esr. 195-205; repr., in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism 
2° ed. Introduction by Wlad Godzich (London: Methuen, 1983), 187-228. 
12 The imbrication of the grotesque within the incomprehensible is a given in this poem as 
well. The old man's appearance "would have invited showers of alms," the old men are described 
as "baroque phantoms," whereas a hypothetical eighth one would be "pitiless, ironic." 
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The material gaze and the sublime suspension of affection and cognition . 
Jean-Luc Nancy has observed that "the sublime does not constitute in the 
general field of [re ]presentation just one more instance or problematic: it 
\. 
transforms or redirects the entire motif of presentation .... In the sublime, the 
imagination no longer has to do with its products but with its operation --and thus 
with its limit.,,13 It is within this conceptual framework that several of 
Baudelaire's lines can be seen to address imagination's enabling conditions.14 . For 
instance, the apostrophe at the end of the "Spleen LXXVI" poem (OC I: 73) 
projects the freezing of imagination's faculties onto a liminal experience of 
representation: "-Desormais tu n'est plus, 0 matiere vivante! / Qu'un granit entoure 
d'une vague epouvante, / Assoupi dans Ie fond d'un Sahara brumeux; / Un vieux 
sphinx ignore du monde insoucieux, / Oublie sur la carte, et dont l'humeur 
farouche / Ne chante qu'aux rayons du solei I qui se couche [Henceforth, 0 living 
matter, you are but a granite form shrouded in vague horror, / listlessly sunken in 
the depths of a mist-bound Sahara, / an old Sphinx unknown to the uncaring 
world, / forgotten on the map, and whose grim humour / is to sing only in the rays 
of the setting sun]."lS I will link Walter Benjamin's understanding of the 
petrification of the organic dimension in Baudelaire's poetry in terms that reflect 
objective social determinations with what Christine Buci-Glucksmann calls "the 
baroque phenomenology of the new," and, most significantly, the "fixation on 
13 Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Sublime Offering," in O/the Sublime: Presence in Question (New 
York: State University of New York, 1993),34,40. 
14 See Paul de Man, "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," in Hermeneutics, ed. Gary 
Shapiro and Alan Sica (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 140 passim. 
15 OC I: 73/CV, 155-56; translation Francis Scarfe's. . 
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sight and the anxiety of losing it, and above all the dread of the fragmented 
body.,,16 
The reduction of living matter to the inorganic sphinx allegorises the rupture 
"' \ 
of modernist imagination with naturalism and i"nscribes within the imaginative act 
what Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy call "the necessity of 
presenting, with the object, the conditions of possibility of the object's production. 
In romantic terms, it concerns the entire logic of the fonnation of fonn." 17 In 
Nancy's terms this procedure reflects an enhanced awareness, which I believe 
Baudelaire exhibits, of the presentation of presentation I8beyond the unifying 
space of the (naturalist) figure. The Sphinx, as the allegorical signifier of the 
realm of imagination and cognition, is the intransitive and non-affective entity par 
excellence, non-speaking and non-engaging in a scopic reciprocality. Therefore, 
what is involved here is the depletion of the enabling conditions of 
phenomenology, baroque or otherwise, the depletion of the exchange between 
'd d ~L\cG'-1 k "h" 'bl d' I ' f mIn an nature. / uc smann seems to InSInuate t IS Impossl e la ectlc 0 
perceptual fixations and de-auraticised, forgetful, (as Paul de Man contends about 
the sphinx of the Spleen poem)I9non-reciprocating objects of ocular desire. She 
writes: "Now, the ubiquitous metaphors of the eye and the petrifying dual look 
(divine/infernal) [or sublime/grotesque], like all the correlates exhibited by the 
image, define the Baudelairean theatre of the modem and of the feminine. Or 




Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason, 166-67. 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, The Literary Absolute, 104; emphasis added, 
Nancy, "The Sublime Offering," 43, 
19 See Paul de Man, "Introduction," in Hans Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of 
Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982), xxv. 
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if the eye functions here as the organ of the passions and of their aggravation, the 
theatre for its art is unreal and lacking in affect.,,2o The non-affective dimension of 
the "theatre" where non-reciprocality is staged enables the inflection of 
, 
\ 
representation towards what Nancy called "the presentation of presentation itself." 
The sublime Sphinx serves as the allegory of the depletion of representation and 
incarnates one of the constituting motifs of poetic modernity: the crisis of 
testimonial accountability. 
Apropos of the sphinx in "Spleen LXXVI" Paul de Man writes: "But the 
sphinx is not an emblem of recollection but, like Hegel's sign, an emblem of 
forgetting .... He is the grammatical subject cut off from its consciousness, the 
poetic analysis cut off from its hermeneutic function, the dismantling of the 
aesthetic and pictorial world of "Ie soleH qui se couche [the setting sun]" by the 
advent of poetry as allegory. ,,21 Representational motion purified of testimonial 
import impregnates the Baudelairean text with its instances of a petrifying look, 
and qualifies the hysterical love of his protagonists as a mannoreal and material 
love, exchanged in between bodies that exhibit sculptural immobility,z2 
20 Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason, 166. See also "L'Amour du mensonge [The love of 
falsehood]" (OC I: 98-1001 CV I: 195-8) which exemplifies the lack of affect and void of essence 
that inhabit the melancholy ocular space of the Baudelairean subjects: "Je sais qu'il est des yeux, 
des plus melancoliques, I Qui ne recelent poin~ de secrets precieux; I Beaux ecrins sans joyaux, 
medaillons sans reliques, I Plus vides, plus profonds que vous-memes, 0 Cieux! [I know that there 
are eyes of deepest melancholy, I But which do not contain any precious secrets; I Fine caskets 
empty of jewels, lockets with no relics in them, I Emptier and deeper than the heavens!];" 
translation Francis Scarfe's, slightly modified. 
21 De Man, "Introduction," xxv. 
22 There are numerous examples of the marmoreal quality of the human body in the poetry 
of Baudelaire. All testify to the reification of naturality that is endemic in the deepest layers of 
naturality, in the oversexed body which ideally should be the site of unimpeded vitality. There are 
telling textual instances where the female body is both volatile and sculpturally solid. See, among 
others, "Le Lethe," in Les Epaves section (OC I: 155/CV I: 277-8): "Viens sur mon coeur, ... I 
Tigre adore, monstre aux airs indolents; IIJe veux dormir! II J'etalerai mes baiser sans remords I 
Sur ton beau corps poli comme Ie cuivre [Come upon my heart, ... I Adorable tigress, monster in 
your indolent airs; /I I want to sleep, ... I I will lavish my kisses without remorse I On your 
beautiful body that is polished like bronze];" emphasis added. The stressed materiality of the 
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Paul de Man, in his last essays on Kant, elaborated upon this (Kantian) 
material, intransitive vision [Augenschein] , which, I believe, permeates the 
splenetic Baudelairean gaze, and thus makes the poetry resonate with a modernist 
problematisation of representation. In a few words, Augenschein is a gaze devoid 
of reflexive or intellective complications, a gaze that does not obey the dictates of 
I . I· . 23 persono oglca Intentions. In a state of pure disinterestedness this non-
teleological regard architectonises the sublime objects: oceans, heavens, forests 
and, in the case of Baudelaire, city sites such as cathedrals. He is the first poet 
who managed to de-naturalise the sublime and stare at urban tableaux with the 
same cognitive blankness that only the supernatural inspires ("Je ne vois qu'infini 
par toutes les fenetres [I can see but Infinity through every windowD.,,24 What is 
cancelled here is the putative exchange between mind and nature that has been 
indiscriminately credited to the Romantic sublil!le. Kantian Augenschein moves 
beyond Hegel's Ideenschein, the sensory appearance of the idea. No symbolic 
dimension inheres in it and no exchange of mental and natural properties occurs 
female body translates a new economy of jouissance beyond the male symbolic sovereignty as 
well as the material dimension of the human body that does not yield to sense. 
23 See de Man, "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," 133-5. See also Immanuel Kant, 
"Book II: Analytic of the Sublime," in Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987),97-123. 
24 Interestingly, the pursuit of the infinite transpires in the framework of female 
homosexuality in "Femmes Damnees" (OC I: 113-4). Lesbians are therein apostrophised as 
"Chercheuses d'infini [Seekers of the infinite]." This brings the conjunction of sterility and hollow 
transcendence in sharp relief. The all-inclusive character of homosexual women denotes the 
infinite divisibility of self and its penetration by otherness: "0 vierges, 0 demons, 0 monstres, 0 
martyres, I De la realite grands esprits contempteurs [0 virgins, demons, monsters, martyrs, I Great 
minds who despise reality]." The same concern is encountered in "L'Heautontimoroumenos" (OC 
I: 78-9). Sterility and the voiding of (reproductive) naturality that lesbians exemplify are given a 
melancholic twist that distorts and enriches the familiar motifs of transcendence, materiality, and 
corrosive desire. In "Femmes Damnees: Delphine et Hippolyte" the heroines carry the infinite 
within them: "L'apre sterilite de votre jouissance I Altere votre soif et roidit votre peau, /I Faites 
votre destin, ames desord~ees, lEt fuyez l'infini que vous portez en vous! [The cruel sterility of 
your jouissance I Increases your thirst and eats away at your skin /I Fulfil your destiny, disordered 
souls, I And flee from the infinite that you carry inside]" (OC I: 152-5). 
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within the understanding it fakes, or in the mode of anthropomorphism.25 "Spleen 
LXXVI" belabours the passage from the natural sublime to a formal, optical 
materialism that counters the values of aesthetic experience. There is no reflexive 
\ 
depth in the-gaze of the Sphinx, just as the "mirror of the sea" in "L'Homme et la 
mer" turns out to be flat, the illusion, and not the reflection, of fathomless 
interiority.26 
Paul de Man ingenuously explores the Kantian notion of a body that has been 
liberated from the purposive function of the limbs in the case of the physical 
----
sublime. He links this deliverance to the disarticulation of cognitive seeing. The 
severance of the limbs from the organic totality of the body finds an echo in the 
corporeal montage of fragmented somatic instances in the Baudelairean text, 
especially with regard to the feminine body. The trajectory that de Man 
delineated vis-a-vis the Kantian text can be applied to the poetry as a move that 
leads from the organismic to the phenomenological, and from the latter to the 
material; from the phenomenality of the aesthetic to the materiality of 
Augenschein. The affective neutrality and optical materialism of this poetry 
threaten the constative patterns that uphold the narratives. In "Obsession" the link 
between perception and understanding is mediated by hallucination to the point 
where it is useless to search for any stable propositional background at all. 
25 See de Man, "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," 135. The Sphinx of the Spleen 
poem complicates the boundaries between human and natural and cannot serve as an 
anthropomorphic paradigm. 
26 See "LHomme et la mer [Man and the Sea]," in OC I: 19: "Homme libre, ... 1 La mer est 
ton miroir; [Free man, ... 1 The sea is your mirror]." On the surface the poem seems to affirm the 
mutual recognition of nature and consciousness. However, it is their mutual incomprehension that 
is ultimately put forward in the mode of an eternal struggle between the two: "0 lutteurs eternels, 0 
freres implacables! [0 eternal wrestlers, implacable brothers!]." 
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Comme tu me plairais, 0 nuit! sans ces etoiles 
Dont la lumiere parle un langage connu! . 
Car je cherche Ie vide, et Ie noir, et Ie nu! 
Mais les tenebres sont elles-memes des toiles 
Ou vi vent, jaillissant de mon oeil par milliers, 
- Des etres disparus aux regards familiers. (OC I: 75) 
How you would please me, 0 Night! without those stars 
Whose light speaks a language known! 
Because I look for the void, the black, and the bare! 
But the shadows themselves are canvases 
Where vanished beings with their familiar gaze 
Leap by the thousand from my own eyes. 
De Man's following contention is relevant to my argument: "The lyric 
depends entirely for its existence on the denial of phenomenality as the surest 
means to recover what it denies. This motion is not dependent, in its failure or in 
its illusion of success, on the good or bad faith of the subject it constitutes.,,27 The 
possibility of representation is, first, negatively affirmed and, then in this case, 
thwarted by the very denial of phenomenality ["how you would please me, 0 
night! without those stars / Whose light speaks a known language!"]. Baudelaire 
explicitly links phenomenality with speech. This is one more instance of the 
perpetual motif underlying most Spleen poems, that of the systematic aggravation 
of phenomenality due to its gradual relation and imbrication to language, and the 
climactic metamorphic crossings between perception, illusion, and aborted 
cognition, as in "Spleen LXXVI." Specular absence is not mourned here as in 
the case of T. S. Eliot's "The Hollow Men." On the contrary, it is desired and this 
desire refuses to domesticate its referents by shedding the ample light of 
27 De Man, "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric," 259. 
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phenomenality on them. If one counterpoints all this to "L'ennui ... .1 Prend l~s 
proportions de l'immortalite [Boredom takes on the proportions of immortality]" 
("Spleen LXXVI," OC I: 73), then the phenomenal-temporal dimension is 
1 
\ 
disjointed to such a degree as to merely serve as the enframing context of sheer 
unintelligibility. Most significantly, the Sphinx that refuses the lure of 
phenomenal cognition ["sunken in the depths of a mist-bound .. Sahara"] is 
impervious to the attractions and warmth of the light, and his "humour is to sing 
only in the rays of the setting sun." The constant negation of light, in the frame of 
the latter's explicit connection with speech in "Obsession," brings into sharp relief 
the dual resistance of the examined texts towards both the recuperative force of 
phenomenal experience ["Spleen LXXVI"] and referential language 
["Obsession"]. This resistance occurs by means of a poetic language that stages 
its own oxymora in the mode of a lyrical discourse that both admits of and 
dislocates conceptual resolution. 
Finally, it is in "Les Aveugles [The Blind Ones]" (OC I: 92) that the non-
cognitive gaze takes on its clearest formulation. The spectacle of blind men 
groping their way along the city streets and craning their necks towards the sky 
fills the narrator with dread and anxiety. He is disturbed by them because they 
retain the posture of a testimonial encounter with reality while obviously being 
unable to optically appropriate any referent at all: "Leurs yeux, d'ou la divine 
etincelle est partie, I Comme s'ils regardaient au loin, restent leves I Au ciel [Their 
eyes, from which the divine spark has fled, I As though they were staring into the 
distance, remain lifted I Towards the sky]." There is no substitution of other sense 
impressions for their predicament, either, and they remain throughout 
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imperturbable when faced with urban auditory stimuli. The blind have left the 
realm of the phenomenal, yet, seem to both acknowledge and defy it by darting 
their eyes to the skies above. This non-semantic look that still exhibits traits of 
1 
.\ 
volitional behaviour is a schema for the possibility of sustaining the decorum of 
reference without distilling a conceptual modicum out of it. Reference in this case 
is merely gestural. 
"lIs sont vraiment affreux! [They are really hideous]" affirms the bewildered 
narrator, yet, hastens to add in the concluding strophe: "Vois! Je me traine aussi! 
Mais, plus qu'eux hebete, I Je dis: Que cherchent-ils au Ciel, tous ces aveugles? 
[Look! I also follow suit! But, more stupefied than they, I I say: What are they 
looking for, all these blind men?]." This mixture of repulsion and fascination is a 
typical response to monstrosity "made all the more intolerable by [its] highly 
formalised intellect. ,,28 Their mechanical character ["pareils aux mannequins ... I 
... singuliers comme les somnambules"] gives off their true function as figures of 
formal motion that has no need of semantic intentions. Serving as a trope of 
inherently aborted perception that still retains the graceful decorum of reference, 
they exemplify the negation of self-reflexive consciousness. They are like 
Heinrich von Kleist's puppet-dancers, non-expressive, free from the "risk of 
affectation," unfettered by egological commitments.29 Their gestures sustain the 
formal modality of stable and elegant movement, the physical equipoise of 
"somnambulists," while emanating, like in the case of the latter, from a zone that 
is neither purely corporeal nor menta1.30 Their human dimension can only result 
28 
29 
Paul de Man, "Aesthetic Formalization in Kleist," in Rhetoric of Romanticism, 289. 
See de Man, "Aesthetic Formalization in Kleist," 286 passim. 
30 Ross Chambers writes of their "unconcern for the transcendent dimension" and their 
turning to a sky of "dubious noological status" ("Seeing and Saying in Baudelaire's 'Les 
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from the superimposition of the narrator's exegetic consciousness upon their 
marionette-like movement, and the substitution of a hypothetical intentionality 
animating their gestures for their purposeless mechanical act. This latter must be 
turned into'a pursuit of meaning, a defensive motion of understanding: "Je dis: 
--Que cherchent-ils au Ciel, tous ces aveugles?" This impatient question voices a 
genuine amazement over the bypassing of prevalent modes of absorbing reality 
data, that is, the ocular domestication of the external world. The standard defence 
against the formalisation that this provocative blindness exhibits is the imposition 
of an affective dialogism between subjects, or an affective state within soliloquy 
treated as interiorised dialogue. The narrator's soliloquy, however, leaves the 
blind men intact: "lIs traversent ainsi Ie noir illimite, / Ce frere du silence eternel 
[They traverse limitless night, / The brother of eternal silence]." They confront 
the auditory delirium of the city ("0 cite! / Pendant qu'autour de nous tu chantes, 
ris, et beugles [0 city! While you sing all around us, and laugh, and howl]") with 
a stoic indifference that makes a mockery of any dialogic exchange and seals them 
off from any potential intercourse based on need or dependency.31 The narrator's 
mystification has a productive aspect, however. It does not merely affirm in a 
negative mode the aporia of blindness endemic in the core of every perceptional 
encounter with reality that imperils any constative certainty. It also translates an 
aesthetic response that tries to reintegrate cognitive errancy within the centripetal 
Aveugles,'" in Pre-text, Text,Ccontext :Eessays on Nineteenth-Century French Literature, ed. 
Robert L. Mitchell [Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980], 148). 
31 See de Man," Aesthetic Formalization in Kleist," 288: "Nothing is more mechanical than 
the overpowering romantic figure of interiorization and self-consciousness. Hegel will say the 
same thing in a crucial passage from the Encyclopedia when he defines thought (Denken) as the 
substitution of Gediichtnis (the learning by rote of a conventional code) for Erinnerung 
(interiorization, represented in Kleist's text as the affective response of a consciousness to a 
mechanically formalized motion)." I have already tried to show how Baudelaire's poetry reveals 
the contingency of Eigendenken upon Gediichtnis. 
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movement of cognisable intentionality. It is the ultimate containment of seman,tic 
suspension of which de Man writes that as "an aesthetic education [it] inevitably 
confuses dismemberment of language by the power of the letter with the 
\ 
gracefulness of a dance. This dance, regardless of whether it occurs as mirror, as 
imitation, as history, as the fencing match of interpret"ation, or as the anamorphic 
transformations of tropes, is the ultimate trap, as unavoidable as it is deadly.,,32 
The blind men's somnambulistic gait resembles this "dance" that is but the 
dismemberment of cognition and reference within a referential posturing. 
The sublime evacuation of the self: the hollowing out of representation 
The sublime is a negative aesthetics par excellence, 
questioning art's representational function. 
Linda Marie Brooks, The Menace of the Sublime 
Jean-Luc Nancy's observation that the sublime transforms the entire motif of 
presentation33responds to the Kantian realisation that in the case of the sublime it 
is inhuman limitlessness that confronts the imagination, a limitlessness which as 
such challenges the schematising powers of the latter. Linda Marie Brooks 
focuses upon this "gap that opens between the empirical subject and the world she 
perceives" in the context of a configuration of the sublime in terms of an 
aesthetics of difference, and not of identity.34 Her analyses are particularly 
32 De Man, "Aesthetic Formalization in Kleist," 290. The "fencing match of interpretation" 
may be alluding to Baudelaire's poem "Le Soleil" from the "Tableaux parisiens" (Oe I: 83): "Je 
vais m'exercer seul a rna fantasque escrime [I go practising my fantastic fencing all alone]." The 
narrator "trebuch[e] sur les mots comme sur les paves [stumbles on words as against 
cobblestones]," and thus experiences the materiality of the letter. Benjamin quotes from the same 
poem right after having asserted that "Baudelaire made it his business to parry the shocks ... with 
his spiritual and physical self. This shock defence is depicted graphically in an attitude of combat" 
(Benjamin, Baudelaire, 117-8). Benjamin embeds here psycholinguistic insights into a historicist 
fattern. 
3 Nancy, "The Sublime Offering," 34. 
34 Linda Marie Brooks, The Menace of the Sublime to the Individual Self: Kant, Schiller, 
Coleridge and the Disintegration of Romantic Identity (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995),35. 
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apposite to the discussion of the role of the sublime in Baudelaire because ~he 
explicitly relates it to a poet's "sudden awareness of the fictitiousness of his own 
attempts at signification. ,,35 Fictitiousness is a condition that equally recurs in the 
\ 
case of irony as well, and bears on allegorical reification. I have insisted that as 
an ensemble of tropes, allegory renders transparent its incommensurability with 
what it targets, and thus lays open its constative void. What is inyolved in both 
Baudelairean allegory and the sublime is the disruption of the "possibility of 
reappropriating meaning.,,36 What ensues upon this disruption is "a double 
--
gesture which manifests both the poet's "demystifiedlmodem state (his despair of 
meaning)" and his willed projection of a "mystified or naive/classic state (his 
belief in meaning). ,,37 In the case of Baudelaire this double gesture translates into 
the thematised withering of experience and the accompanying project of 
correspondances, i.e., the spleen/ideal axis. It has already been shown that the 
correspondences register data of remembrance, "data of prehistory" as Benjamin 
called them,38and not correlations of essences retrievable through synchronic 
synaesthesia or restorative memory. Most importantly, this dual gesture occurs in 
the mode of simultaneity and leaves the settling of cognitive accounts in perennial 
suspense. 
35 
Linking allegory and the sublime leads to the realisation that the 
Brooks, The Menace of the Sublime, 32. 
Brooks, The Menace of the Sublime, 32. 
Brooks, The Menace of the Sublime, 33. I am sceptical towards Brook's historicist 
annexation of the two antithetical states she describes. The paternalistic resolution of the "nai've, 
classical" belief in meaning into the acceptance of semantic unresolve is not generically, 
genetically, or chronologically conditioned, but constitutes an endemic trait of language. 
Embedding it into a linear dialectical narrative detracts from its unsettling character and finally 
rehabilitates meaning in the form of meta-awareness of its historically recognisable, and thus 
Eotentially reversible, demise. 




Baudelairean economy of perception reenacts the depletion of subjective ~nd 
historical existence that was diagnosed through the deployment of the allegorical 
method and the mnemonic dissolution of the self into quantal zones of experience. 
\ 
Benjamin's- insistence on the predominantly specular character of allegory is 
particularly apposite here.39 Equally relevant, however, is the way specularity in 
Baudelaire is inflected toward a sublime perception that is appl~.ed not to the 
overwhelming natural, nor to a limitless magnitudo that defies conceptual 
containment. It is attached to the historical fragment and the urban zone that are 
limitless not in the quantitative sense but in their infinite susceptibility to 
perpetual reelaboration triggered by the collapse of communal frameworks of 
experience. The same attachment concerns the mnemonic detritus. 
The Baudelairean gaze signals the subliminal, but not sublimating, tracing of 
historical fragmentation at the limit of representation.4o It can be aligned to the 
sublime experience on the basis of a mutual exasperation of presentation41 that, at 
the same time, contravenes the conventions of subjectivity and its corollaries in 
the sphere of human emotion.42 Jean-Luc Nancy's comments reach out to the 
subliminal targeting of historical and subjective fragmentation that I traced in the 
poetry, and can be related to what Paul de Man has read in the Kantian 
39 See Benjamin, "Central Park," 52. 
Jean-Luc Nancy apropos of the sublime as a liminal experience: "The schema of the 
image, of any schema -or the schema of totality, the schematism of total union- is extended toward 
and tensed in the extreme: it is the limit at the limit of its (ex)tension, the tracing -which is no 
longer quantifiable or hence traceable- of magnitudo" ("The Sublime Offering," 45). 
41 It would be interesting to read this exasperation in counterpoint to Adorno's notion that 
the subject's socially mediated experiences defy representational depiction. See Aesthetic Theory, 
283: "What goes beyond subjective intention and its arbitrariness has a correlative objectivity 
within the subject: in the form of that subject's experiences, insofar as their locus is situated 
beyond the conscious will. As their sedimentation, artworks are imageless images, and these 
experiences mock representational depiction" (emphasis added). 
40 
42 Baudelaire's passionate and distortional imagery with its Baconian rationale is relevant 
here. 
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Augenschein, the apathetic, non-affective and non-cognitive gaze.43 Na~cy 
writes: "If feeling properly so-called is always subjective, if it is indeed the core 
of subjectivity in a primordial 'feeling oneself' of which all the great philosophies 
"\ 
of the subject could provide evidence, including the most 'intellectualist' among 
. them, then the feeling of the sublime sets itself off -or affects itself- precisely as 
the reversal of both feeling and subjectivity. The sublime affection~ Kant affirms, 
goes as far as the suspension of affection, the pathos of apathy. ,,44 I have already 
shown that "Les Aveugles" brings into sharp relief this suspension of affection 
while retaining a postural referential framework. The blind ones dart their hollow 
eyes into an equally empty sky that promises sublime transcendence only to 
frustrate their, or rather the narrator's, expectations. 
The respite of affectivity does not preclude the unleashing of desire which, 
as Suzanne Guerlac has shown, "implies the irrationality of an infinite mode [the 
pursuit of an always elusive object of desire] and its finite realization [posited at 
least as ideal, or as intended]." In this case, "desire operates textually in Les 
Fleurs du mal as a complication of the beautiful and the sublime --of form and 
formlessness.,,45 The Baudelairean sublime as cognitive non-containment bears 
on the poetic archiving of a desire that labours with the unhinging of sexual 
43 The intensification of the formalising impetus of the poetry in distinction to 
hypothetically encased socio-sexual contents, which compensates for the vanishing of the latter, is 
another facet of the situation. See Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 90. 
44 Nancy, "The Sublime Offering," 46. De Man condenses the relation between imagination, 
reason, and the sublime. Imagination can achieve loss of pathos through its elevation from a 
metaphysicaVideological to a transcendentaVcritical principle. The sacrifice of its empirical 
dimension allies it with reason and guarantees its abstraction from, and superiority over, nature. 
The sublime would pass entirely into reason were it not penetrated by imagination. The latter's 
ultimate task is to translate the abstractions of reason back into the phenomenal world of 
appearances and images. At the same time, it mediates the movement of the affects with the 
"legal, codified, formalized, stable order of reason." See "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," 
137-40. 
45 Suzanne Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime: Hugo, Baudelaire, Lautreamont (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990),97. . 
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objects. The history-sensitive explanation as to the causes of this situation would 
be the hollowing out of mediating socio-symbolic codes, theoretical consensus 
about which has turned into cliche. Apart from this, however, understanding 
"\ 
human sexuality in semiotic terms (Lacan,Kristeva) may help to account for 
dimensions that cannot be inscribed within history without a residue of excess. I 
understand that Guerlac's construal of desire as infinite mode and finite 
realization works to complicate the opposition between the terms beautiful and 
sublime, especially when considered under the prism of Holland's insights into the 
nature of Baudelairean desire.46 Not only does the Baudelairean sublime 
contaminate the beautiful with pain and evil, but it also reduces beautification into 
contentless intensification, a frenetic pursuit of gratification that fails to target its 
own referents adequately. The non-containment of desire resonates with the 
impossibility of phenomenalist closure that the sublime entails by virtue of the 
textual denaturalisation of the latter and its qualification in terms that render it 
proximate to the human body (the dead or sick body preferably) in the frame of 
the metropolis. The common logic sustaining the two spheres, those of desire 
and the sublime, is discernible within the imagery of the oversexed distorted body 
and its elevation to a field of contention between signification and asymbolia 
(which is exactly what the sublime constitutes in the first instance).47 At stake 
within this imagery are also the mutual walling up of affection and repulsion, 
symbolicity and allegorical emblematisation, and finally the hankering after 
46 See Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 90 passim. 
47 See Suzanne Guerlac, ''Transgression in Theory: Genius and the Subject of La Revolution 
du lang age poetique," 250: "Parallel to the operations of the Kantian aesthetic sublime, the 
transgressive field of text (as of the sublime) pulverises the phenomenological subject and, at the 
same time, obliges a relation to the subject." . 
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cognitive fulfilment and a state of cognitive disenchantment approximating moral 
and mental blankness. 
Suzanne Guerlac conjuncts contentless and infinite desire in a logic that 
echoes that of Eugene Holland. Ultimately, she const~es Baudelaire's sublimity 
as a "response to an infinity of desire, a 'privation"' that no longer signifies a 
transcendental force. ,,48 In other words, the infiltration of beauty by evil, the 
infinitisation of contentless desire, the dialectic of" desire as infinite mode and 
finite realisation, all these denaturalise the already tense dialectic of phenomenal 
limitlessness and Reason-detachment and its ultimate affirmation encountered in 
the Kantian sublime, and translate it in para-aesthetic terms. This translation 
cannot be subsumed under aestheticism since it critically impacts on the 
categories the latter depends on. What is more important, Guerlac claims that the 
disruption of the phenomenal/cognitive equilibrium is inscribed within the 
Kantian sublime itself, a view that is shared by Paul de Man. She writes: 
In the sublime proper there is a breakdown of representation through 
a violence done to purpose, which, through a critical and ironic 
gesture (one that reinforces a division within the subject), reminds us 
that nature is mere appearance, merely phenomenal. It challenges a 
harmony, or analogical equivalence, between nature and the 
operations of the mind established through the subjective a priori of 
the principle of reflective judgement.49 
I read the last sentence as implying that the self-reflectiveness of reason vis-
a-vis the sublime depletes the nature/mind homology. I agree with Guerlac that 
the sublime (especially as it operates in the poetry of Baudelaire) implicates the 
48 
49 
Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime, 96. 
Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime, 108. 
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domain of the aesthetic but at the same time "marks a point of resistance to 
aestheticism.,,5o Baudelaire's modernity excels in the interimplication of the 
aesthetic and sublime spheres but in such a way as to denaturalise the latter and 
empty the former of any pretensions to cognitive homdlogies of the mind/nature 
type. Baudelaire's poetic practice has rendered the tension between the two 
realms visible and has bequeathed it to successive generations of hermeneuts with 
the proviso that the security behind the cognitive entrenchments of 
phenomenalism is a false one. There has not been, and cannot be, a depassement 
of Baudelaire by putative successors that allegedly brought the aesthetic agenda 
to fruition, fulfilment, or closure (Mall arme , for example, or the "post-
moderns,,).51 I can only agree with Suzanne Guerlac when she chooses instead to 
propose modernity "as the paradoxical move of both erecting the autonomy of the 
aesthetic (Baudelaire) and of critiquing the aesthetic from the angle, not of a 
humanist ethic, but of the autonomy of ethos (Ducasse). This is the ambivalence 
we hear through the sublime in the writings of Hugo, Baudelaire, and 
Lautreamont-Ducasse, an ambivalence vital to a modem (or postmodern) horizon 
of art production". 52 
50 Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime, 192. 
51 See de Man, "Lyric and Modernity,"Jn Blindness and Insight, 174 passim. He cites from 
Hans Robert Jauss, "Zur Frage der Strukture~eit alterer und moderner Lyrik," GRM XLI (1960) 
and Karlheinz Stierle, "Moglichkeiten des dunken Stils in den Anfangen moderner Lyrik in 
Frankreich," in Immanente Aesthetik, Aesthetische Reflexion: Lyrik als Paradigma der Moderne, 
ed. Wolfgang Iser (Munich: Poetik und Hermeneutik, Arbeitsergebnisse einer Forschungsgruppe 
II, 1966) in order to critique their "genetic concept of literary history and modernity" (de Man, 
"Lyric and Modernity," 174, fn 8). He exposes the fallacy of "dating the origins of modernism 
with historical accuracy" and Jauss' assumption that "the movement of lyric poetry away from 
representation is a historical process that dates back to Baudelaire as well as being the very 
movement of modernity" (183; emphasis added). 
52 Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime, 196. The ethos of Lautr~amont-Ducasse consists in 
the elaborate playing out of specularity, and is thus more than relevant to the understanding of 
modernity and its primary anxieties. Guerlac insists that in Les Chants de Maldoror what takes 
place is the dramatisation and literalisation of "the relation between specular identification and the 
problematic of self-consciousness or subjectivity." In the Poesies she reads the "interdiscursive 
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Linda Marie Brook's combination of a radical configuration of the sublime 
sphere with a traditional historical pattern that mitigates the edge of her own 
insights symptomises the persistence of linear modes of accounting for semantic 
unresolve. -The movement away from a traditionally sarictioned sublime to a non-
phenomenalist one hypothetically enabled by the advances of modem poetry 
historicises what has been endemic in any sublime confrontation with reality. 
There cannot be a sublime that does not admit of layers of meaning that remain 
representational. In "Les Aveugles" the imbrication of the sublime and grotesque 
dimensions as embodied in the presence of the blind men takes on sinister 
undertones regarding the outcome of the hypothetical pursuit of transcendence 
(hypothetical because it is the narrator who ascribes their gestures intentionality). 
The representational and referential framework, however, is never elided. 
Casting off reference or phenomenality takes a higher toll than Brooks or anyone 
who grafts the tension between phenomenality and the blindness integral to the 
conceptual elaboration of reality onto a pattern of continuity are willing to admit. 
The same applies to the relationship between mimesis (and/or symbolicity) and 
allegory. 53 
operations of the plagiat," a citational mode of intertextuality. In summary terms, one can say that 
the significance of both Baudelaire and Lautreamont is due, among other reasons, to their 
desublimating and nonphenomenological mode of confronting the sublime and representation. 
S3 See de Man, "Lyric and Modernity", in Blindness and Insight, 185: "All representational 
poetry is always also allegorical, whether it be aware of it or not, and the allegorical power of the 
language undermines and obscures the specific literal meaning of a representation open to 
understanding. But all allegorical poetry must contain a representational element that invites and 




THE HISTORICAL AND TRANSHISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
BAUDELAIRE'S POETRY 
History may be servitude, History may be freedom 
T:\ S. Eliot, "Four Quartets"-
"As a star without atlnosphere": the tension between psychoanalytic' 
and historicist accounts of human experience 
Spleen LXXVI (OC I: 73) negotiates the erosive agency of temporality 
and the depletion of the reminiscing lyric subject in a way that takes into account 
the metonymic disanchoring of memory's referents. 
l' ai plus de souvenirs que si j' avais mille ans. 
Un gros meuble a tiroirs encombre de bilans, 
De vers, de billets doux, de proces, de romances, 
Avec de lourds cheveux roules dans des quittances, 
Cache moins de secrets que mon triste cerveau. 
C' est une pyramide, un immense caveau, 
Qui contient plus de morts que la fosse commune. 
--Je suis un cimetiere abhorre de la lune, 
OU comme des remords se trainent de longs vers 
Qui s'achament toujours sur mes morts les plus chers. 
Je suis un vieux boudoir plein de roses fanees, 
OU git tout un fouillis de modes surannees, 
OU les pastels plaintifs et les pales Boucher, 
Seuls, respirent l'odeur d'un flacon debouche.2 
I am fuller of memories than if I had Ii ved a thousand 
years. 
See Benjamin, Baudelaire, 154: "[Baudelaire] paid dearly for consenting to this 
disintegration ["of the aura in the experience of shock"] -but it is the law of his poetry, which 
shines in the sky of the Second Empire as 'a star without atmosphere. '" These are the very last 
words of the central Baudelaire essay. Benjamin cites from Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations, 97: 
"All living things require an atmosphere around them, a mysterious misty vapour; if they are 
deprived of this envelope, if a religion, an art, a genius is condemned to revolve as a star without 
atmosphere, we should no longer be surprised if they quickly wither and grow hard and 
unfruitful. " 
2 OC I: 73/CV, 155-6; translation Francis Scarfe's. 
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Not even an enormous chest of drawers stuffed with 
accounts and verses, love-letters -and law-suits, 
Drawing-room ballads, 
And heavy plaits of hair rolled in receipts, has fewer 
secrets 
To hide than has my unhappy brain. It is a pyramid, a 
vast \. 
Burial-vault, more packed with dead than any chamel-
house. 
1 am a graveyard that the Moon abhors, in which 
Long worms crawl like remorses, always battening on 
Those dead 1 hold most dear. 1 am a bygone boudoir 
Full of faded roses, in which a medley of old-fashioned 
Dresses lie scattered everywhere, with only the 
Plaintive pastels and pale Boucher canvases to breathe 
The fragrance of a scent-bottle left uncorked 
A dazzling thematic and associative wealth renders this Spleen poem particularly 
apposite to a discussion on memory, temporality and history especially since it 
overtly entwines memory with the reality of reification. Eugene Holland alerts us 
to the poem's hyperbolisation of the anamnestic act causing a situation where the 
narrator's memories become not only infinite but subject to a temporal elongation 
that encroaches upon horizontal temporality's potential for the encasement of 
experience. "1' ai plus de souvenirs que si j' avais mille ans [I have more 
memories than if 1 had lived a thousand years]" echoes a paroxysmic mnemonic 
impetus. The metaphoric axis connecting the narrator to a number of emblems of 
memories ("un gros meuble," "une pyramide," "un immense caveau") switches to 
the positioning of spatial- equivalents for the narrating subject3 which bear sinister 
undertones of vacuous depth: "--Je suis un cimetiere abhorr~ de la lune [I am a 
cemetery abhorred by the moon]," "un vieux boudoir." Gradually the landscape 
See Holland, Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, 87-8. 
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of reification is narratively insinuated in a way that links it inextricably with the 
mortified body and the reduction of reference to mere gesture. "Je suis un vieux 
boudoir plein de roses fanees [I am an old boudoir full of faded roses]" is inflected 
to the defiant apostrophe: "-Desormais tu n'est pl~s, 0 matiere vivante! [--
Henceforth you are no more, 0 living matter!]."·· The way the abortion of 
memory-retrieval impacts subjectivity is put into relief through the transformation 
of Ii ving matter into inanimate stone. 
Rien n' egale en longueur les boiteuses journees, 
Quand sous les lourds flocons des neigeuses annees 
L' ennui, fruit de la morne incuriosite, 
Prend les proportions de l'immortalite. 
--Desormais tu n'est plus, 0 matiere vivante! 
Qu'un granit entoure d'untvague epouvante, 
Assoupi dans Ie fond d'un Sahan,brumeux; 
Un vieux Sphinx ignore d'un monde insoucieux, 
Oublie sur Ia carte, et don't l'humeur farouche 
Ne chante qu'aux rayons du solei! qui se couche.4 
Nothing could 'be as long-drawn-out as the limping 
days, When under the heavy flakes of the snowy years, 
Boredom, the fruit of sullen indifference, 
Takes on the proportions of immortality. 
Henceforth,O living matter, you are but a granite form 
Shrouded in vague horror, listlessly sunken in the 
Depths of a mist-bound Sahara, an old Sphinx 
Unknown to the uncaring world, forgotten on the map, 
And whose grim humour is to sing only in the rays of 
The setting sun. 
Benjamin has already identified this process as "empathy with inorganic 
things.,,5 He gives it a historicist twist by explaining it as "matter that has been 




OC I: 73/CV, 156; translation Francis Scarfe's. 
Benjamin, Baudelaire, 55. 
Benjamin, Baudelaire, 56. 
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between Erfahrung and Erlebnis, Benjamin's perspective imposes a historical 
accent on what he himself had already determined in terms that affirmed both the· 
primary agency of mnemic-linguistic mechanisms and of the controlling socio-
- .\ 
symbolic milieu. His insistence on historical determination is not always immune 
,. ' 
to a reflexive model of understanding the interimplication of text and social reality 
and tends to slur over inherent rhetorical exigencies. It also ta~es insufficient 
account of the incommensurability of experience and (historical/temporal) context 
that defines trauma, that is, the traumatic impact of temporality and finitude that 
the narrating subjects attempt to ward off. His emphasis inevitably diminishes the 
history of intertextual entanglements that determine, to a certain extent, the 
examined work? Benjamin tries to historicise an allegorical text that is sceptical 
of the possibility of embedding experience within a historical framework in a way 
that would exhaust its semantic potential. Baudelaire's discourse exposes the 
factitiousness undergirding all bipolarlbinomial arrangements and is mistrustful of 
the logic that reduces the text to an instrument that reflectively registers (its) 
historical circumstances. The text problematises the reliance on memory that is 
prerequisite to the embedment of experience within a historical seriality. The 
text's determination by factors that resist the full grasp of historicist 
appropriations, however, does, not indicate that it is created in a historical vacuum 
but testifies to a constitutive aporia and indeterminacy recognised by modem 
experience. 
Another point concerning Benjamin's analyses is that he offers a partial 
"corrective" to his historicist emphases in his Arcades Project. Therein he 
7 On intertextual rapports in the text, see OC I: 976. 
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combines a stunning awareness of historical environments with an archaeology of 
inter-textual influences. As always with Benjamin the abundance of insights is 
overwhelming and the reader is challenged to unfold the intricate counterpoint of 
his texts a~d read them as if they complemented, and r~sponded to, one another. 8 
I must, however, declare what I regard as a source o(friction in his analyses. Hi's 
recourse to a Freudian understanding of memory and trauma (the division into 
voluntary/involuntary memory, the inscription of traumatic mnemonic traces 
when the protective shield of consciousness is caught "off guard," the whole 
psychoanalytic vocabulary in his Baudelaire essays) raises the issue of the relation 
of traumatic memory to the collective and historical character of human 
recollection. His understanding of memory on the basis of the conjunction of 
personal memories and the communal commemoration of collectively shared 
experiences within the body of a community affirms the primacy of the inscription 
of mnemonic contents on the basis of a commonality of political and ethical 
values, and within collective imaginaries. All these are positively valorised. 
Benjamin laments the dispersion of values and codes that could stabilise memory 
and reduce or absorb trauma. However, I see Baudelaire's poetry as refusing to 
do that. Baudelaire's ambivalence vis-a-vis the non-transmissibility of experience 
points to his awareness of the non-conjunctural dimension of this condition. This 
is not an endorsement of ontological destiny but the realisation that within the 
mechanisms of language and memory the inscription of experience along 
horizontal lines necessary to the stabilisation of collective identities and 
imaginaries is far from certain, and in no way reflects non-contingent fundaments 
8 See Walter Benjamin, "Konvolut J: Baudelaire," in The Arcades Project, 228-387. 
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of essence. This is the way in which Baudelaire's poetic production exceeds its 
historical circumscriptions. Again, this does not mean that it cannot be given a 
certain historical recognition as an event. The poetry renders imperative, 
- \ 
however, that one re-negotiate one's understanding of what identity means, its 
phantasmatic and exclusionary foundations. 
Mnemonic reification is seen by Benjamin to be not simply, or not 
primarily, the outcome of a process of content-disintegration consequent upon the 
embedment of traumatic experience in a pseudo-temporal horizontal schema. 
This integration serves to alleviate trauma by defusing the memory traces of their 
pathogenic, ego-dismantling force (the logic of Erlebnis disguising itself as 
Erfahrung; the logic of psychoanalytic treatment, as well). He also understands 
reification to be the necessary outcome of the market-oriented mode of existence 
monitoring all layers of social life and human production. There is nothing 
inherently fallacious in the amplification of the causes and significance of 
reification and its more historico-political inflections provided that one 
understands that Baudelaire's poetic praxis has anticipated its historicist 
appropriations, and has thematically ingrained them in and through its contractual 
and dialogical character and its metafigural awareness.9 Reification in Baudelaire 
accommodates both the iteI?isation and commodification of human experience 
due to economic and political reasons and the disintegration of experiential 
contents caused by the semiotic character of language and memory. The latter 
dimension turns more clearly visible in the vicinity of (modem) trauma. 
9 From the introductory "Au Lecteur [To the Reader]" (OC I: 5-6) to the more overtly 
contractual poems of the Revolte section history clamours at the door of this poetry. One of the 
primary traits of lyric poetry, i.e., its monological, soliloquising character, is thus bracketed. . 
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Benjamin's analyses bear upon the dual aspect of reification in Baudelaire's 
poetry, which explains why he conjugates Freudian psychoanalysis with historical 
determinism. Still, he does not account for the way in which traumatic experience 
~ "' 
and its correlate mnemonic flash-backs problematise\ the past/present relation 
upon which a historicist explanation must depend. Trauma invalidates the 
evidentiary force behind the witnessing and communicability of a social reality 
and eludes the retrospective linear and historiographic classification of events. In 
addition to that, an analytical model that insists on the historicist susceptibilities 
of texts in terms of their bearing witness to historical reality does not resolve the 
difficulty of circumscribing, and then transcending, the designated historical 
environments in order to determine their specificities and their control over the 
artistic product. One cannot jump from text to reality as if they inhabit a zone 
wherein their reciprocal recognition and illumination is possible. 
Benjamin never infantilises the textual realm to an epiphenomenon of 
historico-economic infrastructures. However, the ambivalent way in which he 
lumps fragments of a psychoanalytic theory of trauma with insights ingrained 
with a certain historical determinism glosses over the potentially anti-historicist 
dimensions of the psychoanalytic rationale or the aspects of it that move beyond 
an exhaustive historicist annexation. First, it is the "personal," individual intra-
psychically generated processing of modem traumatic reality that does not 
resonate well with Benjamin's more communal, "calendar" screening of historical 
events and personal histories. The latter make sense (or should make sense, 
according to Benjamin's implied injunction) through the conjugation of personal 
experience with commonly absorbed shock-insulating experiential frameworks. 
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The psychoanalytic accounts of (traumatic) memory do not entirely preclude the 
- . 
societal dimension but must hold it in abeyance in order to focus, instead, on the 
intra-psychic belabouring of reality. Second, in the psychoanalytic account of 
-, 
\ 
experience-processing there is a modicum of immutability with respect to the 
psychic processes involved. The influence of external reality on the individual is 
not, of course, shunned, yet the subject is regarded as struggling with a reality, 
and with means, which elude his conscious control. I do not believe that this 
antinomy is resolved by Benjamin's assertion that the cementing of collective 
consciousness is more or less unconscious. to 
The subject/patient is, according to the traditional psychoanalytical 
versions to which Benjamin seems to point, constituted at the crossroads between 
external reality and internal psychic mobility, and is thus manipulated by them. It 
is not argued here that psychoanalytical insights and a historicist perspective are 
de facto mutually exclusive since there have been instances of a successful 
rapprochement of the two in the Deleuzian angle of Eugene Holland, and others. 
Lacan's enhancement of the mediatory role of language vis-a-vis the negotiation 
of reality can serve as a bridge rendering the two zones apposite to each other. 
Considering human desire orbital to the linguistic dimension encroaches upon the 
grafting of individual experience onto qualities of a collective, which is what 
transpires in the case of more anthropological versions of psychoanalysis, family 
triads and oedipal plots including. Psychoanalysis has had various branches and 
its vicissitudes seem to have no final exit. Nevertheless, the tension between the 
two analytical modes must be registered especially since they are brought to 
10 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 185: "Experience ... [is] a convergence in memory of 
accumulated and often not conscious data." 
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proximity by Benjamin in the context of a discussion of personal and more 
communal accounts of experience, memory, and history. I contend that 
Benjamin's conjunction of Freudian psychoanalysis and his unorthodox version of 
'\ 
historicist determinism slurs over the potentially disturbing incongruence of the 
two and refrains from acknowledging the resistance to historicist, cumulative 
integrations that traumatic memory entails. I I Still, Benjamin himself writes that 
Baudelaire's poetry concerns a time that is geschichtslos ["without history,,].12 
The Baudelaire essay's concluding lines resonate with insightful ambivalence and 
call for an act of reading that will do justice to Benjamin's creative irresolution: 
"[Baudelaire] indicated the price for which the sensation of the modem age may 
be had: the disintegration of the aura in the experience of shock. He paid dearly 
for consenting to this disintegration -- but it is the law of his poetry, which shines 
in the sky of the Second Empire as 'a star without atmosphere. 11,13 A "star without 
atmosphere" signals a phenomenon in complete isolation from any surrounding or 
enveloping environment. As such it cannot be historicisable. 
II Michel Foucault has, however, brought the historical determinations of psychoanalysis to 
the fore. Analysis has constitutively been captive to the antinomy between the affirmation of 
natural, extra-historical givens and the shaping of the human subject by historical forces. See his 
History of Sexuality, vol. I: An Introduction, 159. He arraigns the emancipatory illusions of 
psychoanalysis: " ... the good genius of Freud placed it [sex] at one of the critical points marked 
out for it since the eighteenth century by the strategies of knowledge and power ... in giving a new 
impetus to the secular injunction to study sex and transform it into discourse." Cited in Jacques 
Derrida, "To Do Justice to Freud," in Resistances of Psychoanalysis, 112. Foucault's stance 
towards psychoanalysis was not unwavering. In general, the tendency was critical climaxing in his 
ultimate project, The History of Sexuality. Nevertheless, any attempt to grasp the tensional relation 
of Foucault to psychoanalysis must take into continuous account The Order of Things, especially 
pages 373-76. Analysis is there seen to entangle with representation and finitude in a way that 
overspills the former and embraces the latter. 
12 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 143. 
13 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 154. He quotes from Friedrich Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations, 
97. Nietzsche's "atmosphere," however, protectively envelops "a religion," "an art, a genius" 
from historicist dissection allowing them, thus, to live and grow. It could be that Benjamin 
implies that Baudelaire's poetry is open to history, and consciously so. Within the broader context 
of reference, however, one gets the feeling that it is the isolation, the shock-like non-assimilability 
of the work that Benjamin cryptically addresses. 
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The deployment of historicist circumscriptions at the service of poetic 
hermeneutics addressing the poetry of an author like Baudelaire makes clearer 
their limitations. The binomial logic of immanence/transcendence within which 
" historicism moves has already been anticipated, thematised and problematised by 
the examined poetry. Baudelaire's moratorium against the dialectical resumption 
of experiential fragments incapacitates reading acts that presupp~se signifiers to 
be adequate expressions of their signifieds or perfect embodiments of the 
conceptual paradigms that they put forth. 14 No latent essence can be deciphered 
negatively, dialectically, or otherwise, to which manifest contents could be 
referable. Baudelaire's poetry leverages a reality where desire and memory 
galvanise subjects not into action in the pragmatic sense, but into an exit-less 
pursuit of cognitive territorialisation. This pursuit never winds up as an indirect 
confirmation of an egocentric ontology of life. 
"Spleen LXXVI" also addresses "the necessary but noncomplementary 
relations, or better, interferences, between tropological structures of cognition and 
the material forces of inscription [that] could therefore never result in a 
chronological pattern of sequential and continuous movements." 15 It does so by 
gearing the dynamics of memory towards the apostrophised sphinx that serves as 
a semi-anthropomorphic trope not, ultimately, for the act of remembering, but for 
irreversible forgetting. It shapes up as the abrupt petrification of sense into 
14 On the contrary, the unimpeded fusion of signifier and signified that symbolism promises 
cannot be supported through the allegorical mode. See Richard Stamelman, "The Shroud of 
Allegory: Death, Mourning, and Melancholy in Baudelaire's Work," Texas Studies in Literature 
and Language 25 (1983): 390-409. He writes: "Allegory represents an alterity with which it can 
never coincide" (398). 
15 Kevin Newmark, "Paul de Man's History," in Beyond Symbolism: Textual History and the 
Future of Reading (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991),225. 
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literarity, the sense-less materiality of the letter. Its hieratic immobility enhan?es 
what de Man regards as "the dismemberment of the aesthetic whole into the 
unpredictable play of the literary letter." 16 The granite marmoreality that 
" 
.\ 
permeates the text is a mute statement as to the failure to cognise.17 By 
implication, it testifies to the impossibility of synthesising mnemonic referents 
into a coherent history, that is, the impossibility of effecting .. their symbolic 
binding. What Kevin Newmark writes apropos of the "Correspondances" can also 
be said with regard to "Spleen LXXVI": "History ... for de Man as well as for 
Baudelaire is therefore a textual process governed by laws that would be proper to 
the acts of inscription and reading rather than a natural process patterned on the 
chronological continuity and change of empirical entities.,,18 
Baudelaire inflects hypertrophic memory ("J'ai plus de souvenirs que si 
j'avais mille ans") to literal amnesia ("Un vieux sphinx ... oublie sur la carte") 
eliciting thus the understanding that the grammar of memory is not commensurate 
to its semantics. The assumption is not that the subject does not remember; he 
does so, but it is the semantic value of memory that is ultimately at stake.19 
Memory is not expected to retrieve the core of past events as world occurences. 
Memory is itself censorious, literal, material occurrence and this is what the 
petrified sphinx-emblem conveys. In its lethic defiance and isolation, "ignore du 
16 De Man, "Reading and History," in The Resistance to Theory, 70. 
17 Cf. de Man's "[a]llegorical narratives tell the story of the failure to read" in Allegories of 
Reading, 205; cited in Newmark, "Paul de Man's History," 221, fn. 16. De Man has substantially 
elaborated upon the disjunction between cognition and linguistic performance. 
18 Newmark, "Paul de Man's History," 224. 
19 Memory, in the sense of a letting-emerge of the anterior and aleatory, as the material 
inscription of idea dissociated from meaning, "effaces remembrance (or recollection) just as the I 
effaces itself'(Paul de Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," 773). The Baudelairean 
subject engages in an anamnestic endeavour that "materially inscribes, and thus forever forgets, its 
ideal content" (774). . 
160 
monde insoucieux [ignored by an indifferent world]," it "voices" the constant 
alienation that persists in and as sense. 
Reification and Memory: the extinction of the anamnesticlhistorical subject. 
What Barbara Johnson's analyses have found at the core of the prose 
poems is there in the Spleen sequence as well, that is, a structuqll undercurrent 
that leads to an irreversible freezing of the lyrical, affective register and a prosaic 
explicitation of the textual literarity.2o The crystal-clear character of the 
factitiousness at the core of the textual givens is the outcome of the 
comprehension of the reified character of both external reality and perceiving 
consciousness. Walter Benjamin in The Arcades Project21 and the Baudelaire 
essays addressed the reality of reification in all its socio-economic determinations 
and linked it to an alteration of the perceptuaVconceptual horizon of the modem 
subject. What is visible within the latter, according to him, is a self-estrangement 
ensuing upon the serialisation of experience that capitalism enforces, along with 
the annexation of all organic life to the sphere of the inorganic. Optic and tactile 
experiences are adjusted to the exigencies of shock-defence. The jUineur, i.e., the 
leisurely city stroller, gradually cedes his place to the amorphous and neurotic 
mass of the crowd. The network of reification that Walter Benjamin analyses 
sensitises the Baudelairean poetry to the emblematic character of the prostitute, 
the lesbian, the gambler, and the factory-worker. His is a poetics of sterility and 
20 See Johnson, Defigurations de langage pohique, 40, for an instance of "explicitation de 
I,,,., '.( " . .. rnerantl;. 
21 Benjamin, "Konvolut N: On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress," 45,6-88 
passim. 
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intransiti vity that deploys the allegorisation of the above figures in an ove~all 
strategy of enciphering an already fragmented and commodified (historical) 
existence. The prostitution of the living body to the inorganic world,22the empathy 
with the commodity, all point to the enabling conditions of this poetry: "The 
devaluation of the world of objects in allegory is outdone within the world of 
objects itself by the commodity. ,,23 There is nothing immanently psychological 
for Benjamin that cannot be revealed to be historically conditioned.24 At the same 
time, however, I believe that what this historical understanding negatively 
responds to, if not renders more visible, is the dissolution of historical linearity 
and historical memory. And this is exactly the point where what seem to be quite 
orthodox and more or less dialectical materialist analyses collide with their own 
enabling ground which they had been trying to conceal. Civic memory is seen by 
Benjamin to be the correlate of phenomenological, psychological memory, with 
its division into volitional and non-volitional memory, its logic of a Proustian 
memoire involontaire, its screen-memories, its apres-coup investments of events 
with meaning, the non-commensurability of event and remembrance. At this 
point the tension between the voluntary and involuntary character of memories 
comes to overflow both Baudelaire's poetry and Benjamin's. analyses, the 
oscillations of whom concerning the putative capacity of involuntary memory to 
recognise and/or retrieve experiential traces indicates the unavoidable implication 
of reification in any mnemonic act per see 
22 
23 
See Benjamin, Baudelaire, 166. 
Benjamin, "Central Park," 34. 
It also reflects the 
24 Even impotence in men bears a historical index according to Benjamin. Sexuality is 
perforated by economic and political exigencies as can be seen by his response to Baudelaire's 
configuration of the lesbian. See "Central Park," 36,39 respectively. . 
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incompatibility of deterministic and psychoanalytic vocabularies. . The 
paroxysmic character of the Baudelairean memories ("J'ai plus de memoires que si 
j'avais mille ans [I am fuller of memories than if I had lived a thousand years"]) is 
an index to the defensive formation of consciousness in its retroactive attempts at 
mastering traumatic mnemonic overload. Benjamin recognises the defensive 
character of this consciousness in the human automaton of the jostling crowd 
performing a ritual of shock-defence jerky movements. The whole schema is 
reduced to the Freudian formula postulating the incompatibility of consciousness 
and the essential retentionlretrievability of memory traces. Benjamin translates 
this into Proustian terms: "Put in Proustian terms, this means that only what has 
not been experienced explicitly and consciously, what has not happened to the 
subject as an experience, can become a component of the memoire 
involontaire. ,,25 It is therefore non-volitional memory that has the capacity to 
retrieve the core of inscribed experience, and not the strained voluntary 
recollection. Therefore, the question arises vis-a-vis the very foundations of 
modem subjectivity and historical intelligibility, since they both accrue to a 
mnemonic and testimonial integration of experience: is genuine historical 
memory, and by extension its commensurate subjectivity, at all possible, not only 
in the context of a capitalist organisation of perception that has forced human 
responsiveness to degenerate into a series of spasmodic shock-defences, but most 
importantly, is it possible sui generis as a retrieval of experiential meaning? The 
answer cannot be unconditionally affirmative if one considers that the 
disintegration of the experiential content is granted whenever the incident is 
25 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 114. 
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repressed or activated after an incubation period, as in the case of trauma, ot even 
when the incident meets with an "alert" perceptual mechanism ready to process it 
or relegate it to the mnemonic depository. The mortification of past-matrices in 
\ 
Baudelaire, and the quantal and reified character of his memory morsels, point to 
a condition that exceeds the socio-economic determinations of the era in which he 
lived, and which (condition) is related to the factitiousness undergirding all 
memory acts. Herein lies the emblematic force of his modernist awareness. 
Consequently, the transparency of Walter Benjamin's historically-oriented 
analytics of memory to psychoanalytically investigated infrastructures of memory 
solicits an insight that Benjamin resisted for reasons that can only be strategic. 
There has never been, and cannot be, any reification-free anamnestic act. The 
subject of the memoire involontaire, the subject of the Baudelairean 
correspondances, struggles to embed lived or witnessed events within pseudo-
temporal narratives.26 On the other hand, in the case of shock-defence alertness, 
what is aimed at is the defusal of pathogenic force accompanying a traumatic 
event. Put in other terms, the paradox confronting any possible attempt at 
salvaging empirical contents in and through memory lies in the following: an 
unconscious inscription of experience leaves behind memory traces that can be 
retrieved only through involuntary memory. But, by necessity, and even if one 
bypasses the fact that the non-volitional haphazard character of this mnemonic 
praxis is not adequate to the demands of historical alertness, the only "content" 
that can be said to inhere in these memory traces cannot be immanent, but strictly 
26 See Benjamin, Baudelaire, 154. Benjamin relates Baudelaire's "impotent rage" to the 
attempt to create a sense of collective experience out of individually lived life moments: "This is 
the nature of something lived through (Erlebnis) to which Baudelaire has given the weight of an 
experience (Eifahrung)." 
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mnemonic (i.e., perpetually reconstituted apres-coup, or rather constituted by the 
very act of recall itself). On the other hand, the residual content-potential of ~n 
experience consciously registered has always already been exhausted because of 
the_ wilful character of its elaboration by ,an alarmed consciousness, which 
(elaboration) emanates from the necessities of a shock-defence psychology. What 
the reminiscing subject reaffirms, in Baudelaire's poetry, is not the capitalist 
reification of a pre-Iapsarian mnemonic and experiential homogeneity, but, quite 
to the contrary, the ineradicable cleav,age precluding any unabridged 
communication, and in any medium, between past and present. 
I contend that the melancholia that this awareness gives off is not the 
indication of a political incapacitation, as Max Pen sky would have it,27but the 
effect of an enhanced insight into the dystopic infrastructures of a memory that 
labours to accommodate historical existence and assign personal experience a 
historical index. He believes that Baudelaire's allegorical mode does not translate 
a real insight into actual socio-economic conditions, and that melancholia 
ultimately frustrates the allegorical recognition of the true nature of objects. For 
Pensky Baudelaire failed to grasp the rootedness of the relationship of 
correspondences to his own allegorical system, in 'terms of the emergent 
socioeconomic physiognomy of, high capitalism. According to his hermeneutic 
s'cenario memory was mobilised in the poetry to archive the traces of unalienated 
nature as a response to the commodification of experience under modem 
conditions. A self-crippling melancholia steps in when it is ultimately realised 
that the gulf between real and allegorical nature, between the objective/divine and 
27 See Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 178. 
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the allegorical/arbitrary set of natural sign"s cannot be bridged by the poetic 
subject. In summary terms, Baudelairean melancholy is due, according to Pen sky, 
to the necessity and impossibility of encapsulating the immediacy of experience in 
and. through correspondences via the med~ate, temporal, discursive poetic 
activity.28 "Memory is both the medium of the correspondences and the bitterness 
that kills them.,,29 Pace Pen sky, I have aimed to show that the pervasiveness of 
melancholia in Baudelaire is the outcome of an enhanced awareness that exceeds 
topical historical conjunctures without eliding /them, but that also interrogates the 
conceptual infrastructures uncritically taken for granted by various historicisms, 
materialist or other. This awareness augurs a historical stance that refuses to 
congeal into complacent normativity, and manages to explore the interstices 
between event and representation, force and signification, verbalised and 
poetically enacted event. Baudelaire's centrality for the understanding of modem 
subjectivity is reaffirmed in his elaboration of a supra-historical rhetorical and 
mnemonic depletion of essentiality that does not, however, succumb to a 
determined ahistoricism. 
Adorno's contentions apropos of Kafka seem to apply well to Baudelaire's 
case, and are particularly relevant when it comes to addressing a critique as subtle 
as that of Pen sky. Adorno writes that" [Kafka's] language is the instrument of 
that configuration of positivism and myth that has only now become obvious 
socially. Reified consciousness, which presupposes and confirms the inevitability 
and immutableness of what exists, is --as the heritage of the ancient spell-- the 
new form of the myth of the ever-same. Kafka's epic style is, in its archaism, 
28 
29 
See Pen sky, Melancholy Dialectics, 178-83. 
Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 183. 
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mimesis of reification. ,,30 Baudelairean melancholia emanates from this lyrical-
aesthetic mimesis of reification and translates a dimension of negativity toward i~~ 
own immediacy, regardless of whether the latter is understood in terms of 
response to "primary material" or the resus~itation of inalieriable nature and 
experience through the correspondences portfolio. Melancholia is the outcome of 
a non-deluded metabolic exchange with social reality that admits of t~e collective 
subject not in the form of reflected content, but as the instantiation of form as "the 
locus of social content [Gehalt].,,31 
All these observations do not aim at disputing the validity of Benjamin's 
analyses but intend to highlight Baudelaire's acuity towards, and refusal to 
deploy, either historicist or purely psychologistic accounts of human experience 
and memory. The destruction of aura and communal imaginaries is a historically 
recognisable phenomenon. However, Baudelaire's poetry problematises its 
exclusive historical appointment and shows it not to be exhausted in its integration 
into a chronological, linear schema.32 The perforation of ideal by spleen implies 
that this predicament exceeds a temporally delimited historical assignation. This 
excess, however, does not entail its reduction to destiny or ontology. Baudelaire's 
Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 230; emphasis added. 30 
31 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 230. See also 225-35. My understanding of Baudelaire's 
negativity ("resistance") towards the irninediacy of content and experience, and the way it never 
qegenerates into ahistoric ontology or myth, is partially indebted to Adorno. On page 231 he 
writes: "By constantly admitting into the production of his work an element of negativity toward 
his own immediacy, the artist unconsciously obeys a social universal: in every successfully 
realized correction, watching over the artist's shoulder is a collective subject that has yet to be 
realised" (emphasis added). 
32 Benjamin's implied positive valorisation of pre-capitalist, oral traditions and communal 
ways of making sense of one's reality and relating to one another, modulates around a nostalgia for 
the past while typically beautifying it. However, agrarian societies were beset with the violence 
that emanated from rigid social stratification and inflexible social rank. In distinction to Benjamin, 
Richard Wolin contends that "in truth, communal social organization was never so idyllic as 
modern romantics tend to imagine it. These were societies beset with problems of privation and 
scarcity, at the mercy of nature, where social rank was decided by birth, and in which formal legal 
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refusal to lament the collapse of memory and the collective coding of experience, 
along with the pervasive melancholia of his poetry, are negative pointers to hi~ 
awareness that there has never been a pre-Iapsarian plenitude of representation or 
a retrieval of past experience through ffi<?mory and/or any other act of 
consciousness. Therefore, the interimplication of text and social reality that his 
poetry responds to must be accounted for in terms flexible. enough to 
accommodate the notion of the text as trace (of language, the psychic/semiotic 
chora, reality, and other texts) and as gesturing to reality, demanding reality, 
instead of reflecting or expressing33it. Baudelaire's modem traumatic mnemonic 
scope is antithetical to an idealist apocatastasis of history. 
channels to address injustice and grievances were highly underdeveloped" (Richard Wolin, Walter 
Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption [New York: Columbia University Press, 1982], 227). 
33 See Benjamin, "Konvolut K: Dream City and Dream House, Dreams of the Future, ... 
Jung," 392: ''The superstructure is the expression of the infrastructure. The economic conditions 
under which society exists are expressed in the superstructure .... The collective, from the first, 
expresses the conditions of its life. These find their expression in the dream and their 
interpretation in the awakening." 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 




[H]istory is not simply a science but also and not least a form of remembrance 
{Eigendenken}. What science has "determined," remembrance can modify. 
Such mindfulness can make the incomplete (happiness) into something 
complete, and the complete (suffering) into something incomplete. 
Benjamin, "Konvolut N" 
The double face of history: pana~e~or mystification? . 
In this chapter I shall set off from the contentions of Richard Terdiman 
regarding French modem poetry and Baudelaire. I find his views especially 
relevant to my previous discussion of the challenge for a historicist understanding 
of Baudelaire's production to take into account the poetry's calling into question 
the historicist premises that validate this understanding. Terdiman is sensitive to 
the rhetorical specificities and intertextual character of the texts he discusses while 
maintaining a historicist vocabulary throughout. I regard his work as a stimulus to 
understanding the broader context of reference, however, I am sceptical of the 
way in which he collapses the semiotic and aesthetic impetus of the examined 
poetry to an abortive response to the capitalist commodification of art. Terdiman 
exemplifies both the strengths and weaknesses of a particular branch of new 
literary historicism that has substantially enriched the debate on modem 
aestheticism. He fails, however, to acknowledge the constitutive aporia at the 
heart of poetic modernity, namely the effort to sustain the vocabulary of 
representation when the foundations of cognition and those linking representation 
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to it have been eroded. He interprets this aporia and its artistic and social effects 
in terms of the artistic subjects' political incapacitation and acquiescence in th~ 
moral and political order which they initially purported to overthrow. I argue that 
his stance is premised upon the reciprocal coding of experience and language in 
terms that will not account for the non-sublatable and non-conjunctural 
incommensurability of the two spheres. 
Terdiman contends, apropos of what he determines as a crisis of 
recollection and a denaturalisation of memory in Baudelaire, that the reifying 
hollowing out of linear memory enforced by the capitalist societal organisation 
redefines history as the discipline of memory. History turns into the guarantor 
and registrar of the past to the extent that "natural" memory becomes evacuated.1 
A negative resonance, nevertheless, permeates his schema to the extent that, as he 
acknowledges, by "preserving" the past history turns into the place where the 
mnemonic crisis can be displaced and thus falsely mitigated. In terms I have 
deployed up to now, history comes to occult the individual and communal 
dispossession of the past and can potentially serve as the defensive 
homogenisation and essentialisation of Abgrund. The paradox of the dual valence 
of the historical dimension shows that history is not a pana~~oncept that can 
uncritically be used to counterbalance what some diagnose as "self-reflexiveness," 
"self-referential aestheticism," etc. History can itself serve as the medium through 
which ideology materialises and perpetuates itself in the form of a particular 
historical memory. Terdiman is content to contain this ideological history within 
See Terdiman, "Deconstructing Memory,"19-20. 
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~~k~~l ... c.e~~. . 
the boundaries of / capitalism, disregarding the fact that strategic interests of 
concrete power coalitions have always underwritten any and all collective an~ 
mnemonic imaginaries and their historicist transcriptions. He primarily focuses 
on the loss of developmental memory, which he regards as endemic in bourgeois 
society. Because of this loss, he argues, no revelation of the historical 
determinants of social life and knowledge can be effected. This is more or less 
the social framework within which Baudelaire's poetic practice is crystallised and 
to which it responds by registering the new/forms of non-organic perceptual 
modes and contents on the ascent. Terdiman's narrative rehearses the premise 
that aestheticism came to be consolidated as a self-deluded and abortive counter-
hegemonic discourse. He refines some of the parameters already focalised by 
Benjamin yet remains ambivalently captive to a reflexive model of socio-political 
determinism that fails to encompass, and do full justice to, the aesthetic and 
political agenda of poetic modernity and its counter-discursive rigour. It must be 
said, however, that his analyses acquire a more empathetic inflection vis-a-vis the 
French modernists in his Discourse/Counter-Discourse. 2 
In his Diacritics article he perceives the adversative contents of 
Baudelaire's generic and formal innovations in the light of a capitalist reification 
of the associative structure of memory, the dispersion of social memory itself, and 
2 Richard Terdiman's, Discourse/Counter-Discourse: The Theory and Practice of Symbolic 
Resistance in Nineteenth-Century France (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985) 
translates the effort to reconcile a politically aware perspective with sensitivity to rhetorical-
theoretical exigencies. Even though I cannot fully concur with Terdiman's overdetermination of 
the political/historical sphere, I cannot but recognise his insightful probing into the 
interimplication of the textual and the real dimensions. What is disturbing, though, is that nowhere 
does he fully acknowledge his debts to Walter Benjamin and Barbara Johnson, even though he 
makes extensive, and not so idiosyncratic, use of these two theorists' critical insights. Needless to 
say, behind almost every politically, and rhetorically, sensitive approach to Baudelaire's text lies 
Walter Benjamin. 
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the randomisation of mnemonic matrices. This latter is due to the alteration in the 
whole visual-perceptive horizon effected by the expansion of the press, the 
instrumentalisation of language, and the fabrication and banalisation of the 
contents of memory. In short, he configures ~he nature of poetic modernity as 
defensive. As regards memory, he emphasises that its socially induced reification 
led to the modems' perception of it as a danger.3 The aestheticist paradox is 
gradually crystallised: "A culture whose memory was threatened perceived 
memory as a threat.,,4 This reaction is seen to ,be consonant with the Nietzschean 
radical obliteration of the past, which, he believes, gradually recoils into an 
entrenchment within language, a linguistic closure. Mallarme serves as an 
example of this linguistic idealism for Terdiman, as a characteristic Nietzschean 
epigone. Proust is mobilised in this argumentative framework as another one for 
whom the reified character of the contents of recollection leads to their perception 
as a threat. He will supposedly respond to the latter through the elaboration of a 
mnemotechnics of involuntary memory. However, Proust's mnemonic alertness 
never degenerated into an operation of essence-retrieval. 
Max Pen sky refers to the reified character of Proustian memory fragments, 
memories that "appear also as the dead, suffocating mass of inert material, under 
which thought is crushed -memory in the form that Nietzsche saw it, as hostile to 
life."s By juxtaposing Terdiman's and Pensky's accounts of this threatening 
memory and the reaction of the modems to it, the contours of a sub-narrative 
subtending Nietzsche's rationale, and possibly Baudelaire's tactics, become 
Terdiman, "Deconstructing Memory," 23. 
Terdiman, "Deconstructing Memory," 24. 4 
5 Pensky , Melancholy Dialectics, 164. Pen sky refers to Nietzsche's "On the uses and 
disadvantages of history for life," in Untimely Meditations; see esp. 62, 76. 
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visible. Terdiman configures the Nietzschean radical forgetfulness in distinction 
to a Marxian logic aiming at the radical supersession of the past in social 
revolution, and valorises positively the latter. ,!his Marxian logic, according to 
Terdiman, did not erase the historical determination behind the radical ·gestures 
inherent in the obliteration of past life (but not history itself), and constituted a 
--
conscious dialectical response to the threat of reification and instrumentalisation. 
Pen sky , on the other hand, seems to subsume both the Nietzschean and Marxian 
responses to memory-manipulation within a common post-Hegelian platform and 
radicalises the Marxian insistence on forgetting and its professed desaturation of 
social life from past determinations. He writes: "It [a liberating forgetting, "a 
purging of the mass of memory-laden objects"] is the common legacy of all mid-
nineteenth-century, post-Hegelian philosophical critics who articulate their 
political or ethical theories under the condition of mass commodification. Marx 
also insists, in the 18th Brumaire, that the dead bury the dead lest the weight of the 
past bear down like a nightmare on the brains of the living.,,6 One sees here that it 
is a thin line between radical forgetfulness and an obliteration of the past that will 
not erase the hegemonic infrastructure within which the need to forget was 
induced in the first place, which erasure is what Terdiman accuses the Symbolists 
of having incurred. 
The ambiguity of the Marxian manoeuvre seems to have eluded Terdiman, 
or at least he has strategically chosen not to address it. The injunction to 
conveniently erase those aspects of social life and history that are inimical to 
one's own agenda while retaining a dialectical relation to the past that will 
6 Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 164. 
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preserve a politically acute memory and the understanding of the institutional. 
infrastructures within which opposition is engendered, sounds feeble when 
compared to the Nietzschean imperative. This latter in its historico-epistemic 
" 
nihUism proves to be more aware of the internal contradictions fissuring any 
project of a radical disjunction of past and present and comes to draw its 
theoretical and practical impetus from these very contradictions. The Nietzschean 
agenda of counter-memory eschews the reassuring stigmatisation of some 
historical configurations and its concomitant extolment of power configurations 
normatively compatible to the interests at stake.? I have juxtaposed the two 
conceptions of memory in order to emphasise the distinction between a 
convenient parcelling of historical memory (a la Terdiman) that still admits of 
chronological demarcations and Nietzsche's scepticism towards the viability of 
integrative memory within modernity. I believe that the aporiae to which the 
latter is vulnerable should not blind us to the self-serving character of the former, 
or to the pervasive presence of anti-organicism beneath most modem 
problematisations of developmental memory. 
Richard Terdiman holds Baudelaire and the French avant-garde in general 
responsible for what he regards as an amnesic reification of language and memory 
deployed in a deluded fashion against a capital-induced social amnesia and 
reduction of use-value to exchange value. He indicts the modems, in short, for 
displacing the reification they aimed at combating into the register of 
consciousness and language. He writes apropos of the radical forgetfulness 
7 The seminal text by Nietzsche concerning memory and the historical sense is "On the 
uses and disadvantages of history for life," in Untimely Meditations, 59-123. See also, Friedrich. 
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996),42-3. 
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which, he believes, underlies aestheticism: "Language turns inward to evade its 
own 'materials memory.' Such a movement of active forgetting radicalises 
genesis amnesia, for it must forget the very past which has induced its need for 
forgetting." Transgressive and deinstrumentalised languages are "counter-
discourses which would seek to forget the dominant discourse that situates them 
in their inevitable opposition."s I argue contra Terdiman that the Baudelairean 
text addresses the contradictions inherent in the aesthetic agenda and thematises 
them in various rhetorical ways (allegory being the most effective one and capable 
of preserving a genuine historical awareness). I contend also that Baudelaire's 
poetry constitutes an anti-hegemonic discourse and practice in a more substantial 
and effective way than he concedes to it. Terdiman, following Benjamin 
obviously, takes for granted the capitalist disintegration of an overarching 
conceptual horizon that could bind the modem subjects' experiences into coherent 
wholes. He also concurs with Benjamin in recognising Baudelaire's poetry as a 
sensitive antenna registering this disintegration. What I regard as a contradiction 
in terms in his analyses, however, emanates from his resistance towards the 
inevitable consequences of the evaluated situation. The capital-induced 
destruction of a commonality of conceptual habits, moral customs, and co-shared 
social values makes impossible the meta-historical inscription of the subjects' 
experiences within the overarching horizontal conceptual nexus that is commonly 
called history. The destruction of a co-shared conceptual horizon invalidates the 
functionality of periodising integrative historiography. It is as if Terdiman, and to 
a lesser extent Benjamin, wilfully struggle to affirm the existence of the historical 
Terdiman, "Deconstructing Memory," 25. 
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macro-sequence whose demise they admire Baudelaire for having' adequately 
registered, at the epistemological or meta-historical, i.e., historicist, level. The 
hypothetically successful affirmation of this historical progression would 
"' , 
presuppose the complete separation of the poetic and epistemological spheres and 
would assert the self-referential closure of the text, which is an unavoidably 
aestheticist premise and contravenes, therefore, the interimplication" of text and 
reality that both Benjamin and Terdiman affirm. Either the fragmentation of 
experience and representation that the poetry addresses is a reality and inevitably 
has a retrograde bracketing effect on the horizontal periodisations of historicism, 
or it is a political fiction that serves other ends, which is, of course, not supposed 
to be the case. I believe that behind Terdiman' s resistance to the inevitable 
consequences of the diagnosed non-transmissibility of experience upon a 
historicist configuration of (poetic and not only) modernity lies scepticism 
towards the viability of political praxis and conceptual integrity within conditions 
that cancel the pragmatic screening and transmission of experiential data. The 
implication of the issue with politics is obvious and points to the stakes involved 
in reading Baudelaire's poetry as much as to the necessary traversal of the 
aesthetic and political vistas that this reading mandates. 
For Terdiman the Nietzschean hypercontrariety underlying the texts of 
Baudelaire and Mallarme inaugurates the crisis of representation, which will be 
one of the central preoccupations of twentieth-century critical and poetic 
thought. In his failing to discriminate adequately between the different inflections 
that this crisis assumes in the differing cases of the poets above, though, he 
homogenises the self-reflexivity hypothetically latent in Baudelaire's texts with 
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the pulverisation of referentiality aimed at in Mallarme. When he argues that the 
negation of temporality is endemic in the theory and practice of modernist self-
reflexiveness he fails to recognise that in the case of Baudelaire, at least, the 
, 
:-
desire for the restitution of a natural, linear, developmental memory is explicitly 
addressed and then implied to be illusional and mystifying. Baudelaire explicitly 
addresses the issue of temporality which, however, he regards as a factor that 
obstructs the experiential plenitude that atemporal equivalences (of the 
correspondences type) would allegedly guarantee. I have already discussed the 
theme of the irretrievability of organically connected memory matrices and the 
correlate textual overdetermination of the melancholia triggered by their 
disintegration. This melancholia points to an irredeemable desperation of 
experience and exceeds by far the commonplace sadness permeating lyrical 
poetry. I have also shown how the infiltration of individual by collective 
experience (Erfahrung) and its recuperation are textually seen to be undercut by 
the materiality of meaning-crippling Gediichtnis and a manipulative, wilful 
Erlebnis. There is a wealth of textual experience here that cannot be levelled into 
"aesthetic intransitivity" or "aesthetic self-referentiality." Baudelaire's practice 
does not project an essential timelessness.9 Quite to the contrary, both the cynical 
irony and the melancholic allegories that Baudelaire deploys point to a liberatory 
admission of the semiotic dispersal of egological subjectivity and cognitive 
appropriations of experience, and register the particular historical inflections that a 
response to it assumes. 
9 See Terdiman, "Deconstructing Memory," 26. 
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Allegorical melancholia, temporality and correspondences 
Within the framework of the discussion on civic memory and its eclipse, 
Terdiman regards genesis amnesia as the inevitable outcome of the modernist. 
, 
di~solution of all analytics of memory and history which Baudelaire's poetry 
allegedly transcribes and reinforces. Max Pensky, however, sees this putative 
obliteration of the historical terrain, the preservation of which is necessary for 
. the opposition to capitalism and reification, as one of the poles in a tense 
dialectic which consists in the rejection and embrace of the past. What is 
generated through this dialectic is "a creative tension, a productivity in which the 
elements of the past surge forth." Pen sky attributes this tension that is immanent 
to radical forgetfulness to a melancholic defensive strategy preferring a reified 
and factitious memory to the void left behind by the amnesic erasure of the 
past.10 It is a melancholic knowledge that is affirmed in the Baudelairean poetry 
of spleen and evilification.11 The "thin atmosphere" (indicating the total void of 
knowledge or sense), just like Nietzsche's "star without atmosphere" that 
Benjamin used to describe Baudelaire's non-historicisable poetry, is a marker of 
the non-integratability of knowledge and experience. Knowledge, Pen sky notes, 
comes to fill up the void which lurks behind the "hushed transcendence dwelling 
in rot and decay, or the lush, literal contours of sin and grace, of eroticism and 
monstrosity contained in the form of the human body, of the endless compaction 
10 Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 164. 
11 "Under the weight of memory, the subject is pulled into the tide in which each fragment, 
overladen with memory, appears as a potential correlate to every other; every word with every 
image, every image with every word. Meaning opens up the 'abyss of knowledge.' Knowledge 
may be dead; it may, as Nietzsche warns, clog up and weigh down the mind; it might even be the 
very foundation of ressentiment. But for the melancholic it is infinitely preferable to the 
celebration of the void that its deprivation would leave behind, the thin atmosphere that Nietzsche 
wishes to learn to breathe" (Pen sky, Melancholy Dialectics, 164-5). 
178 
of emotions contained in the glance.,,12 Melancholia is here given a cognitive 
and historical twist. I read Pensky as indicating the immanence of history to 
Baudelaire's modem melancholia and as implying the irrelevance of an 
., 
exi~tentialist or psychologistic account of the ambivalence that the melancholic 
stance entails. All these issues bring to the fore the centrality of the allegorical 
mode of reasoning for Baudelaire and the interimplicati<?n of allegory with 
melancholia that is the consistent caveat of his poetry. Benjamin recapitulates 
this interimplication this way: 
Melancthon's term melancolia illa heroica (this heroic melancholy) 
characterizes Baudelaire's gift most perfectly. Melancholy bears in the 
19th century a different character, however, to that which it bore in the 17th• 
The key figure of the early allegory is the corpse. The key figure of the 
later allegory is the "souvenir" (Andenken). The "souvenir" is the schema 
of the transformation of the commodity into a collector's object. The 
correspondances are the endlessly mUltiple resonances of each souvenir 
with all the others.13 
The extent to which the mnemonic dimension exposes correspondences to 
temporality, or the degree to which this latter is subsumed under the suspension of 
linear time, is an issue fraught with ambivalence. Benjamin's uneasy conjunction 
of inner mnemonic psychodramas with a deterministic model of communal-
versus-individual recollections, points to the difficulty of arresting the contents to 
which the texts lend themselves. A careful analysis of the inflections that a term 
such as "temporality" can accommodate is called for. Understanding what is 
involved in the temporal mutations that Baudelaire's poetry registers is imperative 
if one is to clarify the mnemonic instability that the poetry probes into. 
12 
13 
Pensky , Melancholy Dialectics, 165. 
Benjamin, "Central Park," 55; cited in Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 175. 
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The factor that mediates the relation between memory, coqespondences, 
and temporality, is allegorical melancholia. It underwrites the hopelessness of the 
project of preserving organically/serially linked experiential grids and the 
.mind/nature homology through the correspondences. Pen sky implies this in his 
comments on Benjamin's dictum that "what Baudelaire meant by correspondance 
may be described as an experience which seeks to establish itself in crisis-proof 
form." 14 He writes that "this is a melancholy realization, and the hopeless 
demand to preserve and muster the moments of correspondence against the time 
in which they must appear is the poetic heart of Baudelaire's heroic melancholy. 
The correspondences, as moments of divine meaning, are to stand outside of the 
range of the contemplative -brooding-subject. They are, in this way, presented 
as theologically distinct from the allegorical images.,,15 Correspondences, I may 
add, look as if they seek to establish themselves as a time-proof experience, as 
well. I believe that the extent to which they successfully ward off time or not is 
dependent on whether recollection can be seen to be a temporal act (perhaps the 
temporal act par excellence) or not. I agree with Benjamin when he implies that 
correspondences are internally punctuated by temporality: "There are no 
simultaneous correspondences, such as were cultivated by the symbolists later.,,16 
One facet of the paradox internally fissuring the correspondences programme is 




Benjamin, Baudelaire, 182. 
Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 177; emphasis added. 
Benjamin, Baudelaire, 178. 
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"the murmur of the past may be heard in the correspondences," anq. to the extent 
that "the canonical experience of them has its place in a previous life,,,17they are 
permeated by the immanent difference that undergirds and fixes the poles of a 
.mnemonic reproduction trajectory taking 'place within time, no matter how 
atomistic, fictive, or socially sequestered 'it may be. Therefore, the organicist 
prerogative with which correspondences have traditionally been accredited, that of 
collapsing the ontological and temporal difference between perception, cognition, 
and expression, and the temporal articulations of perceived and cognised events, 
proves to be de facto abortive. The- traditional symbolist understanding of 
correspondences has invested in the erasure of temporality, which (temporality) 
organicist aesthetics regard as inimical to the retrieval of experiential essences 
through empathetic memory. Baudelaire's answer to this rationale is his explicit 
addressing of the issue of temporality in terms that may be ambiguous but that do 
not allow for the empathetic cementing of experience through memory. From 
"L'Horloge" to "Le Voyage," the remembered happenings are either staged as 
scenes with their factitiousness showing through, or are internally hollowed out by 
temporal distances that cannot be breached through empathy. 
One of the reasons why empathetic retrieval is impossible is that the 
collective dimension that mediates and cements the subjects' memories has been 
irreversibly shattered. Involuntary memory turns out to be one's "private ShOW.,,18 
17 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 141. 
18 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 145, fn. 80. See also p. 113: U[memoire involontaire] is part of the 
inventory of the individual who is isolated in many ways. Where there is experience in the strict 
sense of the word, certain contents of the individual past combine with material of the collective 
past. The rituals with their ceremonies, their festivals [are] quite probably nowhere recalled in 
Proust's work." Therefore, non-volitional memory within a shattered commonality of values is 
unable to salvage, restore and integrate the gist of past experience. The presuppositional thread 
behind Benjamin's assumptions is that the destruction of collective imaginaries is the outcome of 
concrete historical configurations and, therefore, the crisis is not destinal but potentially·reversible. 
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Benjamin continually oscillates between the necessity to purg~ involuntary 
memory of its social insularism and the tendency perpetually germinal in his 
project to hypostasise an imaginary social collective.19 Baudelaire's textual 
.practice, however, points to another force\ that is contributory to mnemonic 
dispersion, and which Benjamin and his followers have chosen to disregard. The 
linguistic chora that mediates and monitors the passage from perception to 
cognition frustrates the mutual adequacy of consciousness and experience and 
bars access to either "genuine" recollection or a recapturing of experiential 
plenitude through it. The relays between remembered "events" obey a semiotic 
logic. The putting in inverted commas of any notion of "genuine" cores of 
experience is a pervasive concern of the poetry, and its lyrico-allegorical working 
through its primary tactic. 
According to Benjamin's rationale, the patterns of collective memory have 
succumbed to disintegration as a consequence of the modem alterations in the 
politico-economic and perceptional processing of reality. Therefore, the subject's 
memories have been unhinged from the collective's horizon of its past that could 
help shape and validate these memories. Empathy with the past is not a matter of 
individual choice, but must be enabled and sanctioned by community tradition. 
19 Theodor Adorno's remarks apropos of the spurious and derived character of both 
individuality and collectivity are relevant: "If I reject the notion of the collective consciousness, it 
is naturally not in order to leave the 'bourgeois individual' intact as an authentic substratum. The 
interior should be made transparent as a social function and its self-containedness should be 
revealed as illusion. As illusion, however, not vis-a.-vis a hypostasised collective consciousness, 
but vis-a.-vis the real social process itself. The 'individual' is a dialectical channel which may not 
be mythologised away but can only be sublated [aufgehoben]." See The Correspondence of 
Walter Benjamin 1910-1940, ed. Gershom Scholem & T.W. Adorno, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson 
& Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994),502. Adorno's 
emphasis on wider societal mediations does not seem to take sufficient account of the way 
language globally underlies as much as frustrates Aujhebung. See also Theodor Adorno, Prisms, 
trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London: Neville Spearman, 1967), 236. Adorno stresses 
Benjamin's failure to elucidate phenomena as products of the social whole, and his relating them 
directly, that is, unmediatedly, to material and social processes. . 
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Empathy outside of this sphere yields to mythology. Benjamin's assertions 
concerning the social fibre of experience slur over the ideological parameter 
endemic in any empathetic reconstruction of experience, whether in the midst of 
.vital communal frameworks or not. "Experience is indeed a matter of tradition, in 
collective existences as well as private life. It is less the product of facts firmly 
anchored in the memory than of a convergence in memory of accumulated and 
frequently not conscious data," he writes.20 But the alterations in the objective 
conditions of existence which he laments do not necessarily signal the end of all 
conceptional and mnemonic commonality. They may enable other modes of 
constructing mnemonic identifications and fabricating subjectivity the real or 
virtual character of which can be determined not in immanent terms but within the 
binding premises of one's political norms. No one can seriously claim to be able 
to retrieve an experience that has not been mediated by the social body and 
channelled through its collective imaginaries. Still, to claim or imply that the 
modem era suffers from a post-Iapsarian inability to mnemonically and 
experientially allow for self-understanding and self-presence translates adherence 
to an ontology of being that ultimately contravenes the historicist fiat that every 
human understanding of self and other is conjunctural, contingent, reversible. The 
ambi valence subtending the correspondence agenda testifies to the need to 
preserve some sense of experiential coherence in social conditions that forbid this 
very preservation and not, as the advocates of organicist aesthetics would have it, 
the possibility of salvaging experiential matrices through the levelling of temporal 
distances. Baudelaire, however, does not write from a vantage point of nostalgia 
20 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 185. 
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for an irretrievable past, but exposes the phantasmatic dimensions ?f all relation 
to what has been. His poetry perfects the past in the dual sense of refining it as 
and through memory, and revealing the mutual closure of past and present. 
Pensky schematises the other internal-paradox voiding the correspondence 
programme. The drive underlying it implies, first, the wilful assignment of 
meaning upon a world that has been perceived as irredeemably fragmented and, 
second, the visibility of elements of transcendent meaning that the melancholy 
subjectivity conceives as being metaintentional.21 The representation of these 
moments of transcendence within the medium of language, their ingress within 
the spatium of representation and semiotic difference, negates their 
"preconceptual, prelinguistic, prelapsarian" character and renders them "meaning 
for the poetic subject.,,22 Baudelaire's bid to contain melancholy while avoiding 
his baroque predecessors' final leap into the realm of objectless faith, and his 
effort to remain within the realm of things, entail the enmeshment of 
correspondences with temporality (hence their anamnestic character) and the 
rejection of transcendental timelessness. Pensky's brilliant synopsis of 
(Benjamin's reading of) this paradoxical operation merits extensive quoting: 
Like his Renaissance predecessors, Baudelaire will attempt to master the 
force of melancholy and remain in the realm of things. But as he does so, 
the attempt to "grasp" the moments of transcendent meaning from within the 
continuum of natural history leads to the impossible task of an expression of 
the timeless beauty of the correspondences from within the fallen language 
of allegory. For Baudelaire's poetic work, bringing the correspondences 
into the realm of allegory and allegorical time consciousness means that 
moments of temporal transcendence are to be poetically constructed as a part 
21 For an inexhaustible revelation of the antinomies to which the correspondences 
programme falls prey and for an understanding of the difference between the baroque melancholic 
agenda and that of Baudelaire, see Pensky, "Melancholia and Modernity," in Melancholy 
Dialectics, especially 179-181. 
22 Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 180. 
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of the temporal continuum itself. Transcendent time within the temporal 
continuum crystallizes in the image of the souvenir. The souvenir is the 
product of messianic time consciousness that undergoes commodification: 
this is Erlebnis; time as strangely segmented, as a series of discrete moments 
that bear no organic continuity with one another, that do not flow. 
Correspondences become souvenirs as they are brought into the reified 
realm of modern allegory. They are saved, but saved as dead: "The souvenir' 
is the complement of the Erlebnis. In it the increasing self-alienation of the 
person who inventories his past as dead possession is distilled. In the 19th 
century allegory moved out of the surrounding world, in order to settle in the 
. ld ,,23 mner wor . 
In the light of the above, the souvenir is the correspondence that has been 
submitted to the reifying power of the allegory. It must be emphasised again that 
what underlies all this rationale is the premise of the temporal character of 
correspondences. This temporal character must be understood in the context of 
the ErfahrunglErlebnis tension discussed above apropos of the dynamics of 
Baudelairean memory. The antinomies of allegorical melancholia with its non-
integrateable memories can be summarised in the form of an attempt to save inner 
experience in the realm of correspondences. This inner experience is, however, 
doomed from the very beginning to collapse to dead souvenir during the 
correspondences operation due to the impossibility of empathetic retrieval of 
contents or the saturation of the temporal itinerary. Benjamin formulates the 
paradox in the following way: "The relic derives from the corpse; the souvenir 
from deceased experience which calls itself euphemistically Erlebnis.,,24 Pensky 
summarises all this in the following way: 
This is the result of Baudelaire's melancholy allegory and the reason why 
Baudelaire could not grasp the relationship between allegory and 
correspondence. From the point of view of the melancholic, this relationship 
23 Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 180-1. In the last period Pen sky quotes from Benjamin, 
"Central Park," 49. 
24 Benjamin, "Central Park," 42; cited in Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 181. . 
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could only be grasped by resolving or overcoming its dialectical tension; that 
is, by developing a vision of poetic expression whereby the correspondences 
could be given voice without sacrificing the things themselves to the 
intention of the subject [without turning the things themselves into reified 
souvenirs, that is]. But this is precisely what the allegorist can under no 
circumstances do. Transcending allegoresis, as in the baroque, betrays the 
objects [by leaping into objectless faith, into transcen$nst metaphysics]~' 
Mastering allegoresis heroically, as in the Renaissance or Baudelaire, 
betrays the objects as well [because of reified/ing memory, by turning the 
objects into dead commodities, souvenirs] -and betrays the redemptive will 
at the heart of allegoresis. 
Heroic melancholy in the age of the commodity redeems the object, 
but only as souvenir. The transformation of the·· experience of divine 
remembrance into the souvenir is a source of Baudelaire's allegorical rage. 
Rage is, at bottom, the response to loss. The correspondence -as ideal-is 
the resonance of blessedness that still lingers like a faint fragrance amongst 
the assembled souvenirs.25 
I fail to fathom how Pensky can justify his assertion that Baudelaire "could 
not grasp the relationship between allegory and correspondence." The continuous 
undermining of the ideal by shocking flash-back upsurges of unassimilable 
memories, and the cleavage between perceived and cognised events, put in 
abeyance the notion of an authentic event an~ experience that have hypothetically 
been parcelled into souvenir. It is not the "betrayal of the object" in and through 
allegory that is the real issue here, but the viable possibility of assuming a 
cognitive and moral stance that can bracket the spurious notion of self-presence 
within experience while retaining the possibility of a contingent self-
understanding prerequisite to praxis. I believe that it is the betrayal of historical 
responsibility that constitutes the real anxiety behind the transcendental 'twist of 
allegory. The way I read it, the crucial and ambivalent passage that contains 
Benjamin'S subtle critique in germinal form is the following: 
25 
This [the allegory of resurrection, the final redemptive sublation] solves 
the riddle of the most fragmented, the most defunct, the most dispersed. 
Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 181-2; internal brackets added. 
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Allegory, of course, thereby loses everything that was most peculiar to it: 
the secret, privileged knowledge, the arbitrary rule, in the realm of dead 
objects, the supposed infinity of a world without hope. All this vanishes 
with this one about-tum, in which the immersion of allegory has to clear 
'away the final phantasmagoria of the objective and, left entirely to its own 
devices, re-discovers itself, not playfully in the earthly world of things, but 
seriously under the eyes of heaven. Anq this is the essence of melancholy 
immersion: that its ultimate objects, in which it believes it can most fully 
secure for itself that which is vile, tum into allegories, and that these 
allegories fill out and deny the void iIi which they are represented, Just as, 
ultimately, the intention does not faithfully rest in the contemplation of 
bones, but faithlessly leaps forward to the idea of resurrection. 26 
Melancholia is seen by Benjamin as the side-effect of the' modern subjects' 
incapacity to sustain the intra-mundane "phantasmagoria of the objective." His 
~ 
tone is subtly critical here, but critical nevertheless. Baudelaire's poetry 
thematises the betrayal of history inherent in any redemptive and/or 
transcendental stance. His allegorical proclivities resist the lure of nostalgia that 
usually accompanies a prolonged desolation over the retreat of experience.27 At 
the same time, he cannot give in to the fragmentation and quantification of 
experience without voicing the exasperation of the subject forced to survive the 
fracturing of his socio-symbolic order. "For someone who is past experiencing, 
there is no consolation. Yet it is this very inability to experience that lies at the 
heart of rage.,,28 Benjamin is perhaps right to speak of rage in the case of 
Baudelaire. I do not believe, however, that this is rage over a lost plenitude of 
concept and experience, exclusively. It is rage that is deeply political as much as 
27 
Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 232-3. 
Poems such as "Un Voyage a Cythere" (OC I: 117-9) make a mockery of the nostalgia for 
past beauty or bliss. Cythera is exposed as an "Eldorado banal" from the beginning. The only 
memory that the narrator will hold dear is that of the hanging corpse ("Devant toi, ... au souvenir 
si cher [At the sight of you, ... whose memory I hold dear]"), and the only empathetic retrieval 
possible is that of perennial sorrows: "Ridicule pendu, tes douleurs sont les miennes! I Je sentis, ... 
1/ Le long fleuve de fiel des douleurs anciennes [Grotesque hanging corpse, your sorrows are my 
own! I I felt, ... 1/ The long stream of gall of past sufferings]." Cf. Benjamin's: "'Le Voyage' is a 
renunciation of travel" ("Central Park," 47). 
28 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 143. 
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a predicament within language, and if there is interminable mourning in this 
poetry, it is of a non-restitutive, non-deluded nature.29 The illusion that 
Baudelaire's threnodial poetry exposes is that of the allegedly reversible, 
.. 
. conjunctural, exclusively historical causes of the catastrophe to which the poetry 
is made to respond. This hypothetical catastrophe is supposed to be the negative 
print of over-arching non-negotiable and ultimately extra-historical norms that 
sanction straight historicism. 
Conclusively, it is the supersession of remembrance to the subtending 
infrastructure of time, and its discreet complicity with the refutation of all hope 
for a redemptive encounter with the past, that constitutes the work's open secret. 
Benjamin's following words compress the unreliable character of the only kind of 
memory that may be said to be internally linked to the experience it is supposed to 
belabour: 
[M]ost memories that we search for come to us as visual images. Even the 
free-floating forms of the memoire involontaire are still in large part 
isolated, though enigmatically present, visual images .... [One] must place 
himself in a special stratum --the bottommost-- of this involuntary 
memory, one in which the materials of memory no longer appear singly, as 
images, but tell us about a whole, amorphously and formlessly, indefinitely 
and weightily, in the same way as the weight of his net tells a fisherman 
about his catch.3o 
Forming a complete life out of fragmented, isolated mnemonic images 
spells out an injunction. One, indeed, must place oneself in a special condition to 
29 On non-deluded mourning, see Paul de Man, "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the 
Lyric," in The Rhetoric of Romanticism, 239-262, esp. 262: "If mourning is called a 'chambre 
d'eternel deuil ou vibrent de vieux diles' ("Obsession," OC I: 75), then this pathos of terror states in 
fact the desired consciousness of eternity and of temporal harmony as voice and as song. True 
'mourning' is less deluded. The most it can do is to allow for non-comprehension and enumerate 
non-anthropomorphic, non-elegiac, non-celebratory, non-lyrical, non-poetic, that is to say, prosaic, 
or, better, historical modes of language power." 
30 Benjamin, "The Image of Proust," 209-10. 
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do this, in a phantasmatic reconstruction (with the "re" sous rature) of life out of 
random anamnestic fragments. But it also lets the deeper significance of 
recollection rise to the surface as a desperate gesturing towards experience, and 
.. 
. not its recapitulation: "For the important thing for the remembering author is not 
what he experienced, but the weaving of his memory, the Penelope work of 
recollection. Or should one call it, rather, a Penelope work of forgetting? Is not 
the involuntary recollection, Proust's memoire involontaire, much closer to 
forgetting than what is usually called memory?,,31 Most significantly, popular 
wisdom has it that the visual images that "amorphously" and "indefinitely" point 
to a whole life flare up most intensely when the subject's life approaches its end, 
in the face of death, at the moment when life attains completion. Theoretically, 
right before dying the subject is inundated with flash-backs, images that hanker 
after a complete life. But it is the closure of the life vista that makes this 
conjuring up possible. "The true measure of life is memory," writes Benjamin.32 
Still, it is the end that confers the illusion of coherence upon a life that is called up 
in the mode of sporadic, monadological images. 
By virtue of the same reasoning, the fa~ade of a lyrical understanding of, 
and desire for, the transcendental within the temporal dimension hides, as much as 
reveals, its own duplicitous nature. The text poses this duplicity and this 
31 Benjamin, "The Image of Proust," 198. The "purposive remembering" which is supposed 
to "[unravel] the web and the ornaments of forgetting" actually shrinks the world, concentrates it 
in a suffocating vacuum of time that Benjamin calls "convoluted time" (206). "But this very 
concentration in which things that normally just fade and slumber consume themselves in a flash is 
called rejuvenation .... Proust's method is actualization, not reflection" (207). Baudelaire's poetry 
is sceptical of the possibility of reflexively or empathetic ally reconstituting one's life. The 
difference between actualisation and reflection is enormous. Actualisation points to a constitutive 
absence of essence at the heart of experience. This undercuts Benjamin's restrained melancholic 
of tim ism concerning the viability of calling up the past. 
3 Walter Benjamin, "Notes from Svendborg, Summer 1934," in Selected Writings, vol. 2 
1927-1934 (Cambridge Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 788. . 
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simulation of transcendence as an inevitable precondition of its articulation and 
thus reveals its blind awareness to the second degree. 
Baudelaire's dual resistance: synopsis 
We had the experience but missed the meaning 
T. S. Eliot, "Four Quartets" 
Max Pen sky thinks of Baudelaire's production as a text that "bears within 
it an encoded critique of the ideology of progress" yet "crystallizes the challenge 
that allegory presents to criticism itself.,,33 This challenge to criticism bears the 
form of melancholy in the sense that the latter, in conjunction with allegory, 
cannot but de-essentialise all "inner experience," render its retrieval abortive de 
facto, and reify all memories. "How can the critic harness the flood of memories 
without translating the memories into souvenirs?,,34 Avoiding the paradigm of 
melancholy subjectivity, which is what Pensky ultimately recommends, means 
avoiding the dissolution of the "redemptive-constructive" encounter with nuclei of 
reality (fragments of social reality or mnemonic experiences) into de-
essentialised, reified, alterity. "Memory is both the medium of the 
correspondences and the source of the bitterness that kills them.,,35 A politically 
viable critique for Pensky (and, to a certain degree, Benjamin) would seek to 
"confront the critical challenge of redemption through representation, without 





Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 182. 
Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 183. 
Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 183. 
Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, 183. 
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salvaged from the clutches of reifying melancholic allegory, and some form of 
inner experience must be preserved against the levelling of Erfahrung and the 
frozen, lifeless memories of Erlebnis. I am not certain whether Pensky takes 
.. 
-Baudelaire to task for having eroded the" foundations of representation and 
memory to such an extent as to make it impossible for a socially atturied criticism 
to be articulated in his poetry, or whether he voices concern over the impasse of 
critical thought in general to which the withering of experience necessarily leads. 
I am sceptical about the implied premises underlying this desire for the 
preservation of a stable ground for representation and political praxis in the 
context of Baudelaire's poetry because they presuppose the reality of individual 
choice37 in a way that reproduces categories of subjectivity and agency that have 
been rendered inoperative by the modem reorganisation of social and poetic 
forces. Even if indi vidual choice is seen to be a strategic and flexible response to 
conjunctural challenges, the nostalgia for a praxis grounded in collectively shared 
values and representations and normatively justifiable value-judgements threatens 
to reintroduce surreptitiously the essentialism and analogical representationalism 
that Baudelaire's poetry, among others', problematised. Again, this is an issue 
that partakes explicitly of the political dimension, yet it is taken up because it is 
on essentially political grounds that critiques such as those of Terdiman and 
Pensky are predicated with respect to Baudelaire and poetic modernity in general. 
I have tried throughout to explain that Baudelaire's poetry responds to a crisis 
37 Regarding the issue of choice and its effects on historical praxis, and with respect to 
choosing between the two interpretations "of structure, of sign, [and] of play," (the one being 
origin-oriented, the other trying to "pass beyond man and humanism)," see Derrida, Writing and 
Difference, 293: "I do not believe that today there is any question of choosing - in the first place 
because we are in a region .00 of historicity where the category of choice seems particularly trivial; 
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of/in subjectivity and a social crisis directly located in the moder:n juncture of 
economic, political and cultural forces. Julia Kristeva's formulation is a 
particularly apt echoing chamber of this notion of the dual crisis to which, I 
-believe, Terdiman and, to a lesser degree Pentsky's, critiques fail to do justice: 
The always renewed returned [semiotic chora that transgresses upon the 
symbolic realm, the realm of signification and cognition] of 'materiality' in 
'logic' ensures negativity a permanence that can never be erased by the 
theses of a subjective and blocking desire. Thus heterogeneity is not 
sublimated but is instead opened up with the symbolic that it puts in 
process/on trial. There it meets the historical process under way in society, 
brought to light by historical materialism. 38 
Despite the acute political and rhetorical overtones of Pensky and 
Terdiman's critiques a residual optimism concerning the retrievability of 
communal experience through the experiential and mnemonic debris of modernity 
remains. I find this irreconcilable with the retrograde effect that traumatic 
perception and memory, along with the modem deterioration of experiential 
capacities, can have upon the horizontal circumscription of experience. The 
capacity for political praxis does not necessarily vanish when one admits that 
post-Enlightenment's collective coding of reality has been irreversibly eroded. 
Baudelaire's poetry centres on the gap between perception and cognition and the 
rift between event and representation. It also "works out" the transgression of 
pheI)omenalist cognition by the irruption of sensuous materiality in the form of 
and in the second, because we must first try to conceive of a common ground, and the differance 
of this irreducible difference." 
38 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 191; cited in "Avant-Garde Practice: an 
interview with Vassiliki Kolokotroni," in Julia Kristeva: Interviews, ed. Ross Mitchell Guberman 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 212-3. See also Suzanne Guerlac, ''Transgression 
in Theory: Genius and the Subject of La Revolution du langage poetique," 250: "Parallel to the 
operations of the Kantian aesthetic sublime, the transgressive field of text (as of the sublime) 
pulverises the phenomenological subject and, at the same time, obliges a relation to the subject. It 
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the reified body that allegorically stands in for the heterogeneity of t~e signifier to 
"its" concept. Baudelaire's work solicits the re-negotiation of the imbrication of 
aesthetics and history along lines that will be admissive of the inherent instability 
of the socio-symbolic coding of. experienc~. Acknowledging the rift between 
perception and cognition and the defensive~ contingent, and ideological binding of 
the two zones, does not necessarily lead to political or conceptual incapacitation 
but forces us to renegotiate the terms within which we engage reality, art, and 
politics. The examined works have assumed the labour of translating poetically 
the resistance of modem experience·· to understanding or to the conceptual 
harmony of consciousness and natural and social reality while refusing to lament 
the loss of constative certainty that this condition entails. The texts can only 
articulate this labour in a lyrical modality yet subtly expose the latter as an 
unavoidable simulation and supplement that comes to compensate for the retreat 
of semanticity and experience. This latter constitutes both their adversarial habitat 
and enabling condition. The historicist angle proves to be inadequate when it 
comes to accounting for the impact (upon its own foundations) of the hollowing 
out of reference and experience that it is forced, nevertheless, to negatively admit. 
I have throughout focused on the inherent contradictions of historicist 
perspectives. Their limitations are germane to this project since they compact the 
no~ative denominator underwriting much that is written with the aim to relate 
politics and literature vis-a-vis Baudelaire and poetic modernity. The vantage 
point from which this abortive conjunction takes off is ultimately 
transcendentalist. The relation is abortive not because there is absolutely no inter-
seems to be precisely this dissonance which constitutes the revolutionary -and the theoretical--
subject in the theory of Kristeva" (emphasis added). 
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communication between literature and politics (or history) but beca~se the terms 
investing the stakes involved are internally flawed. I have tried to show the 
performative character of the examined poetry and its resistance to the cognitive 
levelling of difference to which a certain liteiary criticism has assigned it. I read 
Baudelaire's poetry as addressing, and then refusing to subscribe to, a 
metaphysics of experience and representation in response to which he finally 
unleashes the rage of one who sees behind destitution, injustice, and suffering 
both a historically-contingent reification and the impossibility of historical 
grounding. As for representation, Baudelaire voices a critique of phenomenalism, 
and a discontented affirmation of the gap between event and representation, or, in 
Jacques Derrida's terms, force and signification.39 
Pen sky captures the ambivalence in Baudelaire's rhetorical gestures and 
writes of his poetry's melancholia in terms of "a discourse about the necessity and 
impossibility of the discovery and possession of 'objective' meaning by the 
subjective investigator.,,4o In the dialectic of symbolicity and asymbolia that is 
played out in every melancholic act what is at stake is an awareness that exceeds 
the boundaries of historical understanding. This awareness reaches down to the 
psycho-semiotic foundations and enabling conditions of historical understanding -
by, for example, facilitating awareness of the modicum of reification integral to 
every, act of representation, and of its concomitant withering of essence. I 
disagree, therefore, with Pensky when he collapses allegorical melancholy in 




See Derrida, "Force and Signification," in Writing and Difference, 3-30. 
Pen sky , Melancholy Dialectics, 22. 
See "Introduction," in Melancholy Dialectics, 4. 
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writers as being entangled in a disturbing awareness of the mode~ aporiae and 
performative contradictions as much as enacting them in their own poetic and 
theoretical texts respectively. The enactment of these antinomies does not detract 
from the rigour of their mindfulness, howev~r. One particular instance of these 
contradictions is when a suprahistorical p'erspective is assumed in the name of 
historicism, as, for example, when Benjamin affirms the modem collapse of 
experience and the impossibility of integrating experien~ial contents within 
collectively sanctioned imaginaries and then proceeds to assign Baudelaire's 
poetry to a chronologically segmented -point in literary and political history (a 
lyric poet "in the era of high capitalism"). Another example is Baudelaire's 
engagement with the realities that envelop him through the deployment of both' 
historical and linguistic-psychological categories, not to mention his recourse to 
allegory, a rhetorical trope that both conveys and problematises historical 
understanding. One more instance of how historicity and extra-historical 
perspectives are conjugated is Benjamin's drawing on Freudian theory without 
accounting for the possibility that psychoanalysis affirms psychic infrastructures 
to a large extent unaffected by historical conjuncture, and as such the experience it 
probes into, and itself constitutes, is not easily amenable to historicisation. I take 
it that this is the charge of implication behind Benjamin's claim that Baudelaire's 
poetry,addresses "a time [that] is outside history.,,42 
Conclusively, I have treated Baudelaire's poetry as the poetic space where 
the cleavage between historical event and its representation is addressed and 
covered rhetorically, whereas this distance is seen to be enabling of history and 
42 Benjamin, Baudelaire, 143. Also, "significant days are days of completing time ... They 
are not connected with the other days, but stand out from time (139; emphasis added). 
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not an obstacle to historical unfolding. I believe that Baudel~ire's poetry 
mandates the renegotiation of the terms with which we perceive historical 
continuity and plenitude by also rendering apparent the existence of parallel 
., 
histories whose voice has been stifled by official historiography. These are the 
histories of those deprived of historical presence, agency and representation, or 
rather of those whose presence has not been sanctioned _~y the agents of modem 
hegemony. I read Baudelaire's poetry as the textual space .where aesthetics 
confronts politics as a result of an unsettling awareness ~ the political nature of 
representation and the aesthetic nature of politics. His poetry brackets historicist 
hermeneutics by engaging a non-recuperable loss of experience, and therefore 
demands a conception of history that accommodates experiential indeterminacy, 
perspectival flexibility, and semantic unresolve. 
In the light of Walter Benjamin's analyses it has become evident that 
Baudelaire wrote lyrical poetry within adversarial conditions which he ultimately 
managed to tum into enabling ones. This transformation could only have been 
effected through an acute sense of the ruination of experience under modem 
economic and perceptional conditions. This latter endangered the very possibility 
of writing (lyrical) poetry and necessitated the redefinition of it in terms of a 
social imperative. This injunction, however, never took the form of political 
engagement not because Baudelaire was politically incapacitated but because of 
his awareness of the dual valence of the crisis he responded to. He resorted to 
neither an affirmation of a putative historical infrastructure monitoring him as an 
agent nor to the typical ahistoricism of an aesthetic cancellation of the collective 
dimension of experience. Baudelaire, Rimbaud, and Mallarme welcomed the 
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finitude and non-sensical materiality that i~here in all physical and semiotic acts 
and refused to regard poetic discourse as a compensatory force making up for 
what is commonly considered as the catastrophe of death and the suffering caused 
"' 
by the temporal power.43 Baudelaire had alr~ady codified the non-conjunctural 
sapping of the foundations of essence upon which homologies of consciousness 
and reality accrue and assume historically recognisable modalities. While 
labouring within the Romantic conceptual sphere he undermined the ontology of 
genius, which renders him uniquely relevant to a still contemporary re-orientation 
concerning the meaning of Romanticism and modem subjectivity. Baudelaire's 
work cancels the tonalities of a genial and pathic subjectivity. It labours under the 
sign of the disappearance of the reassuring creative voice, codifies its eclipse 
while deploying a lyrical language, and thus effects a generic and semantic 
upheaval whose repercussions are still unassimilable today. 
Baudelaire was also sensitive to the modem mutations of perceptional and 
cognitional processes that the advent of modem technology imposed. His 
ambivalent stance towards photography44 reflects the modem uneasiness over the 
technical reproducibility of reality that, for the first time in history, canonises the 
itemisation of experience by presenting reality as a series of frozen instants.45 
Baudelaire's ambivalence educes the realisation that the modem reproduction of 
reality does not enhance the assimilation of experience but, on the contrary, puts it 
43 Parenthetically, and with regard to the French Symbolists, their alleged aesthetic 
recompense for finitude is more the projection of a certain literary criticism than a reality 
verifiable from the texts themselves. Neither Mallarme nor Valery embrace univocally the erasure 
of history and the bracketing of consciousness in the name of a synaesthesic melange or a 
linguistic idealism that would purportedly compensate for a hypothetical loss of reality. 
44 See OC II: 618-9. 
45 Memory is "photographic" and "pictorial" anyway. But in every perceptional act there is 
an element of temporal distance between the perceiving consciousness and the per9eived object, 
even if the act is supposed to be consummated in the mode of simultaneity. 
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into jeopardy by presenting modem man with a (photographic) "perception" of 
reality that is foreign to the communal understanding of it. For the first time in 
history human perception is seen to be just one organisational mode of reality 
., 
.\ 
among others, which results in an enhanced sense of alienation befalling the 
modem subject vis-a-vis natural and social reality. It is not accidental that 
photographic reproductions of natural landscapes freeze .the natural tableaux into 
nature morte and thus destroy any sense of naturality supposedly inherent in 
them. The whole context within which Baudelaire writes puts the notions of 
immanent essence, naturality, and subjectivity in abeyance. Baudelaire, however, 
does not respond with an anachronistic affirmation of tradition, nor does he 
shatter the formal and lyrical coherence in his verses in an attempt to emulate the 
fragmentation of reality that he experiences as a social subject and thus simulate 
mastery at the level of form over what has been irretrievably lost at the level of 
reality -which could be said of Pound to a certain extent. He answers the 
withering of experience in accordance with the ambivalent logic that tries to cope 
with trauma by either integrating it within a meaning-giving narrative or by 
somatically acting it out. I consider this ambivalent poetic strategy preferable to 
the facile erasure of the conceptual horizon within which the very opposition of 
event and representation, "force" and "signification" (in Derrida's language) can 
be formulated. Baudelaire's ambivalence is not due to his inability to choose one 
analytical mode over another but constitutes an inherent trait of a modernity that 
struggles to situate itself in the space opened up by the difference between the 
above terms. His poetic belabouring of the political, historical, and moral 
constitution of the modem subject, and his refusal to reproduce patterns of 
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thought that had been invalidated by the modem political and technical 
apparatuses, reflect a sense of historical responsibility and aesthetic acuity which 
are not to be found in the assertive normativity of more or less sophisticated 
\ 
determinisms. His double resistance was addressed, first, towards ascribing the 
modem vanishing of integrateable experience to exclusively historical 
determinants. Second, he refused to respond to the .. collapse of experiential 
immanence by affirming an extra-historical essentiality underwriting reality that 
could allegedly be captured empathetically (through aesthetic memory, 
synaesthesia, correspondences, etc.). This resistance signals the advent of a poetic 
thought that overtly addresses the loss of presence and historical plenitude in non-
idealist terms. His dual refusal never succumbs to ahistoricism since the presence 
of historical frameworks always subsumes his individual narrators' lives, not to 
mention the fact that a problematic on the historicity of events is integrally 
embedded in the thematic axes. These historical environments, however, are not 
equivalent to larger explanatory frameworks that can guarantee historical 
understanding and stabilise the historical referents. In Baudelaire's poetry history 
is the memory of the others (both in the sense of the subjective and objective 
genitive). In "Le Cygne," for example, history is the deprivations and sufferings 
that Andromaque remembers (or rather, is fantasised as remembering), h,owever, 
it is also the poetic narrator's virtual "remembrance" of Andromaque the pseudo-
historical figure that contributes to the sense of the historical present. 
Baudelaire's narrators can have a sense of the present only through the 
mediation of memories, "real" or "fabricated." Memory, therefore, is constitutive 
of the present not only in the sense of dialectically interweaving past and present 
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contents, but also in the sense of warding off the plethora of reality stimuli 
threatening to overwhelm human consciousness. In summary terms, for (present) 
experience to be registered as such, it must have been mediated by memory, it 
must have turned into memory. Experience screening is always belated. In 
Benjamin's words, "none of us has time to live the true dramas of the life that we 
are destined for. This is what ages us --this and nothing. else. The wrinkles and 
creases on our faces are the registration of the great passions, vices, insights that 
called on us; but we, the masters, were not at home. ,,46 It is in this sense that 
Baudelaire's poetry precludes the putative reality of self-presence and the 
coincidence of history and self-history via memory and testimony, and renders its 
underlying premise of the possibility of (self) witnessing aberrant. His 
engagement with history is not affirmative but critical of the foundations of 
historical witnessing. As such, it addresses the violence lurking behind every act 
of displacement, be it tropological or "historical," responds to it in the guise of 
lyricism, exposes its own disguises, and finally shatters the illusion of an elegiac 
affirmation of human consciousness in and through language.47 
46 Benjamin, "The Image of Proust," 207. 
47 See Benjamin, "The Image of Proust," 200: "[The elegiac form of happiness is] the 
eternal repetition, the eternal restoration of the original, the first happiness. It is this elegiac idea 
of happiness --it could also be called Eleatic-- which for Proust transforms existence into a 
preserve of memory." Pace Benjamin, but also definitely within the noosphere Benjamin enabled, 
I have tried to emphasise that the destructive dimension of memory overwhelms the redemptive. 
In his own deeply melancholic words: "[O]nly a redeemed mankind receives the fullness of its past 
--which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its past become citable in all.its moments" 
("Theses on the Philosophy of History," 246). 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SUBJECTIVITY, HISTORY AND ALLEGORY IN T. S. ELIOT'S WORK 
[E]very idiosyncrasy is a particular act of violence 
"\ T. S. Eliot, "Milton IT" 
Tradition and the subject: between the essays and the poetry 
This chapter negotiates the particular inflections that the dissolution of 
essence-bound experience and subjectivity assumes in the work of T. S. Eliot. 
Within the echoing chamber of the previous discussion of Baudelaire, it will be 
argued that Eliot's oeuvre belabours the contours of a subjectivity that voices the 
predicament of its disintegration in the mode of homeopathic fragmentation (liThe 
Waste Land") and hallucinatory soliloquy ("Prufrock"). This voicing amounts to 
disintegration to the second degree. Any notion of over-arching history 
discernible in the texts will be argued to be susceptible of a radical unseating of 
positive contents. Eliot's narratival subjects operate in the interstices between 
historically assignable existence and a psychotic elision of reality-anchored 
cognition. As such, they inhabit the discursive terrain wherein the linguistic 
foundations of subjectivity can be put into relief. However, the aim is to discuss 
subjectivity in Eliot within the qualifying environment delimited by the contrast 
between Baudelaire's melancholic allegories and Eliot's fragmented histories. 
Eliot framed depersonalisation and finitude within a transcendentalist 
configuration of history and a nominalist/analogical theory of language. His 
essays reverberate with moral, political and cultural injunctions to embed 
experience within vaulting frameworks that will assign it a historically 
recognisable place. The poetry, however, tells another story. It unfolds in tense 
counterpoint to the criticism, and occasionally as if in defiance of it. In his poetic 
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works Eliot embodies the imperative that the writer and the person be kept apart. 
The poetry does not suffer from overexposure to intentions, which is the primary 
drawback of the essays. They seem to be uninformed by his principle that "the 
" 
,\ 
poet [the author, by extension] has not a 'personality' to express, but a particular 
medium."l The problem is, however, that the way the essays negotiate it, the 
"medium" turns out to be even more stifling culturally than traditional accounts of 
b~ 
personality. The author has/transformed into a surface upon which history, 
culture, language (all defined in essentialist terms) inscribe themselves in 
indelible ink. The more he emanates and disseminates his cultural determinants, 
the more of an author he is. The emotion of art may be impersonal, but it is so so 
that language can be entirely subdued to its historical determinations. The good 
poet, according to Eliot, must "force, ... dislocate if necessary, language into his 
["his" era's, the era of which he is a reflector] meaning.,,2 Baudelaire, however, 
compels the unsettling realisation that it is the opposite that actually does take 
place: meaning is forced into language so that discourse can consolidate in the 
guise of a communicational act. 
The ontological gap precluding the commensurability of experience and its 
verbal expression is, nevertheless, negatively engaged in the examined works. 
The first-phase poetry3 mobilised irony and a devastating sarcasm as vehicles of 
the disjunction of experience and meaning, a theme that will underwrite Eliot's 
poetry up to the Four Quartets. In The Waste Land one encounters' the 
Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," in Selected Prose, 42. 
Eliot, "The Metaphysical Poets," in Selected Prose, 65. 2 
3 By "first-phase poetry" I refer to the sarcastic, irony-suffused, poems from the Prufrock 
sequence through Poems --1920, to The Waste Land. I consider The Hollow Men to be transitory 
and premonitory of the transcendentalist twist that Ash-Wednesday embodies, and which will 
climax in the Four Quartets. 
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compulsive elaboration of themes of sterility, sexual frustration, fragrnentation of 
experiential cores, loss of reality and meaning. This elaboration occurs in a non-
restorative mode despite a diffusive tone of cool lament that seems occasionally to 
" . 
.I 
permeate the text and affirm the healing force of nostalgia. It is a basic tenet of 
this thesis that what appears at first sight to be an interminable mourning over the 
collapse of integral experience and the impossibility of its retrieval hides a 
liberating admission of randomness, finitude and the power of language and death 
to install difference. No normative recuperation at the level of concept and 
experience is ultimately attained. The aleatory elements of this poetry do not 
coalesce into a dialectical ensemble of mutually recognisable matrices that encase 
their determining historical and moral imperatives. This resistance has been 
textually integrated in various modes one of which is the obsessive affirmation of 
death and the temporal gnawing at the foundations of essence. Another one is the 
admission of incomprehensibility at the core of the conceptual moment 
("Prufrock"). The disjunction of performance and constatation is integral to the 
poetry beyond the realm of intentions. Its narratival subjects function in the 
interim between the two zones. 
Eliot's poetic project is of an entirely different nature from his critical 
portfolio. This difference is enabled by the generic antithesis between a discourse 
that is content to serve intentions and programmes, and a language that has 
already bypassed the terrain of intentionality by the time it is articulated as poetry. 
However, close reading of the essays reveals a plethora of inner contradictions 
and inconsistencies that recount the self-justificatory and reductive dovetailing of 
poetic discourse to a flat plane of historical, moral and political imperatives that 
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the essays programmatically undertook. Pursuing such a reading is peripheral to 
my concern which is to elucidate the collapse of experience and testimonial 
accountability that the poetry testifies to within the qualifying framework of 
-, .. 
. 1 
Baudelairean subjectivity, yet necessary. I will refer sporadically to the essays in 
counterpoint to the poetry with the aim to enhance this typically Anglo-American 
twist of subjectivity along more conformist lines. Eliot took up the task of 
discrediting the subjective dimensions of poetic discourse (which he reductively 
identified with his oversimplified version of Romanticism) in order to consolidate 
the hegemony of history, culture and morality over the writing and the praxial 
subject. However, his prose and poetry collide in a most telling manner that 
brings into sharp relief the mutual closure of poetic discursivity and entelechic 
determinisms. In the Dante essay he writes that "in a way, these cantos are of the 
greatest personal intensity ... In the Paradiso Dante himself ... becomes de- or 
super-personalised.,,4 There is a massive difference between de-personalisation 
and super-personalisation, however. Their conflation undermines his applied 
poetics of impersonality. There are numerous instances where the postural 
character of his avowed depersonalisation is revealed: "What may be considered 
corrupt or decadent in the morals of Massinger is not the alteration or diminution 
in morals; it is simply the disappearance of all the personal and real emotions 
which this morality supported and into which it introduced a kind of order. As 
soon as the emotions disappear the morality which ordered it appears hideous. ,,5 
Eliot needs the personal dimension to support his teleological edifice. Pure 
impersonality would fissure it from the inside. Baudelaire, on the other hand, 
4 
5 
Eliot, "Dante," in Selected Prose, 226. 
Eliot, "Philip Massinger," in Selected Prose, 159. 
204 
exposed the imbrication of personal emotions and the grid of moral "imperatives 
by showcasing the political grounding of morality. He bracketed morality not 
because personal emotions had (inexplicably), disappeared, but because it serv.ed 
.\ 
the interests of the ruling classes and functioned as an instrument of interiorisation 
of the hegemonic ideology. Eliot's oscillations are not accidental, or simply 
infelicitous, but endemic. I will show, however, how his poetry contains niches of 
resistance to the organicist logic that many commentators have traced in it, within 
the conceptual terrain of counter-memory and the vanishing of the 
experiencability of reality that was set up in the previous chapters on Charles 
Baudelaire. 
The Hollow Men: being deprived of the pardon of speech6 
Between the desire 
And the spasm 
Between the potency 
And the existence 
Between the essence 
And the descent 
Falls the Shadow7 
The craving for the elimination of what the Eliotic' protagonist calls "the 
Shadow," i.e., the mediating agency of language, the materiality of the letter, has 
throughout his work assumed different forms and various names. In abstracting 
6 See Lacan, "Function and field of speech and language," in Ecrits: A Selection, 70: " ... 
these are the hermetic elements that our exegesis resolves, the equivocations that our invocation 
dissolves, in a deliverance of the imprisoned meaning, from the revelation of the palimpsest to the 
riven word of the mystery and to the pardon of speech." . 
T.S. Eliot, Collected Poems 1909-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 1974),92. 
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from them all a common denominator, one is inevitably led to the notion of 
organicism. The genuine existential pathos of "Between the idea I And the reality 
I... Falls the Shadow," echoes the subject's resistance towards the heteronomy 
'\ 
signalled by language, resistance towards the inaugurating praxis of language as 
non-ontological mediation. The monologising narrator gradually voices his 
inevitable entanglement in the nexus of mediation, which""has expanded to such a 
degree as to engulf the sexual realm. 
The poem negatively educes the hypothesis that essence and one's relation 
to it can no longer be experienced on the platform of the Hegelian progressive 
self-realisation of a consciousness that preserves within it the successive moments 
of its history. The space that opens in between, as much as intermingles, the 
matrices of this binomial economy is not saturated by an integratist impetus. It 
shapes up as effect of the singularity and abruptness of an insurmountable 
ontological cleavage. The staccato rhythm of the text aims at reproducing the 
overarching effect of discontinuity with the insistence of a repetition-compulsion 
that, however, fails to master what it dreads non-residually. What is in excess of 
this attempt at mastery reactivates the whole process, which can be regarded as 
being interminable. The agon of the hollow man is fought over conceptual 
plenitude and historical integration, which demand, however, shapes up in an 
intransitive mode. Social pragmatics is nowhere visible here. This intransitivity, 
which relates to language rather than existential awkwardness, reduces the 
subject's range of responses to a series of convulsive attempts at recapturing the 
immediacy of an imaginary self-coincidence within experience. The textual 
narrator fails to accede to the order of either his personal life or the broader 
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experiential frames engulfing him and wallows in a mixture of self-pity and 
incantational compulsion. Simultaneously, in the interim of the stanzas, another 
melancholic realisation punctures the textual 'rhole, and in a most characteristic 
fashion as its narrator is impossible to identify. The phrase does not ~all within 
the pragmatics of interlocution: "Life is very long." Experiencing life as an 
incessant repetition of the same, a continuous attempt afdistilling essence from 
experience, forces the textual subject to the reality of sterility, and, most 
important, tedious immobility.8 The subje~t is blind to the fact that temporality is 
arrested not because between the "motion" and the "act" falls the mediating 
"Shadow," but because self-coincidence causes the suspension of the temporal 
axis. It brackets temporal protention and retention upon which a dynamic sense of 
self and other must necessarily depend. The call for essence infantilises 
temporality into homogeneous unfolding of the self-identical. In the terrain of 
sexuality, self-grounding, by implication, shades off into impotence, the latter 
being a sexual index of the inability to relate to the other in a transitive mode. 
The potency whose lack is connected with mediation, and lamented as such, is 
essentially coextensive with auto-affective desire. Later on I will address auto-
affection through the lenses of Jacques Derrida's La Voix et Ie phenomene,9in an 
attempt to stress the· self-contradictory and self-negating character of this self-
enclosure. The alleged recognition of self by self cannot clog up the unwinding of 
a certain temporality -no matter how interiorised, and organically conceived- and 
finally yields to the dislocation of self-enclosure. It is made to submit to the 
8 Baudelairean ennui can also be seen as an effect of arrested temporality, generated within 
conditions of a temporal and praxial vacuity. 
9 Jacques Derrida, La Vou et Ie phenomene: introduction au probleme du slgne dans la 
ph~nomlnologie qi"Husserl (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967). 
207 
tremors of linguistic and temporal exteriority. This is the trajectory that 
"Prufrock" negotiates. 
"The Hollow Men" articulates the relati!Jn of the subject to his speech and 
by extension to the enveloping explanat~ry frameworks that legitimise his 
language and intentions. The alienation emitted by the semi-autistic intentio1?ality 
of the enunciating protagonist translates a symptomatic denial of speech, 
expressed through language, of course, and so never inhabiting the silence it 
professes to desire ["In this last of meeting places / We grope together / And avoid 
speech"]. There is a "language-barrier opposed to speech, and the precautions 
against verbalism that are a theme of the discourse of the 'normal' man in our 
culture merely serve to reinforce its thickness." 10 The self-inflicted denial behind 
the whole enterprise can be seen to combine with a mute nostalgia for the 
prevalence of ocular plenitude. "Speech varies, but our eyes are all the same," 
writes Eliot. I I Yet, the poem already exposes the contingency of sight upon 
broader conceptual infrastructures which The Waste Land will radicalise to the 
point of revealing the blindness endemic in any conceptual elaboration of reality. 
The primacy assigned to perception reflects a cognitive economy that tries to 
bypass language in order to access the referent directly without sensuous 
mediatory interventions. However, the divine sight that would restitute 
transcendental sense has abandoned the textual narrator. 
10 
11 
The eyes are not here 
There are no eyes here 
In this valley of dying stars 
In this hollow valley 
Lacan, "Function and field of speech and language," 71. 
Eliot, "Dante," 210. 
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This broken jaw of our lost kingdoms 
In this last of meeting places 
We grope together 
And avoid speech "\ 
Gathered on this beach of the tumid river 
Sightless, unless 
The eyes reappear 
As the perpetual star 
Multifoliate rose 
Of death's twilight kingdom 
The hope only 
Of empty men. 12 
The empty men "groping together avoiding speech," voice "1' ali~nation de 
la folie [the alienation of madness]," and their affliction consists in their 
persistently resisting the fact that, in Jacques Lacan's words, "Ie sujet y est parle 
plutbt qu'il ne parle [the subject ... is spoken rather than speaking].,,13 In 
attempting to negate mediation the textual subject has incurred upon himself the 
hollowing out of his own intentionality. It is language that engenders 
intentionality, and not vice-versa. Nevertheless, the text does not allow any 
restitution of the materiality/transcendence divide in the form of a reversal of the 
relevant poles. Neither the rationalism of transcendent concept nor the empirical 
intransigence of reality givens is highlighted here or in the other examined works. 
The narrator's discourse does not enforce the right of appearances over the essence 
of abstract concept. It is addressed to simulacral experience. This latter, however, 
should not be understood as the negative indicator of essence-replete life 
12 
13 
Eliot, Collected Poems, 91. 
Jacques Lacan, "Function and field of speech and language," 69. 
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subsisting outside history. 14 
The pursuit of what lies anterior to the serial articulations of discourse, of 
wpat is allegedly primordial to the genesis ··of language, ultimately leads the 
narrator to death ["In this last of meeting places,,].15 After the loss. of ocular 
plenitude and speech, the subject is ensnared in a realm which inevitably is that of 
the structure of language winnowed out of originary finitude. The fact that the 
subject cannot pattern his relation to language after factual experience impinges 
upon his understanding of finitude. Speech is not offered to him as pardon but as 
hideous imperative. 
The demand for reality: to eliminate the signifier 
The poet [must] force, ... dislocate if necessary, 
language into his meaning. 
T. S. Eliot, ''The Metaphysical Poets" 
Tropological configurations in language, and the logic that governs them, 
. are intrinsic to the broader discussion on the impossibility of ontologising 
experience and history. Language's mediatory and materialist intervention is 
inextricably linked with its tropological character which in the case of modernist 
poetry has been enhanced to the point of internally threatening meaning as 
14 The impossibility of genetic substantivalisation is what I attempt to formulate throughout. 
See Michel Foucault, ''Theatrum Philosophicum," in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 167-
8. Foucault writes apropos of Deleuze's reading of Plato, and in the overall context of the aporia 
of essence and the event, that a reversal of Plato in the sense of restituting appearances over 
essential forms is insufficient, and can only strengthen the metaphysical bipolar infrastructure. 
"And what will enter, submerging appearance and breaking its engagement to essence, will be the 
event; the incorporeal will dissipate the density of matter; a timeless insistence will destroy the 
circle that imitates eternity; an impenetrable singularity will divest itself of its contamination by 
rurity; the actual semblance of the simulacrum will support the falseness of false appearances. " 
5 See Lacan, "Function and field of speech and language," 105: "it is as a desire for death 
that he [the subject] affirms himself for others; if he identifies himself with the other, it is by fixing 
him solidly in the metamorphosis of his essential image, and no being is ever evoked by him 
except among the shadows of death. To say that this mortal meaning reveals in speech a centre 
exterior to language is more than a metaphor; it manifests a structure." 
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traditionally understood, i.e., as being subsidiary to the solid grasp of reality's 
essence invariants. The apparently self-contradictory nature of the rhetorical 
o~ganisation of Baudelaire's poetry, i.e., the lyrical voicing of the impossibility of 
sustaining a symbolic/lyrical understanding of the world under modern conditions 
of existence, is collateral to this threat. The evacuation of essence- can 
legitimately be seen as the hidden agenda behind the decadent thematic decoys in 
Baudelaire's poetry. 
In the case of Eliot what is sometimes felt to be an extreme stylistic self-
awareness that erupts upon the text's linear diegesis can be ascribed to the 
negative realisation of language's proper and ina~ienable qualities. 
That was a way of putting it -not very satisfactory, 
A periphrastic study in a worn-out poetical fashion, 
Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle 
With words and meanings. The poetry does not matter. 16 
What seems to constitute the target of intentional negation, i.e., poetic 
discursivity, is immediately reaffirmed in and through the very act that stated its 
negation. The pathos of the wrestle with words and meaning is triggered by the 
impossibility of pertaining to the order of pure non-paraphrasis/non-
circumlocution; circumlocution being the effect of the exogeneity of signifier to 
signified. Paradoxically, what the textual narrator professes not to understand is 
that this order would entail locutionary arrestation, pure semantic stasis, and the 
implosion of the equation signifier-signified-referent. This is not a failure of 
understanding that should be attributed to the subject's individual weakness, 
16 T.S.Eliot, "Four Quartets," in Collected Poems 1909-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 
1974), 198. 
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however. It is secondary to the desire for the transparency of the linguistic sign to 
the reality constant turned referent, as if the process whereby the latter relates to 
th~ fonner is free of semiotic/material residues; .. I contend that any affinnation of 
this transparency in the poetry serves the purpose of mere wish-fulfilment. What 
is articulated in texts such as the above is a recurrent need that obeys an enttopic 
logic. The more the sufficiency of reality constants wanes through their 
absorption into language, the more the Eliotic subject voices concern over this 
obfuscation and desires the restitution of a putative diaphaneity of sign to reality-
given. The principle of non-circumlocutionary discourse that the extract 
expresses and purports to exemplify cannot but. be appropriated to an analogical 
semantics, and it is symptomatic that it is uttered in such a self-defeatist way. 
The self-undennining mode whereby the subject gives vent to his 
exasperation over the material thickness of discourse translates an albeit negative 
and stifled insight into the void of essence underlying the purported owning of 
reality'S positive contents and the language supposed to render them 
communicable. The intentionality by which it is infonned is proleptic and, 
therefore, self-justificatory. The pseudo-modesty that accompanies it would be 
really annoying to a sensitive reader if it were not immediately cancelled by the 
pragmatic mode of its being expressed. Eliot's struggle at this point is, at least, 
intra-linguistic by admission, intra-tropological. In other occasions, though, his 
efforts seem to concern the appropriation of the existent in itself, as if language 
were a diaphanous veil to be torn apart so that the object could be brought forth in 
all its substance and concreteness. In the context of his rejection of Milton and 
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Swinburne's idioms on the grounds of excessive verbality, his demand for a solid 
grasp of immutable sense acquires disturbing inflections: 
·1 
.\ 
This speaks to me of what I have long· aimed, in writing poetry; to· write 
poetry which should be essentially poetry, with nothing poetic about it, 
poetry standing naked in its bare bones, or poetry so transparent that we 
should not see the poetry, but that which we are meant to see through the 
poetry, poetry so transparent that in reading it we are intent on what the 
poetry points at, and not on the poetry, this seems to me the thing to try for. 17 
The calculated denigration of the aural dimension is a programmatic 
integer in the criticism. In "Milton I" he writes that "a dislocation takes place, 
through the hypertrophy of the auditory imagination at the expense of the visual 
and tactile, so that the inner meaning is separated from the surface, and tends to 
become something occult, or at least without effect upon the reader until fully 
d d ,,18 un erstoo . What The Hollow Men poetically lets be seen, that is, the 
inevitable collapse of ocular/conceptual plenitude to a phantasm of reference, the 
essays castigate as flawed strategy, reversible, contingent, and affixed to a 
historically recognisable place and time. 19 
Eliot also failed to understand that, in his systematic critical effort to 
devalue the figural dimension, what he invoked was a series of allegedly 
Romantic ideological tenets, banalised, however, to a considerable extent.' The 
17 Unpublished lecture on "English Letter Writers," New Haven, Connecticut [Winter 
1933]; cited in F. O. Matthiessen, The Achievement of T. S. Eliot (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1935),89-90; emphasis added. 
18 T. S. Eliot, "Milton I," in Selected Prose, 263. 
19 In "Milton II," however, Eliot will mitigate the edge of his critique: "I do not think that 
we should attempt to see very clearly any scene that Milton depicts: it should be accepted as a 
shifting phantasmagory .... This limitation of visual power ... turns out to be not merely a 
negligible defect, but a positive virtue .... We must ... not expect to see clearly; our sense of sight 
must be blurred, so that our hearing may become more acute" (Selected Prose, 270). The 
underlying emphasis is, nevertheless, on the antagonism between the aural and ocular eiaborations 
of reality. The primacy of the latter over the former remained an unwavering given throughout 
Eliot's work. 
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scenario of the catastrophic "dissociation of sensibility,,20 that set in at some stage 
in "the seventeenth century" can only make sense in counterpoint to an organicist 
and immanentist conception of meaning-production and the artistic endeavour in 
genera1.21 Christopher Norris has emphasised the contaminating . logic of 
analogism that capitalises on the convergence between history, meaning, and 
phenomenal perception.22 Eliot's aesthetic ideology is reflexive of, as much as it 
lends critical weight to, the homologisation of the sphere of language and 
meaning with experience -either empirical, or purportedly reconstituted through 
obedience to the cultural hegemony. What is premised is the binding of language 
to the realm of phenomenal cognition, a basic tenet of all theocentric, aestheticist, 
20 See Eliot, "The Metaphysical Poets," 64. Organic sensibility entails "a direct sensuous 
apprehension of thought, or a recreation of thought into feeling" (63). 
2 See Christopher Norris, Paul de Man: Deconstruction and the Critique of Aesthetic 
Ideology (London: Routledge, 1988), 35-6, 117. Norris rightly insists on Eliot's numerous 
programmatic inconsistencies. They must become the object of analysis because they are 
symptomatic of a New Criticist mixture of assertorial rhetoric and a certain application of critique-
politics, which is, or purports to be, blind to indebtedness to previous critical paradigms. An 
apotheosis of tradition, at the same time, reverberates throughout. Norris: 
Thus when Eliot (and the New Critics after him) set out to rewrite the canonical 
Tradition of English poetry, they did so by means of an historical myth which 
expressly devalued the Romantics but implicitly invoked a whole series of arch-
Romantic values and assumptions. If there did indeed occur, as Eliot thought, a 
"dissociation of sensibility," a cultural malaise that set in some time toward the 
mid-seventeenth century, then the only possible standard by which this decline 
could be measured is that of the "organic" or unified sensibility, a condition of 
reconciled thought and sensibility conceived very much in Hegelian terms .... 
What emerges from Eliot's account is precisely the linkage that de Man perceives' 
between a certain, highly simplified notion of poetic language and an attitude that 
reduces all history to a species of reactionary myth .... For de Man, on the 
contrary, such thinking leads to a kind of aesthetic imperialism, an authoritarian 
drive whose signs may be read in the subsequent uses of organicist myths and 
metaphors. Thus in Eliot, for instance, the idea of "tradition" goes along with that 
of an imaginary, long-lost cultural order when thought and sensibility were as yet 
untouched by the dislocating forces of secular history and politics. (117-8) 
What is apparent throughout is a "mystified vision of cultural order" and a series of "self-serving 
idealizations". The way they are disarticulated by the poetic texts constitutes a vital and open 
agenda. The essays themselves, however, are not impervious to a reading that would reveal their 
f:0tential for a self-undermining on the level of positive contents. 
2 "[Tennyson and Browning] do not feel their thought as immediately as the odour of a 
rose. A thought to Donne was an experience; it modified his sensibility" (Eliot, "The 
Metaphysical Poets," 64). 
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and organicist hermeneutics. Norris' statement concerning Hans Robert Jauss'. 
Rezeptiortilstheti~ applies equally well to Eliot: "If understanding transcends the 
." 
obstacles of temporal and cultural distance, it does so by perceiving those salient 
features of the work that stand out against the various implicit 'horizon"s' of past 
and present response.,,23 This transcendence can only transpire by means of 
abstraction from the materiality of concrete life interests." As such it is profoundly 
ideological. 
What is discernible behind Eliot's (and, incidentally, Pound's) insistence 
on the primacy of phenomenalist cognition, and their -admittedly ambivalent-
emphasis on the conceptual grasping of invariants of reality, is the 
commensurability of the linguistic realm with reality givens. Pound's sensuous 
intuitionism yielded, however, to the gradual interiorisation of the historical 
dimension to the extreme point of turning the latter into an internal periplus. His 
agenda vis-a-vis the historico-political dimension dramatically condenses, and 
polarises, the tensional congruence of phenomenalism and language agency in a 
series of poetic texts which obsessively thematise the phantasmatic constitution of 
their meaning. The ego scriptor finally comes to allegorise himself into a 
grammatical moment embedded within a series of historical kernels whose 
semantics fail to mutually accrue.24 To a certain extent, the same applies to the 
narratival subjects of "Prufrock," "Gerontion," and the "Preludes," where 
insistence on dialectical self-correction in terms of an increased sensitisation and 
upgrading of consciousness, does not harmonise with the desired heightening of 
phenomenal cognition. The potency of the texts lies in their offering the 
23 
24 
Norris, Paul de Man, 37. 
See Ezra Pound, The Pisan Cantos (London: Faber and Faber, 1954). 
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possibility of reading the immanence of this centrifugal co-existence of 
antagonistic moments within them as something more than negatively intended. 
·f 
.\ 
Eliot's static allegories versus Baudelaire's dissolution of mythology 
into the space of history25 
History is not simply a science but also and not least a 
form of remembrance <Eingedenken>. What science 
has "determined" remembrance can modify. 
Benjamin, "Konvolut N" 
The disarticulation of phenomenalist cognition that "The Hollow Men" 
educes shapes up in distinction to Eliot's statements on allegory and the 
predominance he ascribed to the specular dimension within the grids of 
perception. His understanding of allegory differs radically from Baudelaire and 
Benjamin's construals of this tropological ensemble and is premised on religious 
transcendentalism being immanent to it. What BaudelairelBenjamin treated as a 
transcendental distortion and betrayal of allegory's force, i.e., its no longer zeroing 
in on the detritus of history and experience in order to leap into the realm of faith 
and afterworld mythologies, Eliot considers as a sine qua non. He stresses the 
cultural and religious conditioning of the allegorical mind and its lucidity of 
style,26as much as its creation within a European Catholic Middle-Ages milieu. 
All this inevitably detracts from allegory's radical relativising of its own meaning 
25 See Benjamin, "Konvolut N: On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress," 458. 
26 "What we should consider is not so much the meaning of the images [which is there, 
nevertheless, primordial, unaffected, and exogenous to the allegorical grid], but the reverse 
process, that which led a man having an idea to express it in images. We have to consider the type 
of mind which by nature and practice tended to express itself in allegory .... [I]t was not a device 
to enable the uninspired to write verses, but really a mental habit" ("Dante," 209). In general, Eliot 
taxonomises in accordance with inflexible moral, cultural and political criteria. His insistence on 
"types of mind" is one more disturbing pointer to the fact. In contrast to Eliot's immutable and 
essentialist allegorical imagery, Benjamin's configuration of the dialectical and/or allegorical 
image is motivated by a sense of permanent peril threatening to obliterate its historical character: 
"The image that is read --which is to say, the image in the now of its recognizability-- bears to the 
highest degree the imprint of the perilous critical moment on which all reading is founded" 
(Benjamin, "Konvolut N: On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress," 463). 
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through the transparently conjunctural character of the relation of its signs. He 
also insists on the preponderance of the visual dimension, which seems to be the 
only common denominator underneath differing configurations of allegory.27 His 
distance from Benjamin's understanding of· the optical parameter, however, is 
significant. The optical element in Eliot is bound to a visionary grasp of reality 
which he considers perfectly legitimate even for the modem world.28 It is part of 
a medieval intuitive grasp of phenomena. Eliot turned allegory into myth 
denuding it thus of its critical potentia1.29 In his version of things there is no space 
for any allegorical entanglement into history, and no cleavage between the poles 
of self-understanding that medieval allegory promotes. The subject is no stranger 
to himself because the elaboration of meaning, whether the allegorical meaning or 
the broader significance of what it means to be human, is not broached at all: 
"[A]llegory means clear visual images. And clear visual images are given more 
intensity by having a meaning --we do not need to know what that meaning is, but 
in our awareness of the image we must be aware that the meaning is there too. ,,30 
No more clear formulation of the desire to force the allegorical elaboration of 
reality into the mould of univocal meaning could be given.31 
27 See Benjamin, "Central Park," 52: "In allegory the original interest is not linguistic but 
~ftic." 
"Dante's is a visual imagination .... It is visual in the sense that he lived in an age in which 
men still saw visions. It was a psychological habit, the trick of which we have forgotten, but as 
good as any of our own .... [W]e have forgotten that seeing visions --a practice now relegated to 
the aberrant and uneducated-- was once a more significant, interesting, and disciplined kind of 
dreaming" ("Dante," 209). If seeing visions was a disciplined practice, however, then the 
unpredictable, unsolicited, and haphazard nature of epiphany that it is supposed to serve vanishes. 
29 Baudelaire's project, on the contrary, addressed the possibility of "the dissolution of 
'mythology' into the space of history" (Benjamin, "Konvolut N: On the Theory of Knowledge, 
Theory of Progress," 458). 
30 Eliot, "Dante," 209. 
31 "In good allegory, like Dante's, it is not necessary to understand the meaning first to 
enjoy the poetry, but that our enjoyment of the poetry makes us want to understand the meaning" 
("Dante," 230; emphasis added). 
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The differences between Eliot and Benjamin's configuration of the 
image, the allegorical image for that matter, symptomatise a significant 
divergence of ideological outlook. that inevitably bears on their respective 
aesthetic positions. To Benjamin, dialectical, historical images, the images that 
Baudelairean allegory built on, are genuine pointers to historical becoming. His 
idiosyncratic understanding of dialecticity does not detract from, but on the 
contrary reinforces, the irreducibly historical nature of these images. Contrary to 
Eliot's totally static understanding of allegory and its concurrent imagery 
networks, Benjamin enhances the destructive-redemptive impact of the 
monadological and dialectical image upon historical continua and stresses the 
fragile constellation that the present forms with the past. This latter has nothing to 
do with Eliot's stifling tradition which amounts to the stringing out in time and 
space of primal essence and history, both being unaffected by the vicissitudes of 
historical strife.32 Eliot goes for empathy on the basis of a co-sharing of every age 
in primal givens of essence that translate into cultural norms, moral imperatives, 
and political injunctions. This is what lies behind his affirmation of the "historical 
sense" which "involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its 
presence .... [T]he whole of literature of Europe from Homer ... has a 
32 Cf.: "It may be that the continuity of tradition is mere semblance. But then precisely the 
persistence of this semblance of persistence provides it with continuity" (Benjamin, "Konvolut N: 
On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress," 486). In After Strange Gods: A Primer of 
Modern Heresy (London: Faber and Faber, 1934) Eliot presents a corrective to a static construal of 
tradition by emphasising the need for the maintenance of orthodoxy that will guarantee the 
upgrading of tradition without at the same time relinquishing its normative and timeless core (29). 
Therein tradition is seen to be unconscious (29) and aided by conscious orthodoxy. In the 
"Tradition" essay, however, he had supported the view that "[tradition] cannot be inherited, and if 
you want it you must obtain it by great labour" (38). After Strange Gods was eventually 
withdrawn from publication, yet more because of some potentially damaging and strategically 
infelicitous anti-Semitic remarks (see page 20) rather than for inherently theoretical reasons. In 
general, the tendency has been to move from a more flexible, mobile notion of tradition (to which 
one relates rather than be totally determined by it) to a more inflexible, static and un-historical 
one. 
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· I . d . I d ,,33 SlmU taneous eXistence an composes a Slmu taneous o~ er. Benjamin, and I 
believe Baudelaire, envisaged the blasting apart of essentialist simultaneity of 
.. 
primal constants which disguises as linear historical progression. Concerning 
Baudelaire's poetry, the anamnestic flash-backs' and abrupt scenic interpolations34 
in the broader context of his allegorical predisposition mobilise image-grids that 
both enhance the present's imbrication in past concerns and highlight the figural, 
and not simply temporal, proclivities of the experiential gists. Benjamin's 
formulation of the meaning of the dialectical image merits extensive quoting: 
It's not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is 
present its light on what is past;35rather, image is that wherein what has 
been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In 
other words, image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of 
the present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of 
what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is not progression but image, 
suddenly emergent. --Only dialectical images are genuine images (that is, 
not archaic);36and the place where one encounters them is language.37 
33 Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," 38; emphasis added. He concludes the essay 
by asserting that "he [the poet] is not likely to know what is to be done unless he lives in what is 
not merely the present, but the present moment of the past, unless he is conscious, not of what is 
dead, but of what is already living" (44). This should be contrasted to Benjamin's "What science 
has 'determined,' remembrance {Eingedenken} can modify. Such mindfulness can make the 
incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the complete (suffering) into something 
incomplete" ("Konvolut N: Theory of Knowledge," 471). Contra Eliot and his obsession with 
closed totalities, history for Benjamin is incomplete. The above-cited sentence responds to 
Horkheimer's critique of (Benjamin's) notion of the incompleteness of history. In general, I 
believe that Benjamin's complex construal of the dialectical image can be related to Baudelaire's 
anti-essentialist understanding of history and experience along lines that resist historicist 
Erogressivism while not succumbing to ahistoricism. 
4 See "Le Cygne," for a narrative that accrues to the juxtaposition of mnemonic scenes with 
present perceptions in the broader framework of a metamorphosis of urban and historical 
environments. On the scenic character of history in Baudelaire see Sigrid Weigel, Body and 
Image-Space: Re-reading Walter Benjamin, trans. Georgina Paul with Rachel McNicholl and 
Jeremy Gaines (London; New York: Routledge, 1996),45. 
35 This is what, more or less, Eliot's notion of tradition affirms. 
36 Eliot's image-grids accrue to the notion of the archaic. From the simultaneous order of 
antiquity and modernity that "Sweeney Among the Nightingales" (Collected Poems 1909-1962, 
59-60) affirms to the mythopoetic infrastructures of The Waste Land, and, most important, in the 
essays, Eliot conceives of history in primal terms, as the translation of primal constants in 
mundane form. The poetry, however, allows for the possibility of deconstructing this essentialist 
schema through the homeopathic form it has assumed to act out its traumatic contents. It is only to 
a significantly lesser degree that the same can be said of the essays. 
37 Benjamin, "Konvolut N: Theory of Knowledge," 462. 
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One should counterpoint this to Eliot's assurances as to the predominance 
and immutability of the ocular foundations within human perception.38 The Waste 
"" 
Land, as I will show promptly, deals with the undoing of ocular stability and 
aligns the desire to affirm extra-historical moorings in essence with blindness. 
Tiresias'resumption of experience through empathy and in-sight is postural. The 
Dantean model upon which Eliot bases his pre-modem aesthetic presupposes an 
organic rationale that is totally irrelevant to the exigencies of modem 
discursivity.39 It is not accidental that in his "Baudelaire" essay he does not 
discuss allegory. The Catholic worldview that is transparent behind his 
formulations is not commensurate with Baudelaire's melancholic allegories of loss 
and finitude despite Eliot's assertions as to the contrary.40 Benjamin is not duped 
by the religious-decadent decorum41and, as usual, strikes at the core of what is 
involved behind surface similarities. Baudelairean self-estrangement and 
allegorical fragmentation of self and experience render impossible the reflex 
mentality that the visionary grasp of the world necessitates: "The decisive ferment 
which, entering the taedium vitae transforms it into spleen, is that of self-
estrangement. Of the infinite regress of reflection [in Romanticism] ... all that 
remains in the Trauer (sorrow) of Baudelaire is the tete-a.-tete sombre et limp ide 
38 See Eliot, "Dante," 210: "Speech varies, but our eyes are all the same." 
39 There have been readings of Dante that emphasise the "gap between the sign and the 
signified .... [which] cannot be merely wished away in a magical return to a simple and natural 
relation between representation and reality" (Stephen J. Greenblatt, "Preface," in Allegory and 
Representation: Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1979-80, ed. Stephen Greenblatt 
[Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press], ix; apropos of Robert M. Durling's, 
"Deceit and Digestion in the Belly of Hell," in Allegory and Representation, 61-93). 
40 See Eliot, "Baudelaire," in Selected Prose, 231-6. Eliot treats political dissidence and 
moral revolt as a blasphemous affirmation of the political hegemony and Catholic religiosity 
eliding thus the political dimension altogether. 
41 On Baudelaire's merely postural Catholicism see Benjamin, "Konvolut J: Baudelaire," 
248. The practical reasons behind its adoption show through its aggressive and contradictory 
character. 
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(face-to-face, sombre and limpid) of the subject with himself. Herein lies the 
specific "Ernst" (gravity) of Baudelaire. It is just this which hinders the 
assimilation by the poet of the Catholic worldvlew which is reconciled with that 
of allegory only within the category of play. ,,42 
The examined poetry jeopardises the primary role of specularity and 
reference, and the contingency of cognition on them. It exemplifies the 
recalcitrance of linguistic form to cognitive appropriation and scorns the 
imperative of cumulative understanding.43 The textual embodiment of cognitive 
aberration cannot be written off to an aesthetic anxiety aiming at collapsing the 
antagonism between phenomenal experience and the discursive chora and at 
foregrounding the putative transparency of the latter to the former. However, the 
reality remains that in his criticism Eliot's insistence on unified sensibility as the 
absolute prerequisite for consummate artistic cognition is subsidiary to viewing 
the aesthetic as a force of convergence of the empirical and the transcendental 
realms in an ideal reciprocity of concept and phenomenon. His aesthetic is mostly 
metaphor-based. As I have shown, to the extent that the criticism addresses or 
accommodates allegory, it is a medieval version of it, totally exhausted within 
religious-metaphysic parameters.44 The reciprocal mediation of the aesthetic, 
Benjamin, "Central Park," 33. 42 
43 See de Man, Allegories of Reading, 10: "Rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up 
vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration." 
44 See Eliot's telling statement concerning the two tropological systems: "[A]llegory and 
metaphor do not get on well together .... But as the whole poem of Dante is, if you like, one vast 
metaphor, there is hardly any place for metaphor in the detail of it" (Eliot, "Dante," 210). In this 
case, Eliot has fused allegory into metaphor as a consequence of his integratist drive. His 
medieval notion of allegory is based on the conceptual and moral unity of the optically supervised 
field of human history. Nothing could be further than Benjamin's understanding of allegory as a 
reifying and melancholic attachment to an always already fragmented history: "That which is 
touched by the allegorical intention is torn from the context of life's interconnections: it is 
simultaneously shattered and conserved. Allegory attaches itself to the rubble (Trummer)" 
(Benjamin, "Central Park," 38). 
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moral, and political dimensions accrues to the underlying constant of his critical 
theory, which is the sensuous (vide ocular) apprehension of the realm of the 
concept, i.e., the amalgamation of language andlWithin the noumenon without any 
materialist residues. In "Andrew Marvell" he writes that "[T]he wit is riot only 
combined with, but fused into, the imagination. ,,45 The aesthetic realm will 
ultimately be grafted onto a transcendental and derivative notion of experience 
aiming to affirm the extra-historical and non-contingent moorings of experience: 
"[wit] is confused with cynicism because it implies a constant inspection and 
criticism of experience. It involves, probably, a recognition, implicit in the 
expression of everyday experience, of other kinds of experience. ,,46 The 
combination of wit (a primarily aesthetic, rhetorical entity) with a transcendental 
configuration of experience is paradigmatic of the systematic imbrication of 
aesthetic, moral and political categories in Eliot's criticism.47 If one contextualises 
these instances within assertions as to language's immanence to, and subsidiary 
role vis-a-vis, experience and empirically verifiable reality, then the anti-
materialist streak of Eliot's understanding of poetic language becomes clearer. He 
snaps at Philip Massinger because "Massinger's feeling for language had 
outstripped his feelings for things; that his eye and vocabulary were not in co-
operation." Language is supposed to serve cognition in harmony with an ocular 
integration of experience. 
45 Eliot, "Andrew Marvell," 164. 
Eliot, "Andrew Marvell," 170. 
He proceeds by praising his (Massinger's) 
46 
47 See, also, concerning the imbrication of moral and aesthetic categories, and apropos of 
the "middle and later years" of Yeats: "a kind of moral, as well as intellectual, excellence" (Eliot, 
"Yeats," in Selected Prose, 252). Also, "he [Thomas Middleton] wrote one tragedy which .... has a 
profound and permanent moral value and horror" (Eliot, "Thomas Middleton," in Selected Prose, 
195; emphasis added). 
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" .r.~~ 
contemporaries', and Shakespeare's, "[fusion] into a single phrase [of] two or more 
diverse impressions." Then he offers his ultimate criterion concerning a 
"\ 
successful metaphor in the context of Shakespearean language: "the metaphor 
identified itself with what suggests it. ,,48 The procession from there to the "affirmed 
binding of the intellect to the senses, that is, to a testimonial, verificatory and 
empiricist screening of experience, feels inevitable: "[W]ith the en~ of Chapman, 
Middleton, Webster, Tourneur, Donne we end a period when the intellect was 
immediately at the tips of the senses. Sensation became word and word was 
sensation.,,49 The refusal to acknowledge language's materialist rupture of the 
phenomenalist/ocular and cognitive equilibrium is the underlying topos 
throughout. Eliot is not original at all but merely rehearses a long line of 
enlightened reasoning in a mildly qualified form. Its cornerstone is the epistemic 
necessity to unceasingly reaffirm the primacy of logic and grammar over rhetoric, 
ensuring thus the referential function of language and monitoring all parameters 
that could erupt upon its representational flow. His assertoric ethos is endemic in 
all programmes that aim to uphold the collusion of mind and nature. The latter 
should ideally be attained as and through the unfolding of an appropriative 
consciousness, and is itself the correlative of what is erroneously considered to be 
the main Romantic paradigm. His deployment of a metaphysically-charged 
conceit, his "objective correlatives," the metaphysical poets' "wit," virtually most 
of his methodological tools as defended in his essays, are collateral to the 
48 
49 
See Eliot, "Philip Massinger," 155; emphasis added. 
Eliot, "Philip Massinger," 156; emphasis added. 
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principle of organic unity, a desired union of emotion and thought, nature and 
consciousness, and the primacy of analogical thinking. 50 
'1 
,\ 
"When the intellect was at the tip of the senses": embattling the figure51 
The symbiosis of an anthropocentric logic .. with phenomenalist 
intuitiveness is apparent throughout. What is of special interest to the current 
discussion is that this logic is immanently hostile to figural errancy. F. O. 
Matthiessen, who frequently reads like Eliot's spokesman in compressing and 
glossing over the latter's telling inconsistencies, manages to condense in periods 
such as the following an instance of self-contradiction characteristic of the 
organicist dri ve lending it its impetus. 
Swinburne's aberration was that he tended to blur together sense 
and sound, to use language merely as musical incantation. As a 
result he seldom gives us 'clear, visual images'; he uses the most 
general words more for their association than for any precise 
denotation; and he rarely conveys the feeling that he has observed 
any immediate object. 52 
With an astonishing lack of discerning the contradictory nature of his and Eliot's 
assertions, he goes on to profess that what bothers Eliot most in Arnold's poetry is 
the thinness of the musical quality.53 By "general words" he probably means 
abstract nouns, whereas the blurring of sense and sound, which in itself cannot be 
50 For "dissociation of sensibility" see "The Metaphysical Poets," 64 passim; for "wit" see 
"Andrew Marvell," 162, 170 passim. For de-personalisation see "Tradition and the Individual 
Talent," 40 passim. However, there are continuous modifications of the notion of impersonality 
throughout the essays. See "Yeats," 251. 
51 See Eliot, "Philip Massinger," 156~: "And indeed, with the end of Chapman, Middleton, 
Webster, Tourneur, Donne we end a period when the intellect was immediately at the tips of the 
senses. Sensation became word and word was sensation. tI 
52 Matthiessen, The Achievement ofT.S.Eliot, 77. 
53 See Matthiessen, The Achievement ofT. S. Eliot, 81. 
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such a great aberration since it characterises the bipartite organisation of the 
linguistic sign, cannot be congruent with a usage of language in terms of "musical 
., 
.\ 
incantation." Music as a semiological code is semantically void and cannot 
accommodate sense except in its diluted song version wherein it has been 
demoted to a medium for words.54 Also, the lack o~ ocular precision is, 
significantly, targeted as an anomaly. Texts such as the above acquire a particular 
significance when seen as instances of a certain rationale. It becomes obvious that 
the sensuous, sense-deficient (vide "musical" in the case of Swinburne) aspect of 
language erupts upon the ideal reciprocity of concepts and phenomenal intuitions. 
By negative implication, the role of the aesthetic as a common denominator 
amalgamating the cognitive and phenomenal spheres becomes apparent. It serves 
in the case of Eliot as the platform upon which the mutual penetration of the 
orders of knowledge and experience can occur. The enterprise whereby 
experience fuses into knowledge is underwritten by a persistent nominalism that 
will culminate in the Four Quartets. It edges to a histrionic devolution of 
language to the condition of a transparent sheet allowing for the putative 
substance of reality invariants, and the plenitude of cognitive contents, to shine 
through. 55 In this common nexus of representations and things there is no space 
and no need for a transcendental subject, ergo Eliot's relevant demand for 
impersonality. Eliot's "extinction of personality" was a step strategically 
54 I am not at all convinced by Eliot's assertions that "musical" can be applied to rhythm and 
meaning, too. The aesthetic valorisation of the "musical pattern of the secondary meanings of the 
word" is totally arbitrary. As usual, the aesthetic criteria behind the evaluation process are missing 
("The Music of Poetry," in Selected Prose, 113 passim). 
55 Foucault has arraigned the gestural character of the whole endeavour apropos of the 
classical episteme: "The figures through which discourse passes act as a deterrent to the name, 
which then arrives at the last moment to fulfill and abolish them. The name is the end of 
discourse. And possibly all Classical literature resides in this space, in this striving to reach a 
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prerequisite to the individual's unconditional surrender to the moral, political and 
cultural hegemony, the way he understood it (Eurocentric, Latin, Christian, 
\ 
monarchic). The doctrinal tone throughout many of the essays emanates from the 
strict adherence to these underlying fundaments and, I surmise, from the need to 
shield them from the devastating impact of the negative i1?:sights that the poetry 
compels. These insights concern the necessarily fragmented nature of historical 
trajectories and the impossibility of upholding essentialist anchoring concerning 
--
human experience. Whence the perpetual re-elaborations of the notion of 
impersonality. In "Yeats," he writes: "The second impersonality is that of the poet 
who, out of intense and personal experience, is able to express a general truth; 
retaining all the particularity of his experience, to make of it a general symbol."s6 
De-personalisation is continually modified, if not undone altogether, so that the 
moral, aesthetic and political injunctions can materialise through penetrating a 
minimally sustained human vessel.S7 
name that remains always formidable because it exhausts, and thereby kills, the possibility of 
sreech" (Foucault, The Order o/Things, 117-8). 
5 Eliot, "Yeats," 251; emphasis added . 
. 57 The toning down of de-personalisation is brought into sharper relief when contextualised 
within the perpetual affirmations of universal moral and emotive fundaments in accordance with 
an essentialist logic. Personal emotions transcribe global moral imperatives: "What may be 
considered corrupt or decadent in the morals of Massinger is not an alteration or diminution in 
morals; it is simply the disappearance of all the personal and real emotions which this morality 
supported and into which it introduced a kind of order. As soon as the emotions disappear the 
morality which ordered it [sic] appears hideous" ("Philip Massinger," 159). Contrary to this logic, 
Baudelaire exposed the political and contingent underpinnings of morality and revealed the social 
dimensions of moral guilt. See "A. une mendiante rousse [To a redheaded beggar girl]" (OC I: 83-
5) for a moving self-accusation of the narrator and his moral and aesthetic exoneration of the 
woman who is forced to beg and probably prostitute herself. In "Je n'ai pas pour ma1tresse" (OC I: 
203) the narrator exonerates the prostitute-addressee and declares himself to be one more market 
commodity: "I who sell my thought and would be an author" (cited in Benjamin, "Konvolut J: 
Baudelaire," 266). Moral injunctions in Baudelaire's poetry are visibly contingent upon social 
relations of asymmetry and in no way translate or reflect universal constants. Eliot's levelling 
down of the political (and ultimately historical) dimension into a mundane supplement of 
essentialist cores is obvious in passages such as the following: "The Elizabethan morality 
... provided a framework for emotions to which all classes could respond, and it hindered no 
feeling. It was not hypocritical and it did not suppress" (Eliot, "Philip Massinger," 159). In 
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Eliot's foundationalism adheres to a Classical conception of the sign that 
asserts a structurality of "[d]ifference starting from the secretly varied monotony 
·r 
.\ 
of the Like.,,58 It climaxes in the notion of the still centre in the Four Quartets.59 
The double bind of transcendental fundaments· and mundane experience leaves no 
space for language, is not one of language itself. It is supposed to lead to the 
mutual recognition of entities partaking of the same essence, the recognition of 
self by self. An essential synchrony is reputedly created thus in which beings co-
share in essence and which somehow manages to contain a compatible form of 
1 1· 60 tempora rea tty. 
In counterpoint to the theory of language and experience that is overtly or 
negatively present in the essays, it is essential to return to the poetry and 
encounter the bracketing of the essays' over-arching moral and aesthetic 
conceptual paradigms. The poetic oeuvre, from the Prufrock poems to the Waste 
Land and even further to the Four Quartets (in a more covert form, however), has 
integrated the possibility of the undoing of this ontology of essence in the form of 
a modem anti-ontology devoid of metaphysics. I consider it significant that the 
examined texts elaborate the space/time plexus in proximity to the cultural 
identity/difference network in a fashion that reveals the intricacy of this relation. 
The "distance creating a vacuum within the Same,,61 fissures the integrity of the 
Prufrockian characters making it impossible for them to rest assured in any form 
defiance of any notion of historical groundings of experience, Eliot is positive about the existence 
of "universal emotion[s]" (Eliot, "In Memoriam," in Selected Prose, 243). 
58 Foucault, The Order o/Things, 339. 
59 See "The Four Quartets," 194: "Only by the form, the pattern, I Can words or music reach 
I The stillness, as a Chinese jar still I Moves perpetually in its stillness." 
60 "And all is always now," ("The Four Quartets," 194). 
61 Foucault, The Order of Things, 340. 
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of self-composure. As for the Waste Land subjects, the void of essence within 
ontic identity is experienced as perpetual mutation of identity/ies. The bisexual 
'I 
,\ 
Tiresias is a good example of this. No stable subjectivity can be solidified under 
these conditions. The double bind is now one·of language and desire operating in 
a purely asymptotic mode vis-a-vis their referents. .. Eliot's poetic work 
accommodates both binds and allows for the understanding of their antagonism 
and complementarity. 
The temporal modalities in The Waste Land are ones of prefiguration and a 
perpetually frustrated announcement of some hidden core of meaning to be 
excavated in the process. The temporal gap between the anticipation and the 
event-cum-epiphany is constitutive of the experience of always receding essences. 
What this temporal chiasmus structures is an experience of unreason that renders 
the imperative to relate the narrators' experiential patterns in terms of a sequential 
history of events impossible. As in the case of "Prufrock," experience cannot 
inhabit its proper meaning-giving conceptual and temporal site. Tiresias and 
Prufrock cannot reconstitute the essential character of their experience but 
oscillate in the grips of a bind that is now that of a future-anterior truth and 
absolute void of essence. Memory storage hinges on a virtual archiving of 
experiential contents in the case of the former character, and a mnemonic 
synchrony of mutually reverberating cores in the case of the latter. It is telling 
that Prufrock teases apart the mnemonic threads of a life that is experienced in 
terms of a saturation of experience ("For I have known them all already, known 
them all- / Have known the evenings, mornings, afternoons, / I have measured out 
my life with coffee spoons; / I know the voices dying with a dying fall") and 
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convalescence. The latter, however, amounts to resigning to annihilation ("We 
have lingered in the chambers of the sea / By sea-girls wreathed with seaweed re~ 
'\ 
and brown / Till human voices wake us, and we drown"). The exit from auto-
affection is for Prufrock the moment of death. In the following chapter I engage 
the particular character that self-presence assumes and the way the site of this 
relation to the self is undercut by the constitutively graphematic nature of the 
event of immanent communication. I then explore the counter-mythic dimensions 
of The Waste Land and its undermining of any notion of primordial experience 
and its commensurate subjectivity. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
FROM MYTH TO HISTORY: THE WASTE LAND 
"\ 
Prufrock: The voice that speaks silence! 
Inwardness is the historical prison of 
primordial human nature. 
Adorno, Kierkergaard 
"Prufrock" engages the illusional attempt to create a space of interiority 
that will guarantee cognitive plenitude and mitigate the dispersal of essence 
caused by temporality and the sort of experience that penetrates the subject as 
aleatory recurrence of random events. However, the peculiar tension exhibited in 
the text between a pathic affirmation of interiority based on self-affection and a 
cynical resignation to randoflm~ess signals the distance between what is posited 
as an effect of desire and its actual potentiation, as much as the textual subject's 
negative awareness of this distance. I contend that the text impels one to discern 
the difference inscribed within, and separating, the semiotic and conceptual 
moments which integrally underwrites the semblance of self-presence and serves 
as the originary substratum of auto-affection. The tension between blindness to 
the random and differential character of experience and a near-euphoric 
abandonment to it is textually integrated, whence the occasional intensity of an 
expressivist pathos and its subsequent cancelling out. 
In Lacanian terms, "Prufrock" exemplifies the demand for the Real, a 
demand doomed from the outset to yield to the Imaginary dimension. Maud 
The allusion is to the chapter "La Voix qui garde Ie silence" in Derrida, La Voix et Ie 
phenomene, 78-97. 
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Ellmann writes with respect to the protagonist's narcissistic postures that "while 
Narcissus sees himself and makes himself his object, Prufrock sees himself being 
\ 
seen, while 'The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase' fix the self in language 
and space, estranging it to two exteriorities: and Prufrock owes his selfhood to the 
other ... ,,2 In the light of Lacan's configuration of psychoses, it is clear that the 
narrator sees himself as an object among others. 
They will say: 'How his hair is growing thin' ... 
They will say: 'But how his legs and arms are thin' 
In failing to accede to the Real, for him reality has turned into image 
empathetically filtered through the consciousness of others. In Lacanian terms, he 
"captures this object [of desire] in an elaborate intrigue and his ego is in the third 
party by whose mediation the subject enjoys that object in which his question is 
embodied." For Prufrock, as for the hysterical subject in general, "the technical 
term 'acting out' takes on its literal meaning since he is acting outside himself. ,,3 
Throughout, he indulges in a "disintegrative rhetoric,,4punctuated by the logic of 
an abortive synecdoche. The bodies of others are perceived as a concatenation of 
fragmented limbs ["And I have known the eyes already, known them all--/ And I 
have known the arms already .. .1 Arms that are braceleted and white and bare .. .1 
Arms that lie along a table, or wrap around a shawl"]. The fragmentation to 
which the perceptual referents have succumbed is indicative of a wider disarray of 
. perception not dissimilar to the one encountered in the poetry of Baudelaire. In 
2 
3 
Maud Ellman, The Poetics of Impersonality (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1987),69. 
Lacan, "Function and field of speech and language," 89-90. 
4 Maud Ellman, "Impersonality in the Poetry and Criticism of T. S. Eliot" (phD Diss., 
Bodleian Library; Oxford: University of Oxford, 1982), ch.1. 
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both cases, the passage from perception to cognitive appropriation cannot be 
brought to fulfilment. The withering of experience to which the narrator testifies 
\ 
is non-recuperable since it is not the effect of the loss of something once fully 
owned. Prufrock has had reality slip right past him in the mode of psychotic 
denial. The fragments he obsessively belabours cannot be awarded the cognitive 
closure necessary for the processing of reality. The crooning tone behind his 
utterances stems from his inability to make the scattered fragments of experience 
coalesce into an organon of thought. There is no representational import behind 
the encounter of scenes that are in isolation from explanatory frameworks. 
Prufrock's screening of impressions does not lead to their matching up with 
previous ones and therefore they cannot be synthesised into a cognitive ensemble. 
Prufrock's dispossession of identity elicits the unsettling realisation that his 
being has disproportionately inhabited the imaginary dimension, a fact that 
necessarily impacts on cognitive equilibrium. Lacan writes apropos of the 
subject's empty speech that " ... in this labour which he undertakes to reconstruct 
for another, [to reconstruct a possession of being, a coherent subjectivity] he 
rediscovers the fundamental alienation that made him construct it like another, 
and which has always destined it to be taken from him by another. ,,5 The case here 
is that "Prufrock" compels the understanding of the phantasmatic constitution of 
subjective identity by verbally extemalising the inner frustration of self-owning. 
The narrator's desire is deflected rather than concentrated into simulacra of human 
presences ["In the room the women come and go / Talking of Michelangelo"]. 
The others do not reflect his image back to him but refract it in such a way that the 
s Lacan, "Function and field of speech and language," 42. 
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mediation of the third party requisite to the stabilisation of self-composure turns 
into a stumbling block. There is no adequate reply to his demand for recognition .. 
\ 
-
He objectifies himself by displaying himself before a refractive socia~ mirror 
barring access to the fulfilment of his desire and self-recognition. It is the 
jouissance of the other that internally imperils the constitution of a pacifying self-
image.6 
J. Hillis Miller reads the Prufrockian predicament in the context of what he 
conceives as spatialisation of time evident throughout the text? Temporality, 
according to his reading, is conspicuously absent, and thematised as such. Bereft 
of it, Prufrock employs two methods in order to attain the hypostasis of a proper 
subject: dedoublement de soi [doubling of the self] and self-dramatisation. In 
exercising the first, he deploys the stratagem of entering a certain mentality while 
remaining critical of it. 8 The same experience seems to be regarded 
simultaneously from two differing angles. ,,9 I am sceptical of Hillis Miller's 
contentions, or rather of his ultimate aim in diagnosing the dissolution of the 
temporal realm in this work. Implying that temporality suffices to restore identity 
or a minimal sense of selfhood must be premised on a linear restorative version of 
temporality that, I have argued throughout, is the effect of a cover up of diacritical 
difference. There is a phenomenological streak here and an insistence on 




See Lacan, "Function and field of speech and language," 42. 
See J. Hillis Miller, Poets of Reality (Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 1966), 
8 See G. M. Turnell, "Introduction to the Study of Tristan Corbiere," Criterion XV (1935-
36): 397, for an analogous strategy in Tristan Corbiere. 
9 Characteristically, Eliot infantilises the unsettling implications of this perspectival duality 
upon any notion of stable subjectivity by treating it as an effect of the need "to escape reality" and 
one's moral responsibilities. See T. S. Eliot, "Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca," in 
Selected Essays (London: Faber, 1972), 130. 
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subjectivity are countered here along with the immanent essence to which they 
must be collateral. It is· in this respect tha~ I believe the text parts from 
.\ 
phenomenological accounts of temporality that would purport to restitute selfbood 
as identity unfolding in homogeneous time. This configuration of temporality has 
always attempted to constrain differentiality within the interstices of immanent 
self-presence. 
Another facet of Prufrock's monologue is a defensive conflict within 
sexuality. It cannot be isolated from the broader context of the subject's relation 
to the outside world, especially as it is organised around the axis of rejection of an 
idea from consciousness, or the projection of self-reproach on to external reality 
("And I am formulated, sprawling on a pin, / When I am pinned and wriggling on 
the wall, ... "). The text is suffused with impotence-phobia and a latent aversion to 
the feminine realm that indicate a wider social performance anxiety and concern 
over social integration. Prufrock seems to articulate the rupture between ego and 
reality in a most characteristic way in the autistic withdrawal accompanying an 
etherised relaxation of consciousness. The sex phobia permeating the text along 
with its correlative subtle misogynistic aura ("[T]he women come and go / 
Talking of Michelangelo") is a direct effect of the frustration of sexual orientation 
entailed upon the dissolution of sedimented identity. Finally, he experiences the 
non-coalescence of intention and expression in the same way as the non-
commensurability of his desire and its human targets, as the ultimate affliction. 
The latter is ultimately translated into semantic/cognitive terms: lilt is impossible 
to say just what I mean!" A cleavage between cognition and enunctative 
performance is articulated here, the impossibility of acceding to one's own history 
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not because of a personal handicap, but because of the objective, universal, and 
inevitable opening on to the exteriority of language, which entails irreversible 
\ 
alienation and dissolution of subjectivity. to 
The non-commensurability of discourse and phenomenal cognition that 
clots the aesthetic interlocking of experience and language is the underlying 
concern of the poem. Prufrock's soliloquy falls under the rubric of auto-affection 
that purports to accrue to non-temporal immanent sense. However, the interiority 
of his s' entendre-parler [hear-oneself-speak]' is radically contradicted by the 
semiotic and temporal nature of all signification processes. The sheer 
impossibility of teasing out the temporal dimension from the interiorised stringing 
out of supposedly originary impressions must be emphatically abstracted. The 
unhindered unfolding of duration would ideally allow for differentiality within the 
interstices of transcendental self-presence, self-identity. Yet, Prufrock wakes up to 
the reality of deferred sense and drowns. The I that purported to affirm plentiful 
sense experiences immersion into difference-producing discourse as annihilation. 
Derrida highlights the abortive character of immutable, non-temporal and un-
historical sense production through phenomenological self-consciousness the 
following way: "Auto-affection is not a modality of experience characterising a 
state that would already be self-identical (autos). It produces the same as relation 
to the self inside the Difference to oneself, the same as non-identicaL ... What 
makes the originality of discourse [parole] is that its substance is purely temporal. 
to See Derrida, "Force and Signification," n. 23, 303: "Because to speak is to know that 
thought must become alien to its self in order to be pronounced and to appear. It wishes, then, to 
take itself back by offering itself. This is why one senses the gesture of withdrawal, of retaking 
possession of the exhaled word, beneath the language of the authentic writer." 
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This temporality does not string out a sense that would be non-temporal. Sense, 
before the stage of its expression, is integrally temporal" (92-3). 11 
., 
.\ 
With Derrida's insights framing my understanding of the examined texts, I 
discern in the poetry up to The Waste Land the textual inscription of the 
contradictory nature of the demand for sense afflatus in "detachment from the 
agency of language. Experiencing language as parasitical upon reality ultimately 
exacerbates the withering of cognitive certainties and leads to experience 
devolving to an interminable pursuit of what supposedly falls outside its 
jurisdiction. The drive for transcendence that the hollow men and the Prufrockian 
characters in general exemplify is a negative indicator of the subjects' inability to 
cope with a subliminally felt sense of irretrievable loss and finitude at the core of 
their experience. The tensional dialectic of negative insight into, and blindness to, 
the constitutive absence of immutable essence and sense within experience 
subtends Baudelaire and Eliot's texts and explains their unappeasable melancholia. 
In the Hollow Men the trace through which one is called upon to conceive 
of the living present is but the one left behind by the subject's struggle with 
language mediation. The mediating agency of the signifier underwrites the 
struggle with the "Shadow" which is conducted by the narrator as if it were an 
exorcism, through psychotic invocations and a self-corrosive melancholia that is a 
negative pointer to the dissolution of his subjectivity. This dissolution relates to 
the temporality which Prufrock experiences as a factor that disturbs mental 
stability and fosters ambivalence: "Do I dare disturb the universe? / In a minute 
11 See also Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice, 194-5: "The present as the recurrence of difference, as repetition giving voice to 
difference, affirms at once the totality of chance.... If being always declares itself in the same 
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there is time I For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse." Despite 
his effort to conciliate subjective interiority with some form of temporality, he 
"\ 
fail~ to sense one commensurate with his imperilled inwardness. I2 Within this 
realm the impossibility of cementing subjectivity in absolute, constitutive terms is 
. l' f 13 put Into re Ie . 
The transitivity latent in the "Hollow Men" is not dissimilar to the one 
encountered in "Prufrock." It takes the removal of successive layers of self-
affectivityI4to give in to the agency of language even if experienced as the 
annihilation of the self. Prufrock finally wakes from the lethargy of self-enclosure 
and immanent sense only to hear human voices calling him to the world of 
language and history. He wakes and submits to death. 
I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each. 
I do not think that they will sing to me. 
I have seen them riding seaward on the waves 
Combing the white hair of the waves blown back 
way, it is not because being is one, but because the totality of chance is affirmed in the single dice 
throw of the present." 
12 Both concerning Eliot and Baudelaire's protagonists, Derrida's words are pertinent: "To 
" hear-oneself-speak is not the interiority of an inside enclosed within itself, it is the irreducible 
opening within the interior space [dedans], the eye and the world inside discourse [parole]. The 
rhenomenological reduction is a scene" (La Vou et Ie phenomene, 96). . 
3 Derrida's critique of the Husserlian economies of SUbjectivity helps understand the 
internally fallacious nature of the conceptual categories upon which the defensive subjectivity 
belaboured by Eliot's soliloquising subjects devolves: "It is not accidental that he [Husserl] 
construes this unnameable as 'absolute subjectivity,' that is, as a being thought on the basis of 
presence as substance, ousia, upokeimenon: self-identical being which translates substance into 
subject .... What is unnameable according to Husserl is only the "absolute properties" of this 
subject that is therefore configured in accordance with the classical metaphysical scheme that 
distinguishes substance (present being) from its attributes .... There is no constitutive SUbjectivity. 
We must deconstruct to the point of constitution" (La vou et Ie phenomene, 96). 
14 Derrida undoes the metaphysical layering upon which self-affectivity depends: "If 
indication does not add itself to expression, which in its turn is not added to [prelinguistic] sense, 
one can speak in this case of an originary 'supplement': their addition comes to fill up a 
fundamental lack, a lack of self-presence which is originary" (La Vou et Ie phenomene, 97). 
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When the wind blows the water white and black. 
We have lingered in the chambers of the sea 
By sea-girls wreathed with seaweed red and brown 
Till human voices wake us and we drown. IS 
Eliot, Collected Poems, 17. 
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The Waste Land: primordial nature and the asubjectivity of myth 
[T]he myth is not presented for its own sake, but as a vehicle for 
universal meaning. \ .. 
T. S. Eliot, "Yeats" 
As long as there is still one beggar around, there will still be 
myth. 
Benjamin, "Konvolut K" 
In the case of The Waste Land there has been an unusual critical consensus 
concerning the textual cathexis on a static model of experience and history, the 
preponderance of spatial models, and "an attachment to the mythopoetic 
dimension. All these are pointers to the desire for self-grounding and 
hypostatisation of essence. A repetition compulsion serves as the organising 
principle behind the discursive kernels. It aims at the mastery of originary 
absence through the lumping together of my themes and fragments of historical 
reality deracinated from wider explanatory cultural frameworks. The discursive 
acting out of what is experienced as primary fragmentation of the organic realm 
(as either cultural tradition or history) can only aim at the interlocking of non-
commensurate compounds which must be coerced into forming historically 
meaningful copulas or organically linked series. However, the desired fusion of 
the fragments into a coherent whole is never attained. The primordial and ever-
receding experience to which the narratives allude, the experience insinuated in 
terms of originary trauma, is never affixed or recalled as a prototype.16 Even in 
16 An unattainable primal scene lurks beneath the four sections of the poem. In "The Burial 
of the Dead," and behind the kaleidoscopic merging of various narratival voices from "Marie" 
going down on a sled feeling frightened to a masculine voice promising to show (her?) "fear in a 
handful of dust" to the "hyacinth girl," and finally to the narrator addressing "Stetson," the 
companion in a primeval archaic, yet historically recognisable, experience of war, the underlying 
stress is on staving off a primordial danger that is formally indistinct yet can hit the subject at any 
time. The attitude throughout betrays the attempt to preempt the core of traumatic event or work 
through it by integrating it into a mnemonic and/or cultural series once it has settled in. In "The 
Fire Sermon" Tiresias the blind seer attempts to empathetically resume the essence of history and 
human experience within him in the form of a perennial catastrophe that keeps recurring in every 
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the earlier Sweeney poems trauma and origin could not be localised as 
recognisable empirical data. Likewise, within the narratival economy of the 
- . 
Waste Land the ancient and modem predicaments are juxtaposed in a way that 
makes impossible their ranking in terms of importance. Agamemnon's murder is 
seen to be commensurate with modem afflictions,17 Tiresias is witness to a 
putatively essential scene perpetually reenacted throughout history, and all are 
reciprocally defined in a state of internal commutation. 
The compulsive need to resume and reenact an archetypal traumatic 
experience has attained obsessional intensity. The allusions to Hellenic tragedy 
and history, the Upanishads and the Grail myth, point to a my tho-poetic logic that 
fails to discriminate between history and myth. I consider the philological aspect 
of the mythical frameworks to be of no consequence to this discussion. What is 
significant, however, is that the interplay of all relevant poles accrues to a sense of 
past conflict. Its core is alien to the subject. It is imperative that the impossibility 
for the subject to accede to his/her own history in terms of a linear conceptual and 
mnemonic annexation180f a primary trauma or primal scene be linked with the 
impossibility of acceding to the historical and the temporal dimensions regarded 
as genesis spontanea of originary impressions (the phenomenological angle) or an 
essentially defined dialectical synthesis of event-clusters (the historicist one).19 
age and surfaces via sexual morbidity and moral deprivation, from the mechanical and uninspired 
copulation of the female typist with the "young man carbuncular" to the rape in Margate Sands 
which is suffered with a resignation that points to the bankruptcy of moral shields. The same can 
more or less be shown concerning the other two sections. 
17 See "Sweeney Among the Nightingales," in Eliot, Collected Poems, 60. 
18 Memory does not seem to be an explicit concern of the poem. Where it is addressed, 
however, it is linked with the exacerbation of the subject's capacity to relate to experience in terms 
other than perpetual metamorphoses of givens: "'Do you know nothing? Do you see nothing? Do 
you remember I Nothing? I I remember I Those are pearls that were his eyes" ("The Waste Land," 
67). In this case the coherence secured whenever a response is formulated is purely citational. 
19 See Derrida, La Voix et Ie phenomene, 93. 
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The text allows for the possibility that history itself must be construed on the basis 
of dif!erance2oand exposes the mythic character of the impenetrable prim~l 
\ 
scene21 around which the fragmented narratives orbit. The rhetorical arrangement 
of The Waste Land organises the acting out of the pathogenic trauma or conflict in 
an attempt at imbuing it with meaning. The struggle also aims at levelling the 
contradictions immanent in an agon which is fought over the viability of the 
organic dimension itself. However, instead of the reunification of the fractional 
gi vens, what is effected is a fragmentation to the second degree. All the subjects 
are left with is series of recurring hallucinatory sensations and symbols of illness, 
sexual and natural sterility. 
Eliot's erection of such a mythopoetic scaffold occurred in the context of 
an intense interest in a by now hopelessly depassee anthropology.22 In the wake of 
structural anthropology we are now able to discern in the mythical taxonomies an 
acentric character making it impossible to decode them as synecdochic 
manifestations of a cognitively decipherable core. The formal morphologisations 
of the mythical parameter do not arrest diacritical force or secure a plenitude of 
presence. The logic governing the my tho-morphemes . is relational, self-
referential, and thoroughly semiotic. It is a logic that fashions myth as a series of 
surface-nexuses, which, however, resist the organicist 
20 Differance in the sense of the deferral of the ultimate cognitive or hermeneutic closure 
that will signal the satisfaction of understanding; also, in the sense of the difference between the 
force of the event and its signification in the broader context of testimonial un-accountability. 
21 I use this Freudian term in a "de-sexualised" sense. Its intriguing aspect emanates from 
the ambiguity surrounding its factual verifiability or intrinsic facti city. See Laplanche and 
Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, 335-6: "it is only through a deferred action 
(nachtriiglich) that it is grasped and interpreted by the child .... [1]t constitutes a happening which 
may be of the order of myth but which is already given prior to any meaning which is attributed to 
it after the fact." 
22 lam referring to James Frazer's The Golden Bough (London: Macmillan, 1924). 
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coerciveness of cognition or the regression of signification into an attribute of 
understanding. Claude Levi-Strauss' views critically address all notions of a pure 
.\ 
archaic origin uncorrupted by temporality and differance. These notions are 
invalidated by the tropological organisation of the examined text. The agony of 
the narratival protagonists transcribes the impossibility· of absolute organic 
embedment and their abandonment to the exteriority of the signifier at the very 
moment of speech and conceptual reasoning. From its inception thought is given 
over to alterity whereas the textual subjects are alienated from their own meaning-
giving environment despite their introspective and empathetic efforts to ascribe 
meaning to an inchoate collection of drives. Observing the language emitted by 
the textual narrators brings one close to the phenomenology of the psychoses. 
What is inculcated in the interruptions of their discursive flow is the possibility 
not of an expressivist entropy but a total absence of sense. 
The broken fingernails of dirty hands 
My people humble people who expect 
Nothing.' 
la la 
To Carthage then I came 
Burning burning burning burning 
o Lord Thou pluckest me out 
o Lord Thou pluckest 
burning 
This discursive segmentation does not eventually coalesce into stable 
associative structurality, as an organicist reading would have us believe, and is not 
a momentary aberration. Lacan has shed light upon this phenomenon in a way 
that applies not only to the psychotic subject but also elucidates a broader 
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predicament of/within language: "Here we go to the heart of the function of the 
sentence in itself, insofar as it does not necessarily carry its meaning with it. I am 
\ 
thinking of this phenomenon of sentences that emerge in his a~bje~tivity as 
interrupted, leaving the sense in suspense .... The interruption evokes a fall 
which, while it may be indeterminate over a wide range, cannot be just any old 
one.,,23 
I cannot engage the totality of Lacan's insights here but only point to the 
relevance of the inherently asymptotic relation of utterance and meaning, of 
indication and expression, of intention and signification, enhanced where the 
negotiation between self and reality falters. To a certain degree, discursive 
segmentation, and all it entails, is not the fate of the delusional or paranoid only. 
What I wish to emphasise through these detours into the analytical terrain is the 
impossibility of acceding to the historical dimension both in the personal sense 
and also in terms of the grand linear, extrinsic, and all-engulfing detour of past 
and present reality. This impossibility does not emanate from a pathological state. 
It is the effect of the mediatory and materialist intervention of language and the 
internal distance between its constative and performative axes·. It is put into relief 
through the self-consciously figural dimension of the text. I do not wish to 
replicate the normalising patterns of a certain branch of psychoanalysis whose 
ultimate aim is the fabrication of a sense of self and assimilable experience here. 
23 Jacques Lacan, The Psychoses (London: Routledge, 1993), 100, apropos of Schreber's 
case; emphasis added. As for the asubjective nature of desire and the call for the other, see 
Jacques Lacan, The Language of the Self: The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis, trans. 
Anthony Wilden (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 190-91. Wilden 
writes: "The absolute character of the subject's desire matches his original status as an 'absolute 
subject.' But the absolute subject is an inexpressible, asubjective entity, since the absolute subject 
is a contradiction in terms, whether it be the primordial monad or the goal of the Hegelian 
Phenomenology." 
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Because of this, I have chosen to selectively deploy Jacques Lacan's 
metapsychological contentions. Ultimately, .\whether as introjected mnemic 
symbols or historiographical referents, the historical segments cannot .coalesce 
into a coherent and cognitively decoded organism. The texts narrate their 
constitutive difficulty in inhabiting the concept that they promise. 
The giving oneself over to alterity voiced by Prufrock ["I shall wear white 
flannel trousers, and walk upon the beach. / I have heard the mermaids singing, 
each to each"] is not foreign to the Waste Land subjects. Its expression does not 
lead to a binding of the mythical morphemes into historical predicates, or to the 
creation of genuinely organic syntagmata. Myths are in the final analysis 
anonymous, and the absence of their centre "is here the absence of a subject and 
the absence of an author.,,24 The textual speakers' mode of re-integrating their 
personal histories into the objective history that engulfs them turns out to be self-
destructive. The Waste Land articulates a discourse that is mythopoetic itself and 
does not thus evade the aporias emanating from the fact. 
The theme of finitude penetrates the textual series either in the form of an 
anthropological analytic of death or as the overwhelming of the subject by time 
and loss. To the extent that the text shares in the modem experience, its analytic 
of finitude is susceptible of the deracination of positive contents caused by the 
emergence of language as a force that disturbs analogical representation. Eliot's 
work up to The Waste Land conceives of finitude in a way that discreetly 
addresses the erosion of essential foundations and the conditioning of man by 
language. A modem anti-ontology shapes up in his poetry that accommo~ates an 
24 Lacan, The Psychoses, 287. 
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analytic of non-sublimated death with the sensuousness of language. It reveals 
the linguistic dimension to be in a condition of exogeneity and excess with regard 
\ 
to the conceptual assimilation of reality. This excess is testified to by d~scursive 
repetitions and circumlocutionary instances behind which crystallises the logic of 
a perpetual elaboration of an experientially void space. The possibility of 
construing the analytic of death in language terms, as pure literalness, as the 
destruction of any symbolic, metaphoric p~otential that could bind the sphere of 
materiality with that of transcendence, becomes a palpable option. This anti-
ontology undercuts a text such as Ash-Wednesday too, heavy though it may be 
with religiosity. In the monotonous and obsessive periodicity of its component 
units it attains to the effect of a de-semanticised algorithm. The antagonism 
between performance and constatation inherent in language is highlighted in this 
text that has collapsed religious invocation to senseless discursive pattern. 
Equally, the dialectical interfusion of the fire and the rose of the Four Quartets, 
i.e., the transcendental and material dimensions, cannot conceal the oxymoronic 
character of a union which can only be attempted at the cost of a systematic 
forgetting (of difference) and a pervasive denial (of the temporal annihilation of 
essence).25 
Identity is elaborated as a datum that is an effect of discursive iterability 
and the periodic recurrence of anterior verbal motifs. Neither the linear time of 
25 See the last lines of the "Four Quartets," Collected Poems, 222-23. The climactic 
moment when the "fire" and the "rose" prove to be of one essence is supposed to perfect the 
dialectic of materiality and transcendence. History is affirmed on the surface while being 
substantially voided in this dialectic whose scales incline to the latter pole. From "History is now 
and England" to "the crowned knot of fire," the trajectory leads from the pragmatics of concrete 
social action to the de-materialised unhistorical and transcendental essence undergirding, and 
materialising in, history. 
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Classical experience nor Bergsonian duree are relevant in supporting the textual 
discursive identities. The "mixing of memory, and desire" from the inceptive 
moment of the diegesis renders impossible the minimal closure of identity options 
requisite to the grasping of stable subjectivity patterns. The narratival voices slide 
into one another in a melange that frustrates any potential personological 
demarcations. What is pertinent to my argument is that within the Eliotic scene 
what is re-enacted is the impossibility of at!aining either to a harmony of essences 
or a historicity proper to man wherein intention can ideally coalesce with 
signification, indication can be attuned to the exigencies of expression, and 
expression can add itself to pre-linguistic sense. The text elicits the realisation 
that it is self-undermining to graft the notion of identity onto self-affectivity 
without expecting to be necessarily led to the agency of the signifier-trace and the 
temporal character of sense. As I have shown through recourse to Jacques 
Derrida's La Voix et le phenomene, self-affectivity and subjectivity-
aggrandisement are deconstructible even at the level of constitution. 
The disempowerment of time and history observable in The Waste Land is 
not simply the negative effect of an underlying scepticism towards the historical 
integration of contents. It can also be seen as part of a defensive attempt at 
historical resumption through the intensification of presence and the arrestation of 
temporal and experiential fluidity. The Eliotic subject desires the reactivation of a 
certain version of history but in such a way as to secure the ratcheting up of 
historical moments into a sense-imposing vault ["There I saw one I knew, and 
stopped him, crying: 'Stetson! / 'You who were with me in the ~hips at 
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Mylae!,,].26 History is here grasped as "the movement of a resumption of history, 
as a detour between two presences.,,27 I argue \ that the compulsive character of 
this resumption and the melancholia emitte.d by the narrator(s), point to the 
wilfulness behind the endeavour. These fragments countenance the positing 
power of language and the performative erasure of this power through the 
mechanism of temporal elasticity and figural displacements. The temporal 
displacement allowing for the movement from the narratival present to ancient 
Greece is the correlative of tropological trajectories based on the contiguity of 
signifiers, and not sense associations, like that of metonymy. Both this positing 
and its erasure can be seen to respond to the radically aleatory positionality of the 
historical ensembles, which subsequently yields to the imbrications of 
essentialism. Figural errancy is geared towards holistic symbolicity. The Waste 
Land can be read as the working through of the metamorphosis of discursive 
events into historical and aesthetic monuments. 
Paul de Man apropos of Shelley's The Triumph of Life writes of the power 
of a self-threatening knowledge included therein and stated negatively. A certain 
negative assurance is allegorised raising thus the suspicion that "the negation is a 
Vemeinung, an intended exorcism.,,28 I argue that, in a compatible manner, the 
internal mode of development of The Waste Land revolves around the overcoming 
26 History for Eliot has throughout been a matter of a simultaneous order, of an essential 
infrastructure monitoring human experience: "This historical sense, which is a sense of the 
timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and the temporal together, is what makes a 
writer traditional" ("Tradition and the Individual Talent," 38). 
27 Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play," in Writing and Difference, 291. 
28 De Man, "Shelley Disfigured," in The Rhetoric of Romanticism, 122. This essay brings 
to the fore the examined texts' self-sufficiency, in the sense that the texts themselves have always 
already thematically embedded the possibility of their own deconstruction. In a way, the texts 
have already anticipated, and resisted, the imposition of meaning inflicted on them by all 
hermeneuti'c praxes. 
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of catastrophe through the homeopathic reenactment of its crisis and the re-
figuration of its relational components. At the ~ame time, the failure to exorcise 
the threat "becomes precisely the challenge !o understanding that always again 
demands to be read. And to read is to understand, to question, to know, to forget, 
to erase, to deface, to repeat. ,,29 De Man relates all this to rh~torical prosopopoeia,· 
the trope by which the dead assume a face and voice only to tell the allegory of 
their demise. What is revealed, though, behind apostrophising the dead, behind 
the creation of simulacra of presence, is the impossibility of essentialising what is 
merely the effect of rhetorical play. In Derrida's words, "Being must be 
conceived as presence or absence on the basis of the possibility of play and not 
the other way around.,,3o If the periodicity of the self-positional matrices creates 
the illusion of an empirically recognisable homogeneous datum, a reading that is 
absolutely disfiguring, disincamating of essence and in the final analysis 
absolutely literal, can be counterproposed vis-a-vis the representation of these 
"data of reality." The Waste Land lets emerge the possibility that no degree of 
phenomenal knowledge can stop the excess of the tropological dimension, of a 
generalised prosopopoeia. In a way, every human figure in the poem narrates the 
story of its demise, of its impossibility to accede to the order of presence, but most 
of all Tiresias, the leading narrator. This narration of an impossible presence is 
neither to be welcomed nor to be deplored.31 The corpse that Stetson planted in 
his garden, and must at all costs remain buried, undisturbed by the "sudden frost" 
29 De Man, "Shelley Disfigured," 122. 
30 Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play," 292. 
31 See de Man, "Shelley Disfigured," 120: "What would be naive is to believe that this 
strategy, which is not our strategy as subjects, since we are its products rather than its agent, can 
be a source of value and has to be celebrated or denounced accordingly." 
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and the nails of the "Dog, friend to man," just like the "dead man" that "mid that 
beauteous scene .. .1 Rose with his ghastly fa~e; ... " in Wordsworth's Prelude, 
allegorises the monumentalisation of the subject for the benefit of future 
archaeologists applying their hermeneutic force. 32 However, in de Man's words: 
"Reading as disfiguration [i.e., as resistance to the coercIon of the figure into 
acting as symbol], to the very extent that it resists historicism, turns out to be 
historically more reliable than the products of historical archaeology. To 
monumentalize this observation into a method of reading would be to regress from 
the rigor exhibited by Shelley which is exemplary precisely because it refuses to 
be generalised into a system. ,,33 Only the reading that embraces the figural 
dimension without reducing it to an effect of symbolic/metaphorical potential can 
escape the regression de Man writes about. From the disintegrative acting out of 
primal traumatic scenes bearing the name "Tiresias" to the encounter with the 
"dead master" in Little Gidding34the same inability to imbue perceptional givens 
with cognitive stability hampers the narrators. Whether imaginary, remembered, 
fabricated or not, the scenes slide into the abject field of prosopopoeia wherein 
rules the disfiguration of faces and bodies and the disowning of personal 
experience. As in Baudelaire, mechanical Gediichtnis overwhelms empathetic 
memory. The rigor exhibited by Eliot lies in his nowhere smoothing over the 




See "The Waste Land," in Collected Poems 1909-1962, 65. 
De Man, "Shelley Disfigured," 123. 
See "Four Quartets," in Collected Poems, 217. 
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and demand. The prosopopoeia has conspicuously failed to enhance the image of 
the dead.35 'r \ 
/ I was still the same, 
Knowing my self yet being someone other--
And he a face still forming; yet the words sufficed 
To compel the recognition they preceded. 
And so, compliant to the common wind, 
Too strange to each other for misunderstanding, 
In concord at this intersection time 
Of meeting nowhere, no before and after, 
We trod the pavement in a dead patrol. 
I said: 'The wonder that I feel is easy, 
Yet ease is the cause of wonder. Therefore sFeak: 
I may not comprehend, may not remember.,3 
35 See Maud Ellman, "Eliot's Abjection," in Abjection, Melancholia and Love: ed. John 
Fletcher and Andrew Benjamin (London; New York: Routledge, 1990), 197: "[The Waste Land's] 
ruling logic is 'prosopopeia', as Paul de Man has defined the trope .... The many ghosts that haunt 
The Waste Land ... bespeak the need to give a face and voice to death." 
36 Eliot, "Four Quartets," 217. 
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The Waste Land: History as Diacritics 
Politics attains primacy over [primal] history. The facts become 
something that just now first happened to us, first struck us; to establish 
them is the affair of memory. Indeed, awakening is the great exemplar of 
memory. 
Benjamin, "Konvolut K" 
In this section I will elaborate the dialectic of self.:enhancement and self-
negation in the broader framework of what the text presents as the collapse of 
historical experience. The text marks the culmination of the above dialectic and, 
most significantly, inscribes it within a mythicopoetic platform, the mythical deep 
structure underpinning the multi-prismatic textual surfaces. 
It is immediately apparent that both the thematised predicament and the 
response to it are determined in terms of myth (the Grail legend, the Attis myths, 
ancient Greek characters snatched out of context [Tiresias], etc). Most critics 
have highlighted the centrality of the mythical undercurrent without, however, 
accounting for the consequences that this configuration entails. Their views 
converge on the predominant role of the text's synchronic, inclusive spatial 
perspective that allegedly consists in the reflexive juxtaposition of past and 
present and the negation of temporality. This negation is usually approached as 
the effect of a hypertrophic subjective idealism in the sense of the capacity of the 
narratival subject to sediment an organic, synchronic realm in which historical 
kernels can co-exist in a state of mutual recognition and inclusiveness, and always 
in accordance with a logic that assigns primacy to spatial perception.37 I believe 
37 See J. Hillis Miller, Poets of Reality for the subjective idealism in question. Some of the 
most important studies on the poem which seem to be mutually attuned concerning spatial 
perception are the following: Helen Gardner, "The Dry Season: The Waste Land'," iti Bradley 
Gunter, ed., The Merrill Studies in "The Waste Land" (Columbus: Charles Merrill Publishing 
Company, 1971),67-78; Elizabeth Drew, T. S. Eliot: The Design of his Poetry (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswood, 1950); Cleanth Brooks, "'The Waste Land': Critique of the Myth," in Bradley 
Gunter, ed., op. cit., 37-66; Elizabeth Schneider, The Pattern in the Carpet (Berkeley: University 
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that such commentaries strain the issue. Instead, as William Spanos argues, 
"space, or rather the tradition of spatial perception embodied in the figure of 
Tiresias, is the problem rather than the solution of the poet-protagonist. ,,38 The 
mere affirmation of the strategic enhancement of the spatial dimension fails to 
adequately address textual niches of semantic unresolve .. 
The problematic aspect of these critics' contentions is their referring this 
augmented spatial dimension to an all-inclusive, integratist consciousness 
allegedly resuming all history in itself and effecting thus the consolidation of a 
simultaneous experiential curve. I argue for the legitimacy of approaching the 
text in terms of "simultaneous disorder,,39and the discrediting of the apparently 
desired voices of dead presences that the text compulsively conjures. The 
uninhibited expansion of these voices would ideally restore temporality, fertility, 
and duration. The underlying wistfulness is obvious from the very beginning 
judging from the impeded mode of narratival development with its frequent 
regressions and interpolations of micro-narratives, and the apathetic rhetoric of 
melancholy and sterility fissuring the demand until the very end. The all-
inclusive consciousness in question fails to harmonise its referents. 
. . 
Throughout, one encounters the eradication of identity-boundaries and 
distinctions of identity that separate subject from subject, selfhood from other. 
Eliot's notorious note for line 21840 undermines notions of self-recognition and 
of California Press, 1975); Grover Smith, T. S. Eliot's Poetry and Plays: A Study in Sources and 
Meaning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). 
38 William Spanos, "Repetition in The Waste Land': A Phenomenological De-~truction," 
Boundary 2, XII (spring 1979): 231. 
39 Ellman, "PhD Diss.," 198. 
40 Eliot, Collected Poems, 82: "Tiresias, although a mere spectator and not indeed a 
'character',.is yet the most important personage in the poem, uniting all the rest. Just as the one-
eyed merchant seller of currants, melts into the Phoenician Sailor, and the latter is not wholly 
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self-differentiation since it stresses the "osmosis of identities more than their 
reunion in a central consciousness.,,41 Tiresias, in his bisexuality, comes to 
encompass both sexes' experience, mix self and other, in an ambivalent merge of 
difference and hypothetically immutable essence.42 He can see nothing literally, 
and yet he is expected to disentangle the essential fibre of experience through 
recourse to in-sight, the ability to fore-suffer and re-enact what can only be a core 
of essence underlying all experience unaffected by history and time. I contend, 
however, that what transpires behind this essentialist scheme is not the re-
enactment of an essence-replete experiential matrix but the acting out of 
unassimilable trauma according to the logic of repetition-compulsion. 
At the violet hour, when the eyes and back 
Tum upward from the desk, when the human engine waits 
Like a taxi throbbing waiting, 
I Tiresias, though blind, throbbing between two lives, 
Old man with wrinkled female breasts, can see 
The typist home at teatime ... 
I Tiresias, old man with wrinkled dugs 
Perceived the scene, and foretold the rest--
I too awaited the expected guest. 
....................................... 
(And I Tiresias have foresuffered all 
Enacted on the same divan or bed; 
I who have sat by Thebes below the wall 
And walked among the lowest of the dead.)43 
Far from the recapitulation of experience within an integratist 
distinct from Ferdinand Prince of Naples, so all the women are one woman, and the two sexes 
meet in Tiresias. What Tiresias sees, in fact, is the substance of the poem." 
41 Ellman, The Poetics of Impersonality, 97. 
42 See Maud Ellman, "Eliot's Abjection," 181: "[T]he horror of The Waste Land lies in its 
osmoses, exhalations, and porosities, for this miasma is the symptom of disintegrating 
boundaries." 
43 Eliot, Collected Poems, 71-2. 
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consciousness, what is affirmed here is the constitutive blindness at the core of 
experience. The foresuffering in question is pure abstraction from the pragmatics 
of experience and reflects the desire to ·restitute sense and essence in an 
empathetic mode. Since the seer is blind the movement from the imperceptible 
scene to its conceptual belabouring is a rhetorical effect rather than a genuine 
transcendental crossover. The history-transcending immanent experience proves 
to be an effect of figuration. At the same time, the absence of sensory perception 
negatively reveals the privileged status accorded to vision as a sine qua non to our 
conceptual elaboration of reality. Tiresias speaks in the grip of an irresolvable 
antinomy. He tries to substitute empathetic immanence for sense perception. 
However, the figures of speech he employees throughout derive from the realm of 
the latter [can see ... / Perceived the scene ... J. These figures bar access to the 
transcendental field of unhistorical immanence. The movement from the literal 
perception to the transcendental empathetic immanence is an effect of rhetoric 
rather than a genuine leave-taking of the phenomenal. The thread connecting the 
two realms is the desire to empathise with the core of universal affliction, and 
naturally presupposes an underlying human essence non-susceptible to alterations 
effected by history. 
The depersonalised subject witnesses the perpetual disruption of the 
historical realm and its diffraction into fragmented clusters which, as written and 
historic plagiats,44 have turned absolutely literal, i.e., have been deprived of any 
symbolic or metaphorical potential. The experience he struggles to express defies 
all notions of historical origination seen either in terms of collective or personal 
44 On the plagiat see Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime, 155,215 fn. 15. 
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agency. The destruction of personal inflexions in the text voids the affirmation of 
c9nstants of experience and renders the protagonist's re-enactment of a putatively 
universal experience/affliction merely gestural. The notion of a homogeneous 
self-coalescent subject that would lend credit to the latter has been annulled. 
History in The Waste Land has been written off to concatenation of ruins 
that engulf the speaker(s) in a citational plethora. Far from emanating from the 
ancestral voice of tradition, the historical'debris haunts the narrators as literary 
echoes. The paradoxical nature of the pursuit of immutable historical essence 
gradually crystallises as a constitutively abortive articulation of history through 
the medium that guarantees the diffraction of essence and the deracination of its 
positive contents, i.e., figural language. The "historical" personages glide in and 
out in a state of citational permutation that renders any notion of distinct identity 
fallacious. In Ellmann's words: 
Moreover, the speaker cannot be identified with his creator, not 
because he has a different personality, like Prufrock, but because he 
has no stable identity at all. The disembodied "I" glides in and out of 
stolen texts, as if the speaking subject were merely the quotation of its 
antecedents. Indeed, this subject is the victim of a general collapse of 
boundaries.45 
The textual narrators modulate between a coherentist channelling of 
disparate experiential material into archaic underpinnings and a narcissistic 
interfusion of mortal and living figures within the zone of the self.46 Another 
45 Ellman, The Poetics of Impersonality, 92. 
46 See Lacan, "Function and field of speech and language," 90: "The obsessional subject 
drags into the cage of his narcissism the objects in which his question reverberates back and forth 
in the multiplied alibi of mortal figures and, subduing their heady acrobatics, addresses its 
ambiguous homage towards the box in which he himself has his seat, that of the master who 
cannot be seen or see himself. " 
255 
dimension is offered by Helen Gardner who relates the diffraction of the subject 
tq the dissolution of the city while emphasising' that "there are no characters in the 
strict sense, no persons. ,,47 She seems to have intuited, rather than grasped in a 
theoretically coherent way, the state wherein the narratival subjects succumb to 
mutual infiltration, a state of interpenetrability of identities. Simultaneously with 
this condition of identity transmigration, however, and in proportion to it, lies an 
obsessive attempt of the narratival subject to repel what he senses as the abject 
Other.48 This latter is exemplified by the crowd of the dead flowing over London 
Bridge, or the corpse buried in Stetson's garden;490r even by the female presences 
one of which, Philomela, has suffered the violence of rape, while another, the 
typist, exemplifies the banality of unreciprocated, tedious, and uninspired sexual 
intercourse. Philomela's rape has deprived her of speech, which translates the 
inscription of discourse within an economy of self-possession and sovereignty. 
This sub-sensical excitement with repellence, with the abject and uncanny, 
undergirds the poem's discursive acting out of what it targets as repulsive, in 
accordance with a ritualistic homeopathic rationale. 
The text has been smoothed out by most of the commentators above into a 
critique of the fragmentation of history and the subversion of the metaphysical 
47 Gardner, "The Dry Season: 'The Waste Land,'" 70. 
48 The "Other" in the sense of the space of intersubjectivity that any real or imaginary 
interlocutor opens up. My usage of the term partially overlaps with Lacan's Other. See Anica 
Lemaire, Jacques Lacan, trans. David Macey (London: Routledge, 1970), 157: ''The Other is 
[apart from language/the symbolic, the unconscious, and the third party witness invoked in 
analysis] the site of the intersubjectivity of patient and analyst, and hence the analytic dialogue. 
'The Other is the locus in which is constituted the I who speaks with him who hears' (Ecrits, 19)." 
49 See Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 3-4: "[T]he corpse, the most sickening of wastes, 
is a border that has encroached upon everything. It is no longer I who expel, 'I' is expelled. The 
border has become an object. How can I be without border? .... The corpse, seen without God and 
outside of science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject." The boundaries 
between life and death are indiscriminate in the poem and the corpse enhances the sense of 
permanent threat, of the imminent irruption of forces hostile to life. 
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deep structure underpinning the foundations of Western onto-theology. This 
appreciation slurs over the fact that in its iropological organisation the text 
disrupts what it laments as vanishing. In its "citational abyss"SO it dec~ntres not 
only any hypothetical modicum of organised subjectivity, ?ut also the ontological 
substratum prerequisite to its validation. In deploring absence, itrestitutes it as 
the instigator of asymptotic desire. The subject is gradually metamorphosed into 
linguistic surface upon which idioms and languages merge. In Harriet Davidson's 
formulation: 
"The Waste Land" enacts a loss of the other which is also a discovery of the 
insufficiency of the self (fear of death) and the entry into the linguistic world. 
The poem has a wish to return to a nonrelational and static state, a wish 
brought on by the fear of death and time which results from the initial 
separation from the other. In the poem, the other is simultaneously spurned 
as a symbol of the insufficiency of the self and yearned for as completing and 
annihilating the self. But the only positive conclusion can be an acceptance 
of the absence of the other in the self.Sl 
The disturbing absence of personae (the narrators do not cover up for the author or 
a central encompassing consciousness split up in distinct shapes), the 
impossibility of reconciling the various voices into an inclusive, controlling 
consciousness, translates the irreparable absence of essence at the core of 
experience and history that constitutes the true concern of the text. "These 
fragments I have shored against my ruins"s2 ambiguously points to either the 
inevitability. or deplorability of the narrator's condition. 
I wish to stress the self-undermining nature of the demand to resuscitate 
the voice of the dead literary ancestors and thus revive organic tradition. This 
50 Ellman, The Poetics of Impersonality, 95. 
51 Harriet Davidson, T. S. Eliot and Hermeneutics (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1985), 123. 
52 Eliot, "The Waste Land," 79. 
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demand subtly subtends the text, and is characteristically voiced in a melanchol~c 
'\ 
fashion. It is the effect of anxiety of influence as much as the loss of cognitive 
lineage that the modem experience enforces, ergo its pathetic character. From 
Dante and St Augustine to the Elizabethan dramatists, and from the Upanishads to 
Wagner and Baudelaire, the narrators masticate citational cultural cliches as 
reflections of the interlocking of differing aesthetic and experiential paradigms. 
~ 
All this is supposed to transpire on the basis of a putative co-sharing in essence. 
There is something disturbing in this need to affirm logocentrism in the mode of 
an oedipal entanglement with one's cultural ancestors. The reference to the 
Upanishads at the end, also, does not read like an exit from Eurocentrism, but 
signals the climax of a gradual sliding into primitive organicism.53 
It is telling that the last lines merge fragments that derive from 
incompatible historical and cultural paradigms. Dante, Gerard de Nerval, Thomas 
Kyd, a popular song, and the Upanishads are coerced into an uncanny co-
existence.54 It would be fallacious to claim that this melange succeeds in 
establishing any organic continuity or synchronicity of these cultural smithereens 
on the basis of a co-sharing in essence fundaments that subsists outside historical 
difference. It definitely succeeds in highlighting the desire for the resumption of 
differing cultural instances into an atemporal and ahistorical realm where 
language translates essence and experience is based on the cognitive grasp of 
53 See Ellman, "Eliot's Abjection," 195-6: "Here [in the last lines] at least the poem silences 
its western voice with eastern blessings. By striving towards a universal language, the poem is 
trying to recover the totalising spirit of imperialism from the savage scramble of First World War. 
But the text changes its exhausted English only for the jabber of miscegenated tongues, 
stammering its orisons in Babel." I do not think that exiting Eurocentrism has ever been the real 
issue behind this linguistic pot pourri, but even if it can be seen to be present, this exit would be 
more of a stifling amalgamation into a claustrophobic, regressive ancestral primordial realm. 
54 See the concluding lines 423-33, "The Waste Land," 79. 
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immutable invariants. It is symptomatic, however, that this trajectory speaks the 
language of affliction. Hurling historical frag~ents one against the other in order 
to lament the loss of experience while deploying a mythical sub-structure in order 
to affirm the simultaneity of experiential cores on the ~asis of a putative co-
participation in essence, amounts to turning a problematic of history into 
theology. The text is transparent to its own antinomies, however, and solicits a 
reading that can potentially do full justice to the entanglement of its axes. 
With respect to the self-defeating endeavour to use myth in order to ratchet 
up fragments of experience to an allegedly continuous culture and essence in 
history, I find Helen Gardner's views apposite: "There appears to be something in 
the Grail legend, as in Arthurian material generally, that resists the ordering of 
plot. The 'meanings' are always overflowing the narrative and overwhelming the 
design. ,,55 This "something" is the logic of the my theme. The system in which 
both the predicament (the sterilisation of experience) and the hypothetical solution 
(the atemporal and ahistorical affirmation of common essence and organismic 
coding of experience) are inscribed defies origination. The mythological structure 
sustaining the narrative is a diacritical, relational, and self-referential language. In 
Claude Levi-Strauss' words: 
55 
Themes can be split up ad infinitum .... Consequently the unity of the myth 
is never more than tendential and projective and cannot reflect a state or a 
particular moment of the myth. It is a phenomenon of the imagination 
resulting from the attempt at interpretation; and its function is to endow 
the myth with synthetic form and to prevent its disintegration into a 
confusion of opposites.56 
Gardner, "The Dry Season: 'The Waste Land' ," 69; emphasis added. 
56 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked, trans. John and Doreen Wightman (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1969, 14. 
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Conclusively, in The Waste Land the narratival subjects engage in verbal 
expression neither in order to subjugate a resisting reality exterior and anterior to 
them nor to give vent to a self-coherent cogito that awaits its potentiation in and 
through the verbal moment. The dialectic of self-enhancement and self-erasure 
has reached a climactic point wherein the logic of prescribing depersonalisation in 
order to affirm history as essentialist detour is put under trial. I argue that the text 
constitutes a tensional field wherein history and its correlative notions of 
experience are seen to be antagonised by the linguistic parameter that would 
supposedly appease the subject's loss of cognitive coherence through the 
consolation of communication. The polyvalence of the deployed languages and 
idioms ensures that interlocution can only dissimulate the alleged communication 
of co-shared cognitive frames while covering up their tangential nature. Recourse 
to the pagan/mythical dimension cannot be an adequate response to the waning of 
conceptual plenitude and its concomitant aggravation of historical contents. We 
are presented with a perpetual displacement of successive traumatic scenes onto 
phenomenally archetypal ones which, nevertheless, interweave in such a way that 
the expectation to detect a generating origin is frustrated. The primal scene is 
itself synthetic, intuited only through its ripple effects. It is discernible in the 
amalgamation of differing my themes that are moulded into a coherent whole only 
through the imposition of exegesis. 
The Waste Land belabours the disturbing hypothesis that nothing relates to 
anything else except as an act of discourse, except as an aleatory event potentiated 
in discourse, drawing upon and simulating the arbitrariness of language's self-
positing. The narratival subjects have undermined the outcome of their pursuit 
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through the homeopathic mode that determines it as perpetual recycling of 
contentless experience. The Waste Land coul~ be read as the belabouring of the 
metamorphosis of the literal and singular into the historical and aesthetic, as a 
critical comment on the metamorphosis of ontic lexis int? ontological logos and 
the conferral of totality upon the irreducibly self-positional and in-coherent. No 
wonder then that the desired fertility and conceptual abundance are not attained in 
the end. All one is left with is the sense:void formulaic repetition of fragments 
deriving from an alien language. The Eliotic subjects can only reiterate the non-
assimilability of their experiential fragments. Even non-consensual sex is 
absorbed within resignation, within total moral ambivalence. The body, the 
ultimate metaphor of organic community, has turned into a violated inorganic 
aggregate of limbs.57 This broken ensemble points to the fragmented 
understanding that hankers after the inhabiting of its concept. This inhabiting 
turns out to be impossible. 
'My feet are at Moorgate, and my heart 
Under my feet. After the event 
He wept. He promised "a new start." 
I made no comment. What should I resent? 
'On Margate Sands. 
I can connect 
Nothing with nothing.58 
57 See EHmann, "Eliot's Abjection," 186: "The victim, too, consents to degradation as if it 
were foredoomed .... 'Undone', the woman's body disintegrates into a synecdochic heap of knees, 
heart, feet, weirdly disorganized." 
58 "The Waste Land," 74. 
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The "Preludes": engaging the unthinkable 
Baudelaire and Eliot's work tries to assimilate an experience at the limits 
of the tolerable and the expressible. This experience, however, is internally seen 
to be pure fiction when approached outside the jurisdiction of discourse. The 
Baudelairean subjects' mythical past that is contrasted with their present dejection 
is a phantasm of a life. The arch-concept that would hypothetically organise the 
Eliotic subjects' aleatory fragments of experience into meaningful wholes is 
deferred ad infinitum (see especially The Waste Land). The poetry can only 
belabour this phantasmatic experience and its correlative fabricated concept 
through the deployment of aphoristic fragmentation and the relinquishment of 
cumulative effects. The relaxation of the syntacticlhypotactic manner ideally 
effective of the cognitive sequencing of the discursive kernels is symptomatic and 
indicates the disavowal of principles of summation. The Waste Land is an 
instance of the sacrifice of the instant gratification of conceptual plenitude for the 
sake of a truth that does not gloss over the certainty of non-transcendable death 
and dispersal of essence. 
The examined texts voice the hope for the recuperation on the level of 
style of what is lost on the level of history and experience. Their fragmented 
discursivity could be understood to have a cathartic effect. As Paul de Man has 
remarked: UBy stating the inevitability of fragmentation in a mode that is itself 
fragmented, one restores the aesthetic unity of manner and substance ... "s9 
However, this is not the case here. The hope for unity is subliminally negotiated, 
59 De Man, "Preface," in Rhetoric of Romanticism, ix. 
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but no dialectical progression and/or historical totalisation can ever be attained. 
'\ 
The desired recuperation of history and organicism through the deployment of 
fragmentary rituals and a homeopathic acting out which partakes of the dispersal 
it aims at negating, constitutes an attempt at mastery which obeys the logic of 
repetition-compulsion. The latter is always asymptotic vis-a-vis the traumatic 
referent it tries to absorb. The texts have critically anticipated and bracketed any 
attempt to affix them a historical index-' by problematising the very categories 
upon which such a periodisation must be conditional. 
A desired coalescence with the natural object, at the same time, nostalgia 
for the origin of the object, permeates Preludes III and IV. 
III 
You tossed a blanket from the bed, 
You lay upon your back, and waited; 
You dozed and watched the night revealing 
The thousand sordid images 
Of which your soul was constituted; 
They flickered against the ceiling. 
And when all the world came back 
And the light crept up between the shutters, 
And you heard the sparrows in the gutters, 
You had such a vision of the street 
As the street hardly understands; 
Sitting along the bed's edge, where 
You curled the papers from your hair, 
Or clasped the yellow soles of feet 
In the palms of both soiled hands. 
IV 
His soul stretched tight across the skies 
That fade behind a city block, 
Or trampled by insistent feet 
At four and five and six o'clock; 
And short square fingers stuffing pipes, 
And evening newspapers, and eyes 
Assured of certain certainties, 
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The conscience of a blackened street 
Impatient to assume the world. \ 
I am moved by fancies that are curled 
Around these images and cling: 
The notion of some infinitely gentle 
Infinitely suffering thing. 
Wipe your hand across your mouth, and laugh; 
The worlds revolve like ancient women 
Gathering fuel in vacant 10ts.6o 
As de Man rightly remarks, such nostalgia can only exist "when the 
transcendental presence is forgotten.,,61 The impossibility of delineating the 
referents' contours precisely points to a textually ingrained awareness of absence 
of empirically verifiable essentiality. This is an admission to which the poetic 
intention purports to be blind in order to exist as such at all. The Preludes 
exemplify the proleptic nature of a thought which perpetually projects the 
hypothesis of its possibility into an infinite future hoping to effect the recognition 
of the I by itself at the end of the course. The mechanism is one of 
anagnorisis/recognition of self by self.62 The frustrated crystallisation of the image 
(of the referent), a condition that characterises Eliot and Baudelaire's poetry to a 
considerable degree, and its fluid shaping, are due to the immanent inability of 
language to posit presence and essentialise the signified as something more than 
intended and morphic.63 What triggers off the anagnoristic praxis is the entropic 
resistance to self-erasure. Meaning-intention is thus sedimented in terms of a 





Eliot, Collected Poems, 24-25. 
De Man, "Intentional Structure of Image," in Rhetoric of Romanticism, 6. 
See de Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," 770. 
See de Man, "The Intentional Structure of Image," 6. 
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a field where Er-innerung (as hypothetical recollection of essential core~ of 
"' .I 
experience) and Gediichtnis (asperformative memory, devoid of sense and 
essence) interfuse in a condition of unappeasable tension.64 An allegedly organic 
remembrance competes with one that voids the cognitive content of memories in 
the very act of mnemonic performance. What in other words is engaged in 
"Prelude IV," in the assurance of "certain certainties" and "The thousand sordid 
~ 
images I of which your soul was constituted," is the impossibility of securing the 
ownership of experience, and the coalescence of subject and cognitive predicate. 
Subjectivity in this case is a purely projective enterprise. Its predicates are 
projected onto natural givens without however the closure of personal attributes 
and encompassing reality-constants being fulfilled ["The thousand sordid images I 
Of which your soul was constituted; I They flickered against the ceiling"]. At 
times the text reads as if it negotiates the enmeshment of consciousness in its 
surrounding world, whereas at others it feels as if one is witnessing the unsettling 
projection of personological attributes onto an incorporeal insubstantial reality 
frame that fails to respond dialectically and thus stabilise consciousness. The 
impossibility of integrating experience into thought underlies the text as a 
subliminal constant. 
"Prelude IV," but also Eliot's poetry in general, encodes the impossibility 
of attaining to an unmediated vision. The imagery accrues to an uncanny interplay 
of concreteness and pictorial vagueness that puts any grasp of transcendental 
64 See de Man, "Sign and Symbol in Hegel's Aesthetics," 770. 
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organising principle in inverted commas.65 The imagery creates a semantic 
"\ 
unresolve that cannot be contained within the boundaries of exegetic 
understanding. Subsequently, the Prelude in question works through the de-
concretisation of the referential matrix, its de-particularisation to the point where 
it becomes completely void of essence. This condition, however; far from signals 
the unhampered appropriation of reality to consciousness. It is not simply the 
ontological priority of the intended entity or idea that is interrogated here, but the 
very possibility of cognition-bound reference and the propositional logic 
sustaining it. In "Prelude IV" at stake in the relation between "these images" and 
an "infinitely suffering thing" is neither a symbolic transposition of contents nor a 
sublimation effect. The text enciphers the tension underwriting the symbiosis of 
image and concept or, rather, the illusional character of an operation which 
consists in reinscribing a literal and singular event within the fulcrum of 
conceptual summation. In moving from the emotive to the abstract dimension in 
the examined extract the movement leading to signification and ideality is brought 
to the fore. The transition from the figural/imagistic to the conceptual/infinite is 
significant as it signals the identification of thing-cum-notionlimage as the natural 
ally of ideality. It is thus the transference from the figural to the ideal that is 
mediated by the interpolation of the emotive dimension ["I am moved by fancies 
65 The" incorporeality of several of Eliot's images ("His soul stretched tight across the 
skies"), combined with their disturbing proximity to typical urban modalities of fear and repulsion 
that are more concrete brings to mind what Foucault writes apropos of Deleuze's struggle with a 
philosophy of surfaces and phantasmatic scenes. As is the case with Eliot, the images are never 
primarily, or exclusively, symptomatological. They inseminate the emergence of a dialectic 
between the realms of the amorphous and the schematic with unsettling implicatio·ns. See 
Foucault, ''Theatrum Philosophicum," in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 169: "We must 
articulate a philosophy of the phantasm that cannot be reduced to a primordial fact through the 
intermediary of perception or an image ... in short, ... what Deleuze would perhaps not allow us to 
call its 'incorporeal materiality.' It is useless to seek a more substantial truth behind the 
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... "]. However, this transferential gesture never stabilises a negativity to be 
\ 
-ideally shared by the semantically intended concept and the "real" ~eferent. As 
Paul de Man has remarked in the context of the distinction between rhetoric and 
symbol in Kant, "in each case, the resulting undecidability is due to the 
asymmetry of the binary model that opposes the figural to the proper meaning of 
the figure.,,66 The figure is never appropriated to its proper meaning non-
residually. 
phantasm, a truth to which it points as a rather confused sign (thus, the futility of 
'symptomatologizing')" (emphasis added). 
66 Paul de Man, ''The Epistemology of Metaphor," in S. Sacks ed., On Metaphor (Chicago: 




Scepticism towards reducing (poetic) discourse to a vehicle of. cognition is 
not a sign of rarefaction of thought but the indication, however oblique, of the 
emancipation of language from content67 and the resistance to construing it in 
terms of "an incarnation of thought.,,68 The fact that the negative recognition of 
finitude occurs within the interstices of the ontic Iexis does not constitute a 
contradiction in terms or an antinomy. My aim has not been to affirm the absolute 
extraneity of meaning to language, or prove that the two are in a state of 
irreparable mutual exclusiveness. The reality that I believe the poetry controverts 
concerns the alleged mutual contingency of cognition and reference on the basis 
of a solid grasp of immutable reality essences upon which they both draw and 
legitimate their bond. Baudelaire and Eliot's poetry problematises the passage 
from perception to cognition, from reference to cognition, from ontic lexis to 
ontological logos. This way, it does not simply showcase the encroachment of 
language upon the cementing of cognition, this latter being an invariant behind 
most realistic linguistics and pragmatic theories of communication anyway. The 
sinister undercurrents of the texts emanate from the admission of an undercurrent 
of incomprehensibility ingrained within reason. The realisation that the subject 
does not "own" his/her experience but must re-elaborate it ad infinitum in the 
interest of ,self-preservation problematises any notion of historical understanding 
that presupposes invariants of historical reality and constants of human 
consciousness. Eliot's essays, however, instantiate a typical reaction to th~ poetic 
insights. I have tried to clarify the subsensical layer of essentialism within his 
67 
68 
See Foucault, The Order of Things, 384. 
De Man, "Autobiography as De-Facement," in Rhetoric of Romanticism, 79. 
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poetic texts as much as their palinodic confrontation of it both at the level of form 
\ 
- and theme. 
The poetry does not come up with a panache proposition, nor does it 
address the dissolution of collective codings of reality ,i"s if it were a catastrophe. 
I have argued that the melancholia that Baudelaire's texts give off does not 
indicate mourning over the collapse of experience. The sadness permeating this 
poetry is one over the cognitive barrenness left behind by the waning of reality's 
experiencability and the asymmetrical rapport of social forces within his 
contemporary historical conjuncture. Baudelaire's double resistance towards both 
aestheticism and historicism has an euphoric and liberating aspect about it that has 
been hushed up. His work neither celebrates transgression as a means prerequisite 
to re-establishing a new order, nor capitulates to the political and ethical 
hegemony. This stance is not wilful succumbing to social reification but the basis 
for a futural renegotiation of human praxis in non-essentialist terms. 
Paul de Man has criticised, in "Shelley Disfigured," a logic that aims at 
extending the "instantaneousness of the act of [linguistic self-] positing over a 
series of transformations" through the imposition of an organicist and linear-
temporal axis. But at the same time, "the initial violence of position can only be 
half-erased, since the erasure is accompanied by a device of language that never 
ceases to partake of the very violence against which it is directed.,,69 The self-
undermining nature of this imposition allows insight into the aporias of 
signification and performance. What I consider the examined poetry to r~alise is 
an acting out: "language posits and language means but language cannot posit 
69 De Man, Shelley Disfigured," 118-9. 
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meaning.,,7o I believe this inability of language to posit meaning in absolute terms 
'\ 
- to be the true theme of the texts. It has assumed various allegorical forms in 
Baudelaire, has been geared to the terrain of ethical conflict and sexual frustration, 
and always in the context of a fluid and dispersed subjectivity. It has been 
endowed a mythical form in Eliot and then the false consolation of transcendence, 
and always as the proleptic and ultimately abortive positing of a conceptual 
stability that cannot be fully inhabited. 
Conclusively, Eliot's poetry addresses historical grounding not as an object 
of stable cognition but as a series of re-investments of kernels obeying language's 
logic of the recurrence of pure anteriority, the economy of desire and asymptotic 
memory. One cannot tease out the historico-temporal dimension in terms of 
indivisible atoms of essence lining up into the present unity of time and history. 
The inner-poetic realisation of experiential disintegration does not produce a 
larger conceptual framework accruing upon an awareness to the second degree. 
The allegorical gaze that discerns the historical character of experiential debris, 
just as in Baudelaire, binds the fragments of an ever-receding full life into serial 
concatenations of experiences that cannot accrue mutually. No "days of 
recollection,,71 transpire in order to compel the collective integration of one's 
experiences. The situation, however, is not one whose potential should be defined 
in existential or afflictive terms. 
Baudelaire's poetry elaborates the assumption that performative memory 
fabricates its own referents. It imbues them with a pseudo-genetic potential, with 
a sense of lost plenitude of contents, and ultimately it produces the sense of gUilt 
70 
71 
De Man, "Shelley Disfigured," 117. 
Benjamin, Baudelaire, 139. 
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and suffering whose offspring it is supposed to be. Revisionist memory ensures 
.\ 
- that the its referents will never be endowed with cognitive afflatus and historical 




Summer surprised us, coming over the Starnbergersee 
With a shower of rain; we stopped in the colonnade, 
And when we were children, staying at the arch-duke's, 
My cousin's, he took me on a sled, 
And I was frightened. He said, Marie, 
Marie, hold on tight. And down we went. 
'You gave me Hyacinths first a year ago; 
'They called me the hyacinth girl.' 
Yet when we came back, late, from the hyacinth garden, 
Your arms full, and your hair wet, I could not 
Speak, and my eyes failed, I was neither 
Living nor dead, and I knew nothing, 
Looking into the heart of light, the silence. 
These fragments I have shored against my ruins 
Why then lIe fit you. Hieronymo's mad againe. 
Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata. 
Shantih shantih shantih72 
the same condition of unresolved tension between memories that do not illuminate 
one another is encountered. The temptation to resume experience under an over-
arching historical horizon is not given in to. Eliot and Baudelaire's poetry resists 
its own totalising impulses. Their counter-memories do not restore a previous life 
and do not guarantee the comprehensibility of a future one. Eliot's "sudden 
72 
"The Waste Land," in Collected Poems, 63, 64, 79 respectively. 
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illumination,,73 and the moment of shock and surprise, even of terror, "which can 
,\ 
- never be forgotten, but which is never repeated integrally,,,74point to the traumatic 
impact of modem experience that is guaranteed by the collapse of over-arching 
--
explanatory frameworks. I have argued that the particular inflections that this 
collapse assumes is a matter of historical conjuncture. However, the modem 
exacerbation of testimonial unaccount~bility has had a retroactive destructive 
effect on any nostalgic affirmation of a past condition of sense plenitude. The 
semiotic and diacritical character of language and memory preclude any such 
condition and necessitate the perpetual elaboration of the aesthetic, moral, and 
political space that they liberate in the form of a threatening emptiness. Baudelaire 
and Benjamin's mnemonic and/or dialectical images flaring up at moments of 
crisis encode the inherent forgetting at the heart of historical experience that 
makes it recognisable as experience only later on.75 They try to tum the re-
enactment of trauma into a constructive moment of awareness of something once 
fully owned and subsequently lost that will redress the historical balance. 
Baudelaire's poetry, however, has revealed the fragility of experience and of the 
mnemonic operation aiming at its inhabiting. Eliot's poetic work, pace his literary 
criticism, has forcibly revealed that the site of history and subjectivity is the site 
of trauma, the site opened up by the constitutive non-assimilability of human 
experience within vaulting cognitive frameworks. It shows that history marks a 
traumatic grid of space and time that can only be met after the event of its 
73 See Eliot, "Four Quartets," 208. 
74 Eliot, "Dante," 216. 
75 See Cathy Caruth, "Trauma and Experience: Introduction," in Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory, ed., Cathy Caruth (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 8: 
"For history to be a history of trauma means that it is referential precisely to the extent that it is not 
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occurrence, after the core wherein it is supposed to fold in upon itself either as 
transcendent essence or as referent of experience has turned out to be 
phantasmatic. The homeopathic confrontation of what is felt to be an unbearable 
dispersal of essence and subjectivity with resorting to a spurious essentialist and 
integratist simultaneous historical order spells out its desperate nature in the form 
of a repetition-compulsion that never fills up the void of testimony. Both poets' 
works have shown themselves to be irretrievably marked by the trauma they 
addressed.76 Trauma cannot but disseminate its sense-depleting ripple effects in 
the deceptive mode of an understanding that is blind to its own enabling 
conditions. Benjamin's "crystal of the total event,,77 encases no organising core of 
experience in its absolute diaphaneity, the same way Baudelaire's memories 
narrate their inability to coincide with their referents. The fragile subject that is 
the carrier of these memories is forced to perpetually re-negotiate the terms of the 
contract that binds him to history in an attempt to master the randomness of the 
events that hit him as trauma. The palimpsestic inscription of mnemonic and 
experiential traits impels one to embrace the difference internal to experience and 
temporality and defines Baudelaire's notion of nouveaute. In "The Painter of 
Modem Life," openness to one's own historical era wins over the attachment to 
the canons of the past.78 This resumes the essence of modernity for Baudelaire. 
The challenge that his poetry mandates, and to which an adequate response is still 
fully perceived as it occurs; ... a history can be grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its 
occurrence. " 
76 See Kevin Newmark, "Traumatic Poetry: Charles Baudelaire and the Shock of Laughter," 
in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 254. 
77 See Benjamin, "Konvolut N: On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress," 461: 
"That is, to assemble large-scale constructions out of the smallest and most precisely cut 
components: Indeed, to discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the crystal of the 
total event." 
78 See ''The Painter of Modern Life," 402-6. 
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called for, is to move beyond the "restoration of mortality by autobiography,;79and 
\ 
directly confront the "paranoid fear that characterizes the hermeneutics and the 
pedagogy of lyric poetry."so Baudelaire ends "Le Voyage" with a direct 
--
confrontation of death and the incentive to face experience not as the return of the 
same, the known, the cognitively preempted, but as the radically new. The non-
assimilation of experience within vaultillg cognitive and moral frameworks is thus 
embraced: "Au fond de l'Inconnu pour trouver du nouveau! [In the depths of the 
Unknown in order to find the new!]" (OC I: 134). I have emphasised his 
destructive discursive potential that blasts out historical continua without 
affirming either extra-historical moorings in essence or a notion of sterilised 
aesthetics cut off from historical consciousness. The redemptive aspect of his 
work may have been overwhelmed by the destructive impact of his language, but 
it is subtly there and intermingles with the latter's inexhaustible challenge to de-
sublimate, and ultimately embrace, aleatoriness, finitude and loss of essence. 
79 
80 
See De Man, "Autobiography as De-facement," 81. 
De Man, "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric," 259. 
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